Com. v. Douglas

• Decision Date: 02 November 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-P-286.,08-P-286.
• Citation: 915 N.E.2d 1111,75 Mass. App. Ct. 643
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Tracey DOUGLAS.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

915 N.E.2d 1111

75 Mass. App. Ct. 643

COMMONWEALTH v. Tracey DOUGLAS.

No. 08-P-286.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

Argued March 6, 2009.

Decided November 2, 2009.

Paul C. Brennan, Dalton, for the defendant.

David J. Gold, Assistant District Attorney (Garrett R. Fregault, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth.

Present: GRAHAM, DREBEN, & SIKORA, JJ.

SIKORA, J.

A District Court jury found the defendant guilty of motor vehicle homicide by operation under the influence of intoxicating liquor and negligent operation (in violation of G.L. c. 90, § 24G[a]), and by negligent operation of a motor vehicle (in violation of G.L. c. 90, § 24[2][a]). The defendant, who is African-American, appeals upon claims that (1) the trial judge improperly allowed the Commonwealth's peremptory challenge of the only African-American in the venire; (2) the trial judge improperly admitted evidence of the defendant's blood alcohol content and erroneously instructed the jury on that evidence; and (3) calculated improprieties by the prosecutor and extraneous influences upon the jury resulted in reversible error. We reverse. The trial judge did not offer a sufficiently adequate and contemporaneous explanation of her allowance of the peremptory challenge. In addition, the judge erroneously admitted evidence of the defendant's blood alcohol content without the requisite expert testimony and gave an erroneous jury instruction in relation to that evidence.

Procedural background. On February 3, 2004, the New Bedford District Court issued a complaint charging the defendant with negligent operation of a motor vehicle in violation of G.L. c. 90, § 24(2)(a). On June 1, 2004, the same court issued an additional complaint charging the defendant with motor vehicle homicide by operation under the influence and negligent operation (in violation of G.L. c. 90, § 24G[a]).¹ On July 25, 2005, a District Court judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion to amend the June 1 complaint to add an alternate theory of intoxication, a 0.08 percent "per se" violation of the motor vehicle homicide statute.² On May 15, 2006, jury empanelment commenced in New Bedford District Court, and on May 19, 2006, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both charges.

The trial judge sentenced the defendant to two and one-half years in the house of correction on the motor vehicle homicide charge and a consecutive sentence of two years in the house of correction on the negligent operation charge. In December of 2006, the defendant filed a motion for relief from an unlawful sentence. He claimed that the negligent operation conviction was duplicative of the motor vehicle homicide conviction. In January of 2007, the trial judge allowed the motion. The allowance of that motion is not at issue in this appeal.³

Background. The evidence at trial included the following. On November 27, 2003, at approximately 8:30 P.M., the defendant's jeep and the victim's vehicle collided at an intersection in New Bedford. Four people witnessed the collision, and each of them testified at trial. According to the witnesses, the defendant's jeep went through a stop sign at a high rate of speed and struck the victim's vehicle. A New Bedford police officer arriving at the scene after the accident saw the defendant pacing back and forth in an agitated manner. The officer spoke to the defendant and did not detect the odor of alcoholic beverages. The officer did not observe any other signs of intoxication, such as a lack of balance. The victim died at the scene from multiple traumatic injuries. Paramedics took the defendant to the nearest hospital for treatment.

Shortly after the collision, a New Bedford Police Department accident reconstruction expert investigated the cause of the crash. She analyzed the damage to the vehicles and made numerous measurements of the crash scene. Based on her investigation, the expert concluded that the defendant's jeep had been traveling at sixty-four miles per hour when it entered the intersection.⁴

Soon after the defendant arrived at the hospital, two New Bedford police officers interviewed him. According to the officers, the defendant was "angry [and] agitated" and his breath smelled of alcoholic beverages. He told the officers that he had consumed "a forty of OE," a forty-ounce bottle of Olde English brand beer. Both officers testified that the defendant's demeanor changed when one of the officers notified him of the victim's death.

While at the hospital, the defendant complained of pain in his chest. In response to his complaint, hospital staff drew a blood sample from him and analyzed it. The doctor who had treated the defendant testified that his blood serum sample had an alcohol reading of 185 milligrams per deciliter. A laboratory supervisor from the Massachusetts State police crime laboratory testified that the reading translated to a whole blood alcohol level of .15 to .16.

Discussion. 1. Peremptory challenge. Jury selection proceeded over two days. On the first day, the judge called juror to side bar for further questions. The juror told the judge that she was diabetic. The judge assured her that the disease would not be a problem. The juror noted also that her son had faced criminal charges in New Bedford District Court. She stated, however, that she could be a fair and impartial juror. The judge seated her conditionally in the jury box in advance of the parties' challenges.

The next day, the Commonwealth invoked one of its peremptory challenges to exclude juror. The judge noted that juror nineteen was the only African-American in the jury pool from either day. She asked the Commonwealth to explain the challenge. In response, the prosecutor gave two reasons: (1) the juror's speech and mannerisms indicated that she was slow and might have difficulty in the deliberation of the evidence of a three- or four-day trial; and (2) the prosecutor's discomfort caused by the juror's fixed stare at him during empanelment.⁵ The judge then determined that the prosecutor's explanation was not race-based.

Defense counsel asked for the judge's impression of juror nineteen. The judge stated that the juror had "somewhat of a halting speech pattern" and was "not incredibly articulate but ... not inarticulate either." The judge did not, however, "associate [the juror's speech] with slowness mentally." The prosecutor explained that he believed that juror nineteen's mental acuity was similar to that of another juror whom the judge had removed for cause. The judge did not agree that juror nineteen suffered from a similar disability, but she allowed the Commonwealth's peremptory challenge without further reasoning at that time.⁶ Defense counsel objected.

On the following day, before the jury had entered the court room, the judge commented further on the Commonwealth's peremptory challenge of juror nineteen. She stated that, after the previous day's discussion, she had consulted decisions on peremptory challenges of members of protected classes,⁷ and that she "wanted to put some more ... findings on the record." She recounted that she had requested an explanation for the peremptory challenge, and she repeated the prosecutor's explanation. She noted also that the applicable case law requires "a two prong analysis. One having to do with the adequacy of the Commonwealth's position once having been questioned about the reason for the challenge and then the genuineness of that." Although the prosecutor had not mentioned the criminal history of juror nineteen's son when he had offered his explanation for the challenge, the judge referred to it in her findings.⁸ The judge concluded her findings with the statement that "I find ... the Commonwealth's explanation both adequate and genuine, which is why I allowed the challenges to stand."

Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution and the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors on the basis of race. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 409 Mass. 461, 464, 567 N.E.2d 899 (1991). "[W]e begin with the presumption that a peremptory challenge is proper." Commonwealth v. Smith, 450 Mass. 395, 406, 879 N.E.2d 87, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 202, 172 L.Ed.2d 161 (2008). However, one may rebut that presumption through proof "that (1) a pattern of conduct has developed whereby several prospective jurors who have been challenged peremptorily are members of a discrete group, and (2) there is a likelihood they are being excluded from the jury solely by reason of their group membership." Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 490, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881, 100 S.Ct. 170, 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979). Either the party opposed to the challenge or the trial judge, sua sponte, may raise the issue of the propriety of the challenge. See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460, 463, 788 N.E.2d 968 (2003). When "the judge initiates a sua sponte inquiry into the justification for the challenge, this initiation almost necessarily includes an implicit finding that the prima facie case of discrimination has been made." Id. at 463 n. 5, 788 N.E.2d 968.

Once the prima facie case of discrimination has been made, the proponent of the peremptory challenge must provide an explanation which "pertain[s] to the individual qualities of the prospective juror and not to that juror's group association." Commonwealth v. Soares, supra at 491, 387 N.E.2d 499. If the proponent's explanation seems superficial, the judge should also allow rebuttal from the adverse party. See Commonwealth v. Calderon, 431 Mass. 21, 26, 725 N.E.2d 182 (2000). The judge must then "make an independent evaluation of the [proponent's] reasons and ... determine specifically whether the explanation was bona fide or a pretext." Ibid. "In other words, the judge must decide whether the explanation is both `adequate' and `genuine.'" Commonwealth v....