Com. v. Daley
| Decision Date | 12 November 1996 |
| Citation | 423 Mass. 747,672 N.E.2d 101 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Wayne DALEY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
David P. Hoose, Springfield, for defendant.
Marcia B. Julian, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth.
Before WILKINS, C.J., and ABRAMS, LYNCH, GREANEY and FRIED, JJ.
The defendant, Wayne Daley, appeals from his conviction of trafficking in cocaine in excess of twenty-eight grams. 1 On appeal, the defendant asserts the judge erred in denying (1) his motion to suppress; and (2) his motion for a required finding of not guilty. We allowed the defendant's application for direct appellate review. We affirm.
Facts. The relevant facts are as follows. In February, 1993, two Springfield police officers were working a uniformed patrol evening shift in the Winchester Square district of Springfield. At approximately 5 P.M., while driving a marked cruiser along Albermarle Street, one of the officers noticed that a vehicle in front of him, a 1985 gray Nissan, failed to stop for a stop sign. The officers activated the cruiser's lights and siren, and the defendant pulled his vehicle over to the side of Wilbraham Road, a busy main road. The defendant was the driver and sole occupant of the Nissan. One officer asked the defendant for his license and registration, and the defendant produced an expired, ten month old application for a Connecticut motor vehicle registration. The officer ran a computer inquiry which revealed that the defendant's Connecticut registration plate number belonged to a 1986 Audi.
The officer informed the defendant that his unregistered Nissan would have to be towed from the public way. The officer called for a tow truck and cited the defendant for driving an unregistered motor vehicle, concealing the identity of a motor vehicle, and failing to come to a stop at a stop sign. While waiting for the tow truck to arrive, the defendant was asked to get out of the Nissan so that the officer could conduct an inventory search of the vehicle. The defendant complied, and on opening the vehicle's door, the officer immediately saw a glassine bag containing a cocaine-like substance on the floor directly in front of the driver's seat. 2 The officer arrested the defendant. The defendant denied that the drugs were his. 3
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the officer said that, under Springfield's written inventory policy, he was required to search any vehicle towed by the Springfield police department. Where, however, he stops a driver for a traffic violation and the driver has the towing fee available, the officer said that he may agree to the vehicle's being towed to a reasonable location at the driver's request, rather than to the city-contracted tow company. The officer said that, even when a vehicle is towed to an alternative location, he still must conduct an inventory search as mandated by the written policy of the police department.
At the motion hearing and at trial, the defendant said that he ran a used automobile business, but that he lacked a dealer's license and could not get dealer plates for his vehicles because he did not have a lot. Consequently, he had been stopped and cited by police many times for driving an unregistered and uninsured vehicle with attached plates. The defendant stated that he was quite familiar with the routine when being stopped for an unregistered vehicle and that he knew his vehicle would be searched and towed. The defendant claimed that he requested that his vehicle be towed to his home and that the officer agreed to this arrangement.
1. Motion to suppress. The defendant contends that the judge erred in denying his motion to suppress the cocaine because the drugs were discovered pursuant to an unreasonable inventory search in violation of the defendant's rights under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. His argument focuses on the justification for conducting an inventory search in these circumstances. Specifically, the defendant argues that, where the driver is not under arrest and has the funds to pay the tow truck operator to transport the vehicle to a private location, the police have no legal basis for impounding and conducting an inventory search of the vehicle.
"[T]he propriety of the impoundment of the vehicle is a threshold issue in determining the lawfulness of the inventory search." Commonwealth v. Garcia, 409 Mass. 675, 678, 569 N.E.2d 385 (1991). Commonwealth v. Dunn, 34 Mass.App.Ct. 702, 703, 615 N.E.2d 597 (1993). While we have imposed a requirement of standardized written guidelines as to the conduct of an inventory search itself, see Commonwealth v. Bishop, 402 Mass. 449, 451, 523 N.E.2d 779 (1988), we have not determined whether the police must have written guidelines delineating the circumstances in which an inventory search may be undertaken. See Commonwealth v. Caceres, 413 Mass. 749, 751, 604 N.E.2d 677 (1992). Similarly, we have not addressed whether the State Constitution imposes an obligation on the police to consider practical alternatives to impoundment before an inventory search can be reasonable. 4 See id. at 753, 604 N.E.2d 677. We have said, however, that where there is no practical available alternative, removal of a vehicle from a public roadway and an inventory search of it are constitutional. Id. at 751, 753, 604 N.E.2d 677. We conclude that the present case falls squarely within those circumstances.
The impoundment of a vehicle for noninvestigatory reasons is generally justified if supported by public safety concerns or by the danger of theft or vandalism to a vehicle left unattended. Dunn, supra at 703, 615 N.E.2d 597. See Caceres, supra at 750-753, 604 N.E.2d 677. Here, the fact that the defendant was not under arrest is irrelevant to the propriety of the impoundment because the vehicle at issue was unregistered, uninsured, and had attached plates belonging to another vehicle. See G.L. c. 90, §§ 6, 9, and 34J (1994 ed.). Thus, the officers could not permit the continued operation of this illegal vehicle on the public roadways, nor could they leave the vehicle unattended on the shoulder of a busy main road. See Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 412 Mass. 745, 746-747, 748 n. 4, 592 N.E.2d 1309 (1992). Thus, there was no practical available alternative to impounding and inventorying the vehicle.
The defendant further argues that the inventory search was illegal because he had the means to pay the tow truck operator to transport the vehicle to his home rather than to the city-contracted tow company. 5 The interests protected by an inventory search are what give rise to the officer's obligation to search an impounded vehicle, regardless of its ultimate destination when towed. "We have recognized three separate interests which are protected by permitting police to conduct warrantless inventory searches: the protection of the vehicle and its contents; the protection of the police and the tow company from false charges; and the protection of the public from dangerous items which might be in the vehicle." Garcia, supra at 682, 569 N.E.2d 385. 6
The officer said that he had the discretion to authorize towage to a location other than to the city-contracted tow company but that the police department's written policy still compelled him to conduct an inventory search to protect the department from claims made concerning the contents of the vehicle. Indeed, the written inventory policy of the Springfield police department provides that "[w]henever a motor vehicle is ordered towed by a department member, that member shall assume the responsibility for inventorying and safeguarding the contents of the vehicle." Under the written policy, when it is the police who cause the compulsory towage of an impounded vehicle, the fact that the vehicle is to be towed to a location of the defendant's choice has no bearing on the propriety of the search. As written, the policy gives the officer no discretion whether there should be an inventory search. Thus, this case does not present any question "of police...
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