Com. v. Fisher

• Decision Date: 26 June 1968
• Citation: 354 Mass. 549,238 N.E.2d 525
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Ronald FISHER.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 525

238 N.E.2d 525

354 Mass. 549

COMMONWEALTH v. Ronald FISHER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

Argued March 4, 1968.

Decided June 26, 1968.

Richard J. Rubin, New York City (Edward N. Hurely, Springfield, with him), for defendant.

Matthew J. Ryan, Jr., Dist. Atty. (Leonard E. Gibbons, Asst. Dist. Atty., with him), for Commonwealth.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and SPALDING, WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, KIRK, SPIEGEL and REARDON, JJ.

SPIEGEL, Justice.

The defendant was tried on an indictment which charged that on July 1, 1966, he 'did assault and beat Carolyn Willis with intent to murder her, and by such assault and beating did kill and murder the said Carolyn Willis.' The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. The case was tried subject to G.L. c. 278, §§ 33A--33G, and is here by appeal.

We summarize pertinent portions of the evidence. The defendant was questioned by the Springfield police as one of several persons who had been at a party attended by the victim on the evening of the murder. At that time, the defendant denied any knowledge of the crime. Subsequently the police discovered an inconsistency between the defendant's report and that of another person interviewed. The police left a telephone message at the place where the defendant was staying asking him to come to the police station on Monday morning, July 11, 1966. In response to this request, the defendant voluntarily came to the station. He arrived about ten or ten thirty in the morning and was interviewed by three police officers. One of these, Lieutenant Shea, testified on voir dire that, after reviewing the events of the party, he asked the defendant whether, after the victim's departure, he had borrowed a friend's automobile keys and left the party alone. The defendant denied this. Lieutenant Shea 'told him we 'have information that you did. " At 'about the same time' Shea noticed 'what appeared * * * to be * * * finger nail scratches on his neck,' and asked the defendant about them. The defendant said they were scratches inflicted on the night of the party by a former girl friend. Shea said, 'Have you got anymore on you? Take off your shirt.' The defendant did so, and the officers observed three more scratches on his back. At this point, Lieutenant Shea 'stopped the interrogation and informed him of the fact that he was a suspect,' and 'informed him of his constitutional rights.' At the voir dire, Shea testified as follows: 'I told him that he was entitled to be represented at all times by counsel. I told him that he could remain silent, and if he said anything it could be used against him, and I asked him if he would voluntarily take a lie detector test that day.' Later in the voir dire, Shea testified that on the defendant's return from the lie detector test in the evening, 'I informed him again of his right to an attorney, the fact that if he couldn't afford one, that he would be furnished with one * * *' (emphasis supplied). At the trial before the jury, Shea testified that in the morning 'I told him that he was entitled to the services of an attorney. * * * (T)hat he had the right to a telephone, and an attorney would be furnished to him at the expense of the Commonwealth if he was not able to afford one. * * * I told him he had a right to remain silent and that anything he did say would be used against him if he chose to say anything to us.' Either before or after these warnings were given, photographs were taken of the scratches on the defendant's neck and back. No further interrogation then took place. The defendant was taken to Boston, given a polygraph test, and then was returned to the Springfield police station about nine thirty or ten o'clock in the evening. On his return, the defendant was given further warnings. Lieutenant Shea described these on the voir dire as follows: 'At this time I informed him again of his right to an attorney, the fact that if he couldn't afford one, that he would be furnished with one; his right to remain silent; and the fact that anything he said would be used against him. I also informed him of his right to the use of the telephone. I told him that he could use the phone to call friends, relatives or even engage an attorney if he so desired. He declined the use of the telephone.' On cross-examination on the voir dire, Shea gave this version of the evening warning: 'I said that, 'Ronald, you have a right to an attorney, an attorney can be present here now. You don't have to talk to us. If you do talk to us, anything you say will be used against you,' and I said, 'there is a telephone, if you want to call anyone, call a lawyer, call any friend or for any reason, this is the telephone, go ahead and use it.' He declined. He said, 'No. I don't want to use the phone." Before the jury, Shea testified that after this conversation he asked the defendant, '(D)o you want to talk further with us about this case?' and the defendant replied, 'I will.' At the voir dire Lieutenant Shea testified that he told the defendant he had failed the polygraph test and that in his absence the police had interviewed his former girl friend and had determined that she could not have scratched him. The defendant said, 'I know it's very bad for me. * * * (I)t looks very bad for me.' The interrogation continued until about eleven o'clock, at which time the defendant confessed. About four o'clock of the following morning, the confession was reduced to writing and the defendant signed it. The defendant also made a sketch of the scene of the crime. The photographs, the oral and written confessions, and the sketch were admitted in evidence over the defendant's objections.

The defendant's principal assignments of error concern the denial of his motion to suppress this evidence on the ground that the police did not conform with the requirements set forth in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. At the conclusion of the voir dire on the motion to suppress, the judge made the following findings: '(A)t the time when the suspicion of crime was focused upon the defendant, he was advised by the police that he had a right to remain silent, need not answer questions. He had a right to counsel and the services of counsel. And, Lieutenant Shea told him that if he couldn't afford one, that he would be furnished one. Anything he might say would be used against him and he could use the telephone to call friends, relatives or engage an attorney if desired. * * * (T)he oral statements made and the written statements * * * were voluntarily made by the defendant without threats or duress or promises, or inducements or hope, or favor of reward.'

The defendant contends that the record of the voir dire testimony does not support the judge's finding that the defendant was informed in the morning of his right to have counsel provided at the Commonwealth's expense. While Lieutenant Shea omitted this item in his original recitation of the warnings given in the morning, when he described the warnings given in the evening he said that he 'again' advised the defendant of his right to counsel and of 'the fact that if he couldn't afford one, that we would be furnished with one.' From this testimony, the judge was warranted in determining that this portion of the warning was given in the morning. The correctness of this determination is borne out by Lieutenant Shea's testimony before the jury, recited above. We are of opinion that the warnings which the judge found were given to the defendant in the morning were in this respect in conformity with the rules set out in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.

The defendant also contends that the morning warnings were not given before the commencement of the defendant's in custody interrogation, and that as a consequence the confessions obtained many hours later were tainted with an initial illegality. In Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1766, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the right to counsel attaches 'when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory--when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession.' In Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 477, 86 S.Ct. 1629, it was said that an individual must be warned of his rights 'when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' The defendant contends that the Miranda case modifies the 'focus' rule of Escobedo v. State of Illinois, supra, by advancing the time when the right to counsel attaches (and warnings must be given) ahead of the point when the investigation becomes accusatory to the time when 'custody' begins. As applied to the case at bar, there is no conflict between these two standards. Lieutenant Shea's interrogation of the defendant became an in custody interrogation at the point when Shea observed the scratches and the investigation 'focused' on the defendant. ¹ At this point the warnings were given. Until this time, there is nothing to suggest that the defendant, who voluntarily came to the station at the telephoned request of the police, was 'in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom * * * in any significant way.' We believe the warnings given to the defendant in the morning were timely.

The defendant further argues that he was not apprised of his right to have an attorney present at the interrogation. In Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra, it was held that '(A)n individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation.' 384 U.S. at 471, 86 S.Ct. at 1626. Lieutenant Shea testified on the voir dire that he warned the defendant in the morning that 'he was entitled to be represented at all times by co...