Com. v. Crompton

• Decision Date: 21 August 1996
• Citation: 682 A.2d 286,545 Pa. 586
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. James CROMPTON, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 286

682 A.2d 286

545 Pa. 586

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. James CROMPTON, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Jan. 22, 1996.

Decided Aug. 21, 1996.

[545 Pa. 589] Robert M. Rosenblum, Stroudsberg, for James Crompton.

Curtis J. Rogers, James P. Gregor, Stroudsberg, for Commonwealth,

Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO and NEWMAN, JJ.

OPINION

NEWMAN, Justice.

James Crompton (Crompton) appeals from an Order of the Superior Court affirming his conviction for possession of marijuana ¹ and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. ² We reverse.

Our analysis of the question before us is twofold; whether the police complied with the knock and announce rule, and if they did not, whether the evidence seized during the search should be suppressed.

On August 26, 1992, Pennsylvania State Troopers arrived at Crompton's home to execute a search warrant. The facts presented at trial establish that Crompton's front door was open, leaving only an unlocked screen door between the troopers and the one visible occupant, Richard Homar. Crompton, although not visible to the troopers, was in the living room with Homar. The troopers rang the doorbell, announced their presence, opened the screen door and entered the front hall of Crompton's home. After entering, the troopers found four marijuana cigarettes on a coffee table in the living room and a silver object containing marijuana on the floor. The troopers also discovered five and one-half pounds of marijuana, several water bongs, a pipe, plastic bags and a triple beam scale. Immediately, the troopers arrested Crompton, charging him with violating the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. ³ The case went to trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County (trial court).

The trial court denied Crompton's Omnibus Pre-trial Motion seeking to suppress the evidence obtained during the search. Following a bench trial, Crompton was convicted of possession of marijuana and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. Crompton filed post-trial motions asserting that the search of his home violated the "knock and announce rule" mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 2007. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the police lawfully entered Crompton's home because evidence was going to be destroyed and no occupant responded to their announcement.

On appeal, the Superior Court disagreed and held that the police violated the knock and announce rule. However, the Superior Court refused to suppress the seized evidence, holding the troopers sufficiently respected Crompton's privacy interests during the search and, therefore, suppression was unwarranted. We agree with the Superior Court's conclusion that the police violated the knock and announce rule, but hold that the seized evidence must be suppressed.

The standard of review of an appeal from a suppression ruling is limited to determining whether the findings of fact are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. Commonwealth v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 403, 598 A.2d 539 (1991).

The purpose of the knock and announce rule is to prevent violence and physical injury to the police and occupants, to protect an occupant's privacy expectation against the unauthorized entry of unknown persons, and to prevent property damage resulting from forced entry during the execution of a search warrant. Commonwealth v. McDonnell, 512 Pa. 172, 516 A.2d 329 (1986). Pa.R.Crim.P. 2007 sets forth the manner in which a police officer may enter a premises to execute a search warrant:

RULE 2007. MANNER OF ENTRY INTO PREMISES

(a) A law enforcement officer executing a search warrant shall, before entry, give, or make reasonable effort to give notice of his identity, authority and purpose to any occupant of the premises specified in the warrant, unless exigent circumstances require his immediate forcible entry.

(b) Such officer shall await a response for a reasonable period of time after his announcement of identity, authority and purpose, unless exigent circumstances require his immediate forcible entry.

(c) If the officer is not admitted after such reasonable period, he may forcibly enter the premises and may use as much physical force to effect entry therein as is necessary to execute the search.

Consequently, even with a search warrant, police officers must knock, announce their identity and purpose and then wait a reasonable amount of time for the occupants to respond before entering any private premises. ⁴

In Commonwealth v. Means, 531 Pa. 504, 614 A.2d 220 (1992), this Court identified the following four circumstances in which police may enter without complying with the knock and announce rule:

1. the occupants remain silent after repeated knocking and announcing;

2. the police are virtually certain that the occupants of the premises already know their purpose;

3. the police have reason to believe that an announcement prior to entry would imperil their safety; and

4. the police have reason to believe that evidence is about to be destroyed.

Commonwealth v. Means, 531 Pa. at 508, 614 A.2d at 222-223.

During a suppression hearing, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving that the police seized evidence in a way that did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. Pa.R.Crim.P. 323(h); Commonwealth v. Silo, 480 Pa. 15, 389 A.2d 62 (1978). The Commonwealth can satisfy its burden by establishing either that the police complied with the knock and announce rule or that the circumstances satisfied an exception.

Regarding the instant matter, the Commonwealth sought to establish that the police entered Crompton's home under an exception to the knock and announce rule. ⁵ At the September 1, 1992 preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth presented only one witness, a trooper who executed the search warrant. At trial on March 11, 1993, the Commonwealth introduced a transcript of the trooper's preliminary hearing testimony. The Commonwealth did not produce any additional testimony to describe the events surrounding the execution of the search warrant.

The trooper provided contradictory accounts of his entry into Crompton's home. First, on direct examination, the trooper testified that he could see Homar sitting inside the house through the screen door, and Homar did not move until after the trooper entered the hallway. Similarly, on cross-examination, the trooper repeated that he only entered the premises after the occupants did not move in response to the doorbell. This testimony supports the Commonwealth's theory that the circumstances fall within the first exception to the knock and announce rule, permitting police entry if occupants remain silent after repeated knocking and announcing.

However, later during cross-examination, the trooper gave a different description of Homar's conduct in response to the doorbell. The trooper testified that Homar moved from the sofa toward the kitchen after the doorbell rang. The trooper explained that the officers entered Crompton's home because Homar was moving away from them. ⁶ These facts support the fourth exception to the knock and announce rule, which permits police entry based on a reasonable belief that evidence is about to be destroyed. ⁷

Thus, our review of the trooper's testimony reveals that he testified that Homar did not react, which is consistent with the first exception, and then testified that Homar fled, which is consistent with the fourth exception. Homar, however, could not have simultaneously remained seated and fled.

The law in Pennsylvania is well settled that "when a party on whom the burden of proof rests, in either a civil or criminal case, offers evidence consistent with two opposing propositions, he proves neither." Commonwealth v. Woong Knee New, 354 Pa. 188, 221, 47 A.2d 450, 468 (1946); See Commonwealth v. Trudell, 371 Pa.Super. 353, 538 A.2d 53 (1988).

The trooper's versions of his entry are mutually exclusive. Either no one responded to the doorbell, so the trooper entered the hallway and saw Homar get up from the sofa, or the trooper saw Homar move to the kitchen from his vantage point outside the house and then entered to prevent Homar from destroying evidence. The Commonwealth produced no testimony to explain this inconsistency. The trial court held the testimony established both the first and the fourth exception to the knock and announce rule. The Superior Court held that the Commonwealth,...