Com. v. Eaves, 0605-91-3

• Decision Date: 20 September 1991
• Docket Number: No. 0605-91-3,0605-91-3
• Citation: 408 S.E.2d 925,13 Va.App. 162
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Virginia v. James Douglas EAVES. Record
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals

Page 925

408 S.E.2d 925

13 Va.App. 162

COMMONWEALTH of Virginia v. James Douglas EAVES.

Record No. 0605-91-3.

Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Sept. 20, 1991.

Robert H. Anderson, III, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Mary Sue Terry, Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellant.

John N. Dalton, Jr. (Dalton & Duncan, P.C., on brief), Radford, for appellee.

Present: KOONTZ, C.J., and COLEMAN and ELDER, JJ.

COLEMAN, Judge.

In this appeal, we consider whether a police officer who observed the operator of an automobile make a U-turn as the operator's vehicle approached within one hundred feet to one-tenth of a mile ¹ of a traffic checkpoint had a reasonable basis to suspect that the operator was violating the licensing or registration regulations or was committing or had committed a criminal offense. Based on the facts observed by the officer, we hold that he did have a reasonable basis to suspect that the operator made a U-turn for the purpose of avoiding the roadblock and, therefore, was probably operating in violation of the motor vehicle regulations or had committed a criminal offense. Accordingly, we reverse the trial judge's suppression ruling that the evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal stop, and we remand the case for trial.

The Commonwealth has appealed, pursuant to Code § 19.2-398, a pretrial suppression order in which the trial court ruled that evidence that the operator of the vehicle was an habitual offender, which the officer obtained as a result of having illegally stopped the appellee's automobile, would not be admissible at trial. The trial court ruled that our decision in Murphy v. Commonwealth, 9 Va.App. 139, 384 S.E.2d 125 (1989), "superseded" our decision in Stroud v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 633, 370 S.E.2d 721 (1988), and controlled this case. Relying on Murphy, the trial court held that, because the U-turn was legal and was not a traffic infraction, and because the officer had no other reason to suspect that the driver had done anything illegal, the stop was in violation of the fourth amendment protections as defined in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).

The trial court misapplied our holding in Murphy. Our decision in Murphy was consistent with our holding in Stroud and did not overrule it. In Murphy, we merely elaborated on the principles from Prouse and applied them to the facts of that case, the same principles we applied in Stroud. In both cases, we reviewed the facts to determine whether the police officers had articulated a basis for having a reasonable suspicion that a driver turning before a traffic checkpoint was doing so to avoid detection of a traffic infraction or criminal activity.

In Murphy, the officer observed the operator of a vehicle make a lawful right turn three hundred fifty feet before a roadblock. We held that "a legal turn into an existing roadway prior to reaching a checkpoint, standing alone, does not warrant reasonable suspicion that the operator is involved in criminal activity." 9 Va.App. at 145-46, 384 S.E.2d at 129. However, we expressly recognized in Murphy that other "[f]actors as subtle as the difference between [a driver making] a U-turn 150 feet from a roadblock [as was the fact in Stroud ] and [an operator making] a lawful turn into an existing roadway 350 feet from a roadblock may affect the determination." Id. at 145, 384 S.E.2d at 129. The issue is whether the officer had a reason to suspect that the turn was to avoid the checkpoint, rather than a turn that would normally have been made in the course of the operation of the vehicle without the presence of a roadblock. In Stroud, we held that under the circumstances of that case, the officer stated a reasonable basis to suspect the driver was unlicensed when, based on the officer's eleven years of experience, he observed the driver of a van make a U-turn within one hundred to one hundred fifty feet of the checkpoint and drive in the opposite direction only to pull into a private driveway.

In Murphy, we recognized that an experienced police officer may, under certain circumstances, conclude that a turn before a traffic checkpoint is for the purpose of evading a traffic check, but that officers are not justified in being suspicious of drivers who, without more, make legal turns in sight of a roadblock. Both Murphy and Stroud recognized that circumstances other than a lawful turn in sight of a roadblock must be present to justify an inference by a police officer that the driver made the turn for the purpose of avoiding the checkpoint.

We review the evidence on appeal from a suppression hearing in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). Virginia State Trooper L.W. Findley was manning a traffic checkpoint on Route 11 in Pulaski County on August 17, 1990. He observed two vehicles essentially abreast of one another approaching the checkpoint at about the same speed in the two southbound lanes. The vehicles were traveling at a lawful speed in a fifty-five mile per hour zone. Findley testified that the vehicle traveling in the left southbound lane "all of a sudden" put on his signal "right at" a turn or deceleration lane leading into a crossover, made a U-turn, and headed back in the northbound lane in the direction from which he had come. The crossover was the last place to turn before reaching the checkpoint. The deceleration lane was only about thirty-five to forty feet long and provided barely enough room for a vehicle to get entirely out of traffic. Findley testified that the driver did not give a signal of his intention to turn until he was pulling into the turn lane. ² Findley estimated the crossover was "about one-tenth of a mile or about one hundred feet" ³ from the checkpoint. Findley described the turn of the vehicle into the deceleration lane as "abrupt," "immediate," and "quick." Findley testified; however, that the front end of the vehicle did not dive, nor did its brakes squeal. Findley observed no other movement of the vehicle indicating that the turn was so abrupt that it affected the operation of the vehicle. Although Findley did not observe any traffic infraction which caused him to stop the vehicle, he testified, in effect, that he stopped the vehicle because of the manner in which the operator made the U-turn, because the turn was abrupt and because the signal...