Com. v. Dellamano
Decision Date | 11 October 1984 |
Citation | 469 N.E.2d 1254,393 Mass. 132 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. William M. DELLAMANO. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Robert I. Warner, Longmeadow, for defendant.
Robert S. Sinsheimer, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Com.
Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and LIACOS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.
The defendant was indicted for larceny or receiving a stolen motor vehicle, see G.L. c. 266, § 28(a ), and for defacing a motor vehicle identification number, see G.L. c. 266, § 139. 1 The indictment on which this appeal focuses was returned by the grand jury under a statute criminalizing the conduct of "[w]hoever steals, buys, receives, possesses, conceals, or obtains control of a motor vehicle ... knowing or having reason to know the same to have been stolen ...." G.L. c. 266, § 28(a ), St.1980, c. 463, § 4. The indictment paralleled the statutory language, differing only in that it charged the defendant with "knowing or having good reason to know the same to have been stolen" (emphasis supplied).
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss this indictment because it permitted conviction of a felony and a possible ten-year maximum sentence to State prison without requiring criminal intent. At the hearing on the motion the Commonwealth's position as paraphrased by the judge was that the words "having good reason to know" did "no more than point out that the Commonwealth can, by circumstantial evidence ... bear its burden beyond a reasonable doubt as to what this defendant actually knew." The judge agreed with the Commonwealth and ruled that he would instruct the jurors that the Commonwealth had to prove actual knowledge. 2 The defendant was convicted. He appealed to the Appeals Court alleging that the judge erred in denying his motion and acted improperly in charging actual knowledge without the grand jury's first making the determination that he had actual knowledge. See Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray 329, 344 (1857); Commonwealth v. Holley, 3 Gray 458 (1855).
The Appeals Court concluded that the judge acted properly in instructing the jurors, that the Commonwealth had to prove actual knowledge, and that the amendment of the indictment did not broaden the charges but merely "restricted the Commonwealth in its proof, to the advantage of the defendant." See Commonwealth v. Dellamano, 17 Mass.App. 156, 159, 456 N.E.2d 481 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v. DiStasio, 294 Mass. 273, 278, 1 N.E.2d 189 (1936), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 683, 58 S.Ct. 50, 82 L.Ed. 527 (1937). We granted the defendant's request for further appellate review. We affirm because the record reveals that the defendant was convicted of larceny, 3 and therefore the two issues raised by the defendant are irrelevant to the validity of his convictions.
The indictment charged the defendant with either stealing the motor vehicle or receiving it, knowing or having good reason to know it was a stolen motor vehicle. The two crimes are distinct. "[I]n law the guilty receiver of stolen goods cannot himself be the thief; nor can the thief be guilty of a crime of receiving stolen goods which he himself had stolen." Commonwealth v. Haskins, 128 Mass. 60, 61 (1880). See Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551, 81 S.Ct. 728, 5 L.Ed.2d 773 (1961); Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199, 1223 (D.C.Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1120, 89 S.Ct. 999, 22 L.Ed.2d 125 (1969). 4
In a separate indictment, the defendant was charged with altering a motor vehicle identification number in violation of G.L. c. 266, § 139(a ). With respect to that indictment, the judge charged the jury: 5 The jury returned verdicts of guilty on both indictments. Thus, the jury determined that the defendant was guilty of larceny. 6
"[T]he law presumes, in the case of a general verdict, that the jury have understood and conformed to the directions of the judge in matters of law ...." Commonwealth v. Anthes, 5 Gray 185, 200 (1855). The inescapable conclusion from the record is that the defendant was convicted of larceny, not receiving stolen goods. 7 Because the defendant was convicted of larceny, we need not reach his argument that the judge improperly amended the indictment.
Because there is confusion as to the interpretation of G.L. c. 266, § 28(a ), St.1980, c. 463, § 4, we briefly express our views. Wellesley College v. Attorney Gen., 313 Mass. 722, 731, 49 N.E.2d 220 (1943). We agree with the position the Commonwealth took below, namely, that the 1980 amendment of G.L. c. 266, § 28(a ), merely codified our prior decisional law which permits the trier of fact to infer knowledge from circumstantial evidence. We have held that where Commonwealth v. Holiday, 349 Mass. 126, 128, 206 N.E.2d 691 (1965). See Commonwealth v. Buckley, 354 Mass. 508, 511-513, 238 N.E.2d 335 (1968).
On appeal, the Commonwealth asserts that actual knowledge is no longer required for conviction of receiving stolen goods and that a person may be convicted if he or she acts recklessly in acquiring stolen property. We do not agree. Recklessness as a standard of criminality is generally reserved for conduct that creates an unacceptable risk of severe harm to others. Recklessness may describe subjective culpability: "If the grave danger was in fact realized by the defendant, his subsequent voluntary act or omission which caused the harm amounts to wanton or reckless conduct, no matter whether the ordinary man would have realized the gravity of the danger or not." Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 398, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944). However, a recklessness standard also criminalizes conduct not subjectively culpable: Id. at 398-399, 55 N.E.2d 902.
Statutes criminalizing the receipt of stolen goods do not proscribe objectively dangerous conduct, but are directed at eliminating "a market for stolen goods which the purchaser believes to have probably been stolen." United States v. Werner, 160 F.2d 438, 442 (2d Cir.1947) (L. Hand, J.). It makes little sense to construe the statute before us as criminalizing conduct, such as purchasing goods, that is innocuous in the absence of guilty knowledge. "[C]ircumstances which would create a strong suspicion in the mind of one man might have little significance for another, and one is not to be convicted of a crime because he is of a less suspicious nature than the ordinary man, and where, therefore, he may have acted in entire good faith in the face of conditions which might have put another upon his guard." Peterson v. United States, 213 F. 920, 922-923 (9th Cir.1914).
We have recognized this principle in construing G.L. c. 266, § 60, the general statute applicable in cases involving the receipt of stolen goods. Commonwealth v. Boris, 317 Mass. 309, 315, 58 N.E.2d 8 (1944).
The requirement that a defendant have guilty knowledge of the stolen status of acquired goods, does not mean, however, that direct evidence of actual knowledge is necessary. United States v. Werner, supra at 441 (L. Hand, J.). For this reason, ...
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