Commonwealth v. White
| Decision Date | 07 December 1877 |
| Citation | 123 Mass. 430 |
| Parties | Commonwealth v. Guilford White |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Argued March 26, 1877
Suffolk. Indictment in four counts, charging the defendant with receiving three bonds of the United States knowing them to be stolen.
At the trial in the Superior Court, before Bacon, J., the jury returned a verdict of guilty, on the second count, of receiving two of the bonds; and the defendant alleged exceptions, the material parts of which appear in the opinion.
The case was argued in March, 1877, and a rescript was entered overruling the exceptions. The defendant thereupon moved for a rehearing, and this motion was argued in November, 1877.
Exceptions overruled.
H. W Paine, (T. L. Wakefield & D. C. Linscott with him,) for the defendant.
W. C Loring, Assistant Attorney General, (C. R. Train, Attorney General, with him,) for the Commonwealth.
The second count of the indictment, upon which alone the defendant was convicted, charges that the defendant at Boston "three bonds of the United States, each of the value of ten thousand dollars; three pieces of paper, each of the value of ten thousand dollars, of the property, goods and chattels of one Amasa Stone, then lately before within said Commonwealth stolen, taken and carried away by a certain evil disposed person, feloniously did buy, have, receive and aid in the concealment of, he the said White then and there well knowing the said property, goods and chattels to have been feloniously stolen as aforesaid."
It appeared at the trial that the bonds were stolen from Stone in the State of New York by some person unknown, and were afterwards brought into this Commonwealth by one Chapman, from whom the defendant received them in Boston. The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury "that in order to convict under the second and fourth counts, the jury must be satisfied that the defendant received the bonds in this state from the person who actually stole them from said Stone." The court refused this request, and instructed the jury that "it is not necessary that the person who actually committed the theft should bring the bonds into this Commonwealth; but if any one acting for and in behalf of the thief, or aiding such thief by receiving, having or holding the same after the actual theft, and knowing that they were stolen, brings them into this Commonwealth, and the defendant received the bonds in the county of Suffolk from any such person, knowing that they were stolen, and this is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury must convict."
The parties differ as to the construction of these instructions. The defendant contends that the instructions were intended to present two alternative states of fact, under either of which the defendant might be convicted; and that under them the jury might convict, either if the person who brought the bonds into this state was in so doing acting as the agent of the thief, or if such person had bought them or otherwise obtained them of the thief in New York and afterwards brought them into this state upon his own account and acting independently of the thief. But we are unable to adopt this construction. In the instructions the participles "acting" and "aiding" and the verb "brings" are all in the present tense and all refer to the same point of time. The meaning is the same as if the sentence were transposed, and read, that if any person brings the bonds into this state, then acting for and in behalf of the thief, or then aiding such thief by receiving, having or holding the same, the defendant might be convicted if he received the bonds of such person knowing that they were stolen. The idea expressed is that such person is acting for the thief or aiding the thief in bringing them into this state. This is inconsistent with the defendant's construction. If he had bought them previously and brings them here acting solely upon his own account, he could not in any fair sense be said to be aiding the thief.
The instruction was given in response to a special request for a ruling that "the jury must be satisfied that the defendant received the bonds in this state from the person who actually stole them." No instructions were requested as to what the law would be, if the bonds had been brought here by a person, acting for himself, who had bought them in New York, and the bill of exceptions does not show that this question was important or arose at the trial. If this question had been in the mind of the presiding justice, it is difficult to believe that a ruling to the effect that the defendant might be convicted if the bonds were brought here by any one having then no connection with the thief, could have been expressed in the language of the instructions given.
We are of opinion that the two clauses of the instructions were intended to be explanatory of each other, and not intended to present two alternative and exclusive propositions; and that by the fair construction of the instructions, they suppose the case that the bonds are brought into this Commonwealth by some person acting for the thief as his agent, and not that they are brought here by a person who has bought them in New York, and who, in bringing them here, acts on his own account and independently of the thief.
Assuming, for the purposes of the case, that it was necessary for the government to prove, as alleged in the indictment, that the goods received by the defendant were stolen in this Commonwealth, the question is presented whether, under the circumstances stated in the instruction, the original thief is guilty of a larceny in this Commonwealth.
To put the case in the light most favorable to the defendant, the question is whether, if a man, who was never in this state steals property in another state, and sends it here by the hand of an agent to be sold, ...
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