Com. v. Diaz

• Decision Date: 31 January 2007
• Citation: 448 Mass. 286,860 N.E.2d 665
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Juan DIAZ.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

860 N.E.2d 665

448 Mass. 286

COMMONWEALTH v. Juan DIAZ.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

Argued November 10, 2006.

Decided January 31, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Greg T. Schubert for the defendant.

Marcia B. Julian, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, SPINA, SOSMAN, & CORDY, JJ.

SOSMAN, J.

The defendant, Juan Diaz, was convicted of murder in the first degree (on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty) in connection with the shooting death of the victim, Joel Martinez.¹ On appeal, the defendant claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. He also asks this court to exercise its power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, to reverse the conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction of murder in the first degree, and decline to grant relief pursuant to G.L. c. 278, § 33E.

1. Background. We summarize the facts the jury could have found, reserving other facts for discussion in conjunction with specific issues raised. On the afternoon of July 3, 2003, the victim waved $1,000 at the defendant and Nelson Aponte, the defendant's friend, as they passed each other walking down Orchard Street in Springfield. Later that night, the victim was sitting in front of 39 Orchard Street, the home of two of his good friends, Hector and Emilio Deida. The victim had recently purchased a new vehicle, and Emilio was washing it for him in the driveway next to the house. Sometime after midnight, the defendant called over from the parking lot behind the house and told the victim to join him. The victim left the Deidas' house and met up with the defendant in the parking lot between Orchard and Washburn Streets. Once there, the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and told him to take out his wallet and put it on the ground. A neighborhood resident, Roel Burgos, was passing through the parking lot just as the victim was ordered to put his wallet on the ground. The defendant told Burgos to go away. Burgos complied.

After Burgos left the parking lot, Nelson Aponte, another neighborhood resident, passed through the same lot. The defendant pointed a gun at Aponte and ordered him to get the victim's car and bring it to the lot. The defendant tossed the victim's keys to Aponte. Aponte walked back to the Deidas' house and retrieved the car. He drove it around the block and joined the defendant and the victim, who had moved to a second parking lot across the street, between Washburn and Lowell Streets. Aponte returned the keys to the victim and left the scene. Moments later two shots were fired, hitting the victim in his lungs and heart. He died a short time later.²

Burgos ran back to the parking lot after the shots were fired and remained there while the police were summoned. The defendant came up to him and instructed him to tell the police that "some black people came over here ... shooting." Two days later, the defendant stood on Orchard Street and yelled out, "any of the witnesses who rat on me I'll shoot." On another occasion, the defendant told Burgos that "you just make sure to keep your mouth shut." Later, when the defendant saw Burgos at the court house, he told Burgos, "You messed up, you wasn't supposed to say nothing."

2. Ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in various respects. "In evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a case of murder in the first degree, we begin by determining whether there was a serious failure by trial counsel." Commonwealth v. Harbin, 435 Mass. 654, 656, 760 N.E.2d 1216 (2002). Serious failure of counsel means "serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel — behavior falling measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary, fallible lawyer." Commonwealth v. Shuman, 445 Mass. 268, 276, 836 N.E.2d 1085 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96, 315 N.E.2d 878 (1974). A tactical decision by trial counsel is considered ineffective assistance only if such a decision was manifestly unreasonable when made. Commonwealth v. Martin, 427 Mass. 816, 822, 696 N.E.2d 904 (1998).

We then must determine, in accordance with G.L. c. 278, § 33E, whether counsel's failure gives rise to a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, i.e., whether it was "likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion." Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 428 Mass. 852, 854, 705 N.E.2d 263 (1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682, 584 N.E.2d 621 (1992). A catalogue of "subjective critiques of defense counsel's decisions, absent a showing that errors likely affected the jury's conclusions, is insufficient to support an ineffective assistance claim." Commonwealth v. Scott, 428 Mass. 362, 369, 701 N.E.2d 629 (1998).

The defendant raises his claim of ineffective assistance on direct appeal, based solely on the trial record. Such an ineffective assistance claim is in its "weakest form" because "it is bereft of any explanation by trial counsel for his actions and suggestive of strategy contrived by a defendant viewing the case with hindsight." Commonwealth v. Peloquin, 437 Mass. 204, 210 n. 5, 770 N.E.2d 440 (2002). As such, claims of ineffective assistance should normally be raised through a motion for a new trial, where an appropriate factual record can be developed. Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 Mass. 807, 810-811, 847 N.E.2d 1095 (2006). In most instances, the record on direct appeal is inadequate to consider the claim; therefore, both this court and the Appeals Court normally do not entertain ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal. Id., and cases cited. "The occasions when a court can resolve an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal are exceptional," id. at 809 n. 2, 847 N.E.2d 1095, and that "narrow" exception occurs only where "the factual basis of the [ineffective assistance] claim appears indisputably on the trial record," id. at 811, 847 N.E.2d 1095, quoting Commonwealth v. Adamides, 37 Mass. App.Ct. 339, 344, 639 N.E.2d 1092 (1994). Here, based on the trial record, we conclude that there was nothing manifestly unreasonable about counsel's tactical decisions and that none of the claimed failures by counsel was likely to influence the jury's decision.

a. Motion for severance. The defendant contends that his counsel was ineffective because he made no motion to sever the defendant's trial from that of his codefendant, Pena, until near the end of the trial. An ineffective assistance claim based on the failure to bring a motion requires the defendant to show that the motion would likely have been granted. Commonwealth v. Bly, 444 Mass. 640, 654, 830 N.E.2d 1048 (2005). Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 388 Mass. 255, 264, 446 N.E.2d 383 (1983).

Ordinarily, decisions pertaining to severance and joinder are left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Commonwealth v. McAfee, 430 Mass. 483, 485, 722 N.E.2d 1 (1999). Commonwealth v. Vieira, 401 Mass. 828, 836, 519 N.E.2d 1320 (1988). Separate trials for codefendants are required only in cases where the defenses are mutually antagonistic or irreconcilable. Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 659, 442 N.E.2d 399 (1982). Severance is not required when the trial strategies of the codefendants are merely inconsistent. Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 405 Mass. 646, 654, 543 N.E.2d 12 (1989). Here, neither codefendant directly implicated the other. Not only were their defenses not mutually antagonistic or irreconcilable, but they shared a common strategy. Both defendants relied on impeaching the government's witnesses and raising doubt about whether other persons seen in the area (i.e., Burgos or Aponte) might have been the perpetrators. See Commonwealth v. McAfee, supra at 486, 722 N.E.2d 1 (severance not required in part because both defendants shared common approach of "vigorously attack[ing] the credibility" of eyewitness); Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 406 Mass. 843, 849, 550 N.E.2d 1380 (1990) (severance not required in part because two codefendants shared "common approach" of blaming third person for crime).

Nor does it appear that the judge was likely to use his discretion to sever the trials on counsel's motion. Indeed, codefendant Pena moved to sever at the start of trial (and again at various points during the trial). Severance was denied,³ making clear that the judge would not have severed the trial if the same motion had been filed by the defendant. In these circumstances, it was not "manifestly unreasonable" for trial counsel to fail to bring a motion to sever the trials when the two defenses were not mutually antagonistic and when such a motion was not likely to have been granted.⁴ b. The view. The defendant contends that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to prevent and indeed encouraged the jury to view certain memorials to the victim erected at the murder scene. The defendant argues that Pena's counsel's objection to the view as emotionally prejudicial is evidence that it was manifestly unreasonable for the defendant's trial counsel to have encouraged it. We disagree. The record indicates that defense counsel had hoped to use the presence of certain names on the memorials to the victim to demonstrate the bias of two potential Commonwealth witnesses (Hector and Emilio Deida), and he therefore asked the jurors to take note of those two names on the memorials. This strategic decision was not manifestly unreasonable, as it did highlight the close relationship between the Deida brothers and the victim. Furthermore, the judge permitted the view over Pena's objection; any objection the defendant's counsel might have raised would likely have been unsuccessful.⁵

c. Instruction to defense investigator. The Commonwealth considered calling the defense investigator as a witness, and sought to obtain the investigator's notes, as a potential means of rehabilitating a witness by offering a prior consistent...