Com. v. Gould

• Decision Date: 20 May 1980
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Dennis L. GOULD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 927

405 N.E.2d 927

380 Mass. 672

COMMONWEALTH v. Dennis L. GOULD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Argued Dec. 4, 1979.

Decided May 20, 1980.

Robert Snider, Boston, for defendant.

Charles J. Hely, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

HENNESSEY, C. J., and QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, KAPLAN, WILKINS, LIACOS and ABRAMS, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

On July 17, 1978, the defendant fatally stabbed his former girl friend. After a witness to the attack intervened and told the defendant to stop, he mumbled, "I attacked her. She was impure . . . (i)mpure, impure." For more than five years preceding the fatal stabbing the defendant had suffered from constant, fixed delusions in which he believed that he had a divine mission on earth and that he was required to kill his girl friend because she was "impure." After a trial at which criminal responsibility was the sole issue, the jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree. The defendant appeals. See G.L. c. 278, §§ 33A-33G.

Initially, the defendant argues that it was error for the judge to have denied his motion for a verdict of not guilty on so much of the indictment as alleged murder in the first degree. ¹ Alternatively, the defendant asks that we order a new trial or reduce the verdict to murder in the second degree pursuant to G.L. c. 278, § 33E.

Although we find no error at trial, pursuant to our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, we think the defendant is entitled to a new trial at which he may produce expert testimony on the issue of whether or not the impairment of his mental processes precluded him from being able to deliberately premeditate. At a new trial the jury may also consider the defendant's mental impairment on the issue of whether he committed the murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty.

We summarize the evidence. At approximately 7 A.M. on July 17, 1978, the defendant was seen in a restaurant near the nursing home where the victim worked. Shortly afterwards witnesses observed him keeping the nursing home under surveillance from a covert position. James McPherson drove into the parking lot of the nursing home at approximately 8:30 A.M., and observed the defendant leaning on the back of a van. The victim walked down a ramp from the parking lot to the building. McPherson saw the defendant go "right down after (the victim)," and then saw the defendant on top of the victim, apparently beating her. McPherson ran down the ramp and yelled at the defendant to stop. The defendant straightened up, dropped his knife, and permitted McPherson to seat him on a wall abutting the ramp. McPherson left the defendant to get help for the victim. When he returned, the defendant was again stabbing the victim. Once more, McPherson told the defendant to sit down on the wall; after one final lunge at the victim, the defendant did so, and remained there until the police came. McPherson testified that the defendant was bleary-eyed and "excited," and that he repeatedly stated that she was "impure."

Quincy policeman Kevin Murphy arrived at the nursing home at approximately 9 A.M., and observed the victim lying at the foot of the ramp, covered with blood, and gasping for breath. A knife protruded from underneath her left breast. ² Officer Murphy placed the defendant under arrest and recited the Miranda warnings. In response to a question, the defendant told the officer, "There was nobody with me. I did it myself." Officer Murphy testified that the defendant's shirt and arm were covered with blood when he first saw him; otherwise, he appeared "natural."

The defendant was interrogated at the Quincy police station at approximately 11 A.M., and a transcription of a tape recording of that interview was read in evidence. ³ During this interview, the defendant, appearing somewhat nervous, described his acquaintance with the victim, ⁴ and his history of hospitalization at various mental institutions since approximately 1973. He admitted that he had intentionally caused his right arm to be amputated by falling on a train track. The defendant started to describe the earlier events of that morning, but claimed not to remember anything between the time he got out of his car and the time he found himself sitting on the wall (for what the evidence indicated was the second time). After the tape recorder was turned off, the defendant said, "I know why I did it," but refused to explain.

At one point all but one police officer left the room, and the defendant made several spontaneous statements. The defendant stated that he was commanded to commit the murder: "The rabbi looked at me from his pulpit and told me 'thou shalt kill her.' " He said that he probably would not go to jail or to a hospital, but that he would instead be taken to Israel and tortured or nailed to a cross. He asked the officer what "they" would do to him if they found out he was Jesus Christ. Finally, the officer testified, the defendant said "that she was impure, that all Jewish women were impure, 'including (his) mother . . .,' " and that he thought what he did was "right." The officer added that the defendant appeared normal throughout this conversation.

It was uncontradicted that the defendant had a long-standing, constant delusional belief system. ⁵ The defendant's delusions were religious in nature. He believed that he was the Messiah; he believed that he was the Saviour of the Jewish people; he believed that he was required by God to kill the victim because of his divine mission and because she was "impure."

From 1973 until 1978, the defendant was in and out of various institutions for the mentally ill. ⁶ The defendant was treated with drugs and psychotherapy; as a result he was better able to think and perceive reality, although he never gave up his delusional ideas.

The Commonwealth's expert ⁷ diagnosed the defendant's mental illness as paranoid psychosis. ⁸ The expert said that during the course of his interviews with the defendant, the defendant took responsibility for the killing. The defendant told the doctor that he could not "justify a killing," that he (the defendant) could not "say whether it was wrong or it was right" and that he could "only sanctify it" (i. e., the killing). ⁹

The expert testified that the defendant also stated "that he knew at the time of the stabbing that his actions were illegal in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and were considered to be wrong by society, that he could have stopped himself from stabbing the victim and that he was responsible for what he had done." The defendant later told the expert that he sometimes thought he might "get off through insanity."

The expert concluded that, despite the defendant's mental illness, the defendant appreciated, at the moment of the homicide, that his act was "immoral, wrong and a criminal and illegal thing to do," and that "he was capable of controlling his behavior to such an extent that he could have stopped himself from doing it." In essence, the expert admitted that the defendant's mental powers were impaired, but could not "quantify" the degree of the impairment except to say it was not "substantial."

The defense in this case consisted solely of the testimony of psychiatrists on the issue of criminal responsibility. Dr. Larry Strasburger and Dr. John Snell ¹⁰ both testified that the defendant had suffered from a severe and long-standing mental illness, namely, paranoid schizophrenia, and that this was a "clear-cut" and "straightforward" case of lack of criminal responsibility.

Dr. Strasburger testified that the defendant's chronic disease had led to a functional impairment which made him unable to appreciate the consequences of his actions in a normal, rational way, ¹¹ and to "widespread difficulty checking hostile impulses." Although massive drug treatment improved the defendant's thought disorder, his underlying delusional system remained unchanged. Thus, he might appear to function normally for some period of time, but stress or anxiety would cause his delusional thinking to predominate. Dr. Snell's testimony focused on the causal relationship between the homicide and the defendant's delusions. Dr. Snell testified that the defendant's crime was a direct outgrowth of his delusions and that the defendant could not view his conduct in a rational way, but only viewed his actions as divine.

Motion for directed verdict. The defendant argues, on the basis of two distinct theories, that the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction of murder in the first degree. Therefore, he claims the judge should have directed a verdict of not guilty of murder in the first degree, thus making murder in the second degree the most severe verdict that could be returned. Initially, the defendant claims that as a result of his mental abnormality he could not form the specific intent required for murder in the first degree. Alternatively, the defendant argues that because of the unanimity of psychiatric opinion that there was a causal connection between his long-standing mental illness and the crime, the judge was required to direct a verdict on the charge of murder in the first degree. ¹²

The same short answer applies to each of these arguments. The defendant concedes that the evidence, considered without regard to the defendant's mental disease, was sufficient to support a conviction of murder in the first degree. Directing a verdict in these circumstances would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the province of the jury. See. G.L. c. 265, § 1 (the jury determine the degree of murder). Moreover, jurors find the facts, including those facts or issues on which they hear psychiatric testimony. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 535-536, 350 N.E.2d 444 (1976). "The law should not, and does not, give the opinions of experts . . . the benefit of conclusiveness, even if there are no contrary opinions introduced at the trial." Commonwealth v. Smith, 357 Mass. 168, 178...