Com. v. Hare

• Decision Date: 28 February 1972
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Robert W. HARE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 138

280 N.E.2d 138

361 Mass. 263

COMMONWEALTH v. Robert W. HARE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued Oct. 5, 1971.

Decided Feb. 28, 1972.

William P. Homans, Jr., Boston, for defendant.

Terence M. Troyer, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before TAURO, C.J., and CUTTER, SPIEGEL, REARDON, QUIRICO, BRAUCHER and HENNESSEY, JJ.

TAURO, Chief Justice.

The Commonwealth appeals under G.L. c. 278, § 28E, from an order dismissing an indictment in which the defendant is charged with being an accessory before the fact to abortion by counseling, hiring, or otherwise procuring the commission of such felony (G.L. c. 272, § 19, c. 274, § 2). The trial judge in his decision described the bill of particulars of the Commonwealth as alleging that 'the defendant, as a participating member of the Cleveland Consulation Service, between April 1, 1969, and April 12, 1969, knowing he was in violation of the laws of the Commonwealth, instructed . . . (the young woman) and her companion to proceed to Pierre V. Brunelle, knowing he was an unlicensed physician, located at 4 Tremont Street, Chelmsford, Massachusetts, for the purpose of having Brunelle perform an unlawful abortion on . . . (the young woman); and that the defendant provided the name of Brunelle and the price of the unlawful abortion, $400.'

The judge ruled as follows: 'I do not regard the use of the word 'instructed,' in and Bill of Particulars as implying that the defendant directed, advised, or induced . . . (the young woman) to proceed to Brunelle, the alleged abortionist. An inspection of the evidence of . . . (the young woman) before the Grand Jury confirms this view. In plain language, the defendant informed . . . (the young woman) of the telephone number and address of Brunelle as one who would perform an abortion for $400. From the facts alleged in the Bill of Particulars and the reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, no more can be concluded than that . . . (the young woman) sought out the defendant, seeking information as to an abortion, and that the defendant furnished her with the name, address, and telephone number of the alleged abortionist, and the price. There is no evidence of any connection or communication between the defendant and Brunelle. Obviously, under our law, . . . (the young woman) was not an accomplice in the commission of the crime charged. The Bill of Particulars discloses no stake or interest of the defendant, financial or otherwise, in the commission of the alleged offense. In my view, the facts contained in the Bill of Particulars fall short of showing an association of the defendant with the venture or that he participated in it as in something that he wished to bring about and that he sought, by his action, to make it succeed.'

The grounds for the defendant's motions to dismiss were (1) for lack of jurisdiction, ¹ and (2) for failure of the indictment and bill of particulars to set forth an offence under G.L. c. 272, § 19.

The judge concluded with the following ruling: 'Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment is allowed. In view of this action, I do not reach the constitutional issues raised by another motion of the defendant to dismiss the indictment, particularly and more specifically relating to the issue raised with respect to the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. ² Under these circumstances, I deem it inappropriate for the Trial Court to consider these constitutional questions; and because of this, I have denied the motion to dismiss which is based on such issues.'

1. We will first discuss the issue raised as to jurisdiction. ³ The defendant contends that the alleged acts for which he has been indicted occurred outside the Commonwealth and that our courts have no jurisdiction in the matter. The short answer is that, if the State succeeds in getting the defendant within its power, the law of this Commonwealth permits prosecution of the defendant for acts done outside its borders but intended to have effect within the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 11 Allen 243, 256, 259; Commonwealth v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1, 6, 18; Commonwealth v. White, 123 Mass. 430, 433; Commonwealth v. Welch, 345 Mass. 366, 371, 187 N.E.2d 813; Commonwealth v. White, Mass., fn. 4, 265 N.E.2d 473, ^a Commonwealth v. Carroll, Mass., 276 N.E.2d 705. ^b See also Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285, 31 S.Ct. 558, 55 L.Ed. 735; Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541.

2. We next consider the correctness of the judge's order dismissing the indictment for reasons delineated in his decision. The indictment ⁴ is phrased in the language of the statute. ⁵ But the judge below, in reaching his decision, went beyong the indictment itself and considered the information contained in the Commonwealth's bill of particulars and also in the minutes of the grand jury proceedings. In effect, the judge ruled that the bill of particulars served to cut down or negate what was otherwise a valid and sufficient indictment. It seems clear that the judge's use of the grand jury minutes merely served to corroborate and support a decision made on the basis of the bill of particulars.

Ever since the criminal pleading act of 1899 ⁶ we have held that indictments framed in the language of the statute are sufficient. ⁷ No criminal case has been brought to our attention where this court authorized a dismissal of an indictment on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence prior to trial. In all of the cases cited by the defendant, the pleadings, together with the evidence, were before this court. See Commonwealth v. Giles, 1 Gray, 466; Commonwealth v. Haywood, 247 Mass. 16, 19, 141 N.E. 571; Commonwealth v. Snyder, 282 Mass. 401, 412, 185 N.E. 376; Commonwealth v. Albert, 307 Mass. 239, 244, 29 N.E.2d 817; Commonwealth v. Iannello, 344 Mass. 723, 727, 184 N.E.2d 364. Indeed, this court has considered an indictment to be sufficient if it (a) sets forth the elements of the crime alleged in the statutory form (Commonwealth v. Benjamin, Mass., 266 N.E.2d 662) ^c and (b) if it would 'enable the defendant to plead the conviction or acquittal in bar to another prosecution for the same offence' (Commonwealth v. Bracy, 313 Mass. 121, 123--125, 46 N.E.2d 580, 582). In the instant case, the indictment identifies the principal, Brunelle, the woman, the place, and the method of procuring the abortion, and conviction or acquittal under the indictment would bar further prosecution for the same offence. Thus, following our well established rule, it would appear that the judge erred in dismissing the indictment in the present case unless he could correctly consider the specifications in the Commonwealth's bill of particulars.

This is the precise issue before us. When we last considered this subject in Commonwealth v. Iannello, supra, 334 Mass. at 726--727, 184 N.E.2d at 366, 367, we said: 'The gist of the defendant's contention . . . is that the sufficiency of the indictment . . . be measured by the particulars which purport to state the nature of the crime and the manner and means of its commission . . .. The language of the indictment is . . . prescribed by G.L. c. 277, § 41, and . . . § 79. . . . The purpose . . . of specifications in a bill of particulars . . . is to give a defendant reasonable knowledge of the nature and character of the crime charged (Commonwealth v. Hayes, 311 Mass. 21, 24--25, 40 N.E.2d 27; Commonwealth v. Ries, 337 Mass. 565, 580--581, 150 N.E.2d 527), and the effect, when filed, is to bind and restrict the Commonwealth as to the scope of the indictment and to the proof of be offered in support of it. . . . The specifications in a bill of particulars . . . do not, however, have the effect of derogating from an indictment which sufficiently avers a crime cognizable under our law. . . . (To rule otherwise) would again expose the prosecution to the pitfalls of pleading which these sections, ⁸ authorizing the short form indictment, were designed to eliminate.'

Unless we are now prepared to overrule our holding in Commonwealth v. Iannello, supra, we must conclude that the sufficiency of the indictment in the present case should be judged without regard to the bill of particulars.

We have reviewed the Iannello case, supra, and we adhere to its sound reasoning giving due consideration to its basis in our prior case law. ⁹ For this reason, we follow the holding of the Iannello case, and we conclude that the judge below erred in considering the Commonwealth's bill of particulars in derogation of its indictment. We reiterate what was said in Commonwealth v. Tilley, 327 Mass. 540, 99 N.E.2d 749, more than a decade before the Iannello case. There the defendant argued that the Commonwealth's proposed proof did not support its charge. We rejected this contention in clear terms (at 541, 99 N.E.2d at 751): '(T)hat question is not open. The motion here was presented before any evidence was introduced. At that time the only question raised by the motion was the legal sufficiency of the indictment.' Also in Commonwealth v. Pascone, 308 Mass. 591, 597, 33 N.E.2d 522, 525, we stated: 'Inasmuch as the defendant, seemingly by choice, has confined his exceptions to the denial of his motion to dismiss, which attacks only the legal sufficiency of the complaint and the constitutionality of the statute, no issue is raised on this record as to whether the proof supports the charge . . . nor would we be justified in assuming that all the evidence on that issue is included in the bill of exceptions' (emphasis supplied).

3. The judge erred in his use of the grand jury minutes. In Commonwealth v. Galvin, 323 Mass. 205, 211--212, 80 N.E.2d 825, 830, this court stated: '(The) motion to quash the indictment on the ground that it was based on incompetent and insufficient evidence was properly denied. The court will not inquire into the competency or sufficiency of the evidence before the...