Com. v. Hartsgrove

• Decision Date: 17 May 1990
• Citation: 407 Mass. 441,553 N.E.2d 1299
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Clifton HARTSGROVE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1299

553 N.E.2d 1299

407 Mass. 441

COMMONWEALTH v. Clifton HARTSGROVE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Norfolk.

Argued Jan. 8, 1990.

Decided May 17, 1990.

Chrystal Murray, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Carol A. Donovan, Committee for Public Counsel Services, Randolph, with her) for defendant.

Stephanie Martin Glennon, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

LIACOS, Chief Justice.

We consider whether a pro se defendant, incarcerated in a correctional facility, shall be deemed to have filed a notice of appeal with the trial court at the moment he deposited it in the prison's institutional mailbox. The defendant claims to have placed the notice, which was in a stamped envelope addressed to the Superior Court clerk for Norfolk County, into the hands of the prison authorities within the thirty-day period as specified in Mass.R.A.P. 4(b), as amended, 378 Mass. 928 (1979). The Superior Court clerk did not receive the notice until after the deadline had passed. The Appeals Court eventually dismissed the appeal as not timely filed. The case is here for further appellate review. Mass.R.A.P. 27.1, as amended, 367 Mass. 922 (1975).

We summarize the documented facts, as well as those facts alleged by the defendant. The defendant, on October 28, 1987, was found guilty by a jury in the Superior Court of rape and indecent assault and battery. On the same day he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment at Massachusetts Correctional Institution (M.C.I.), Cedar Junction, of from five to seven years on the rape conviction. ¹ The defendant was notified of his right to appeal his conviction within thirty days, pursuant to Mass. R.A.P. 4(b). ²

On October 28, 1987, the defendant was transported from the courthouse to M.C.I., Cedar Junction. One day later, he was transported to M.C.I., Concord. Approximately one week after sentencing, the defendant was informed by his trial counsel that, if he wanted to appeal, he had to file his own notice of appeal. The defendant, after seeking assistance from an inmate, prepared a document entitled "Notice of Appeals and Request For Transcripts for Appeal."

On November 21, 1987, twenty-four days after his sentencing in the Superior Court and thus within the thirty-day period prescribed by Mass.R.A.P. 4(b), the defendant claims he placed the notice of appeal, dated November 20, 1987, in a stamped envelope addressed to the "Clerk of Courts Superior Courthouse Dedham, Ma. 02026." In accordance with prison procedure, the defendant placed the envelope in the institutional mailbox outside the institutional dining hall.

The clerk of the Norfolk Superior Court did not receive the defendant's notice of appeal until December 3, 1987, after the thirty-day appeal period had expired. The envelope received by the office of the clerk of the Norfolk Superior Court was postmarked in Boston on December 1, 1987, for reasons not made apparent in the record. ³

On December 10, 1987, a Norfolk County Superior Court assistant clerk wrote the defendant a letter informing him that his notice of appeal had been untimely received and that it was being returned to him. On December 15, 1987, the defendant wrote the assistant clerk a letter explaining that he had placed his notice of appeal in the institutional mailbox at M.C.I., Concord, on November 21, 1987, and had made every effort to file the notice in a timely fashion. The defendant wrote: "I ask that you realize that my access to the mail is through one source only, the institutional mailbox at M.C.I. Concord. When the mail is picked up and the length of time it spends waiting to be processed, is not within my control. Kindly accept the enclosed Notice of Appeal and save the courts and everyone else involved the expense, delay and inconvenience of requiring me to have a Judge order the Appeal to be filed."

The assistant district attorney apparently was "unwilling to assent" to any late filing of a notice of appeal. On February 2, 1988, a Norfolk County assistant clerk wrote to the defendant advising him to file a "Motion for late filing appeal along with an affidavit explaining the circumstances of your late appeal." On February 10, 1988, the defendant filed a motion entitled "Belated Notice of Appeal," together with a copy of his original notice of appeal. On February 17, 1988, the trial judge allowed the defendant's motion "as to late filing," apparently without holding a hearing.

On June 2, 1988, an attorney from the appeals division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services entered an appearance for the defendant. On March 20, 1989, the Norfolk district attorney's office filed a motion to dismiss the appeal in the Appeals Court on the ground that the judge had no jurisdiction on February 17, 1988, to allow the defendant's late notice of appeal because the "Belated Notice of Appeal" had been filed beyond the sixty days permitted by Mass.R.A.P. 4(c), as amended, 378 Mass. 928 (1979). On April 19, 1989, a panel of the Appeals Court allowed the district attorney's motion to dismiss the appeal, and, on May 16, 1989, an Appeals Court panel denied the defendant's motion for reconsideration. We vacate the orders of the Appeals Court dismissing the appeal, and remand the matter to the Superior Court for further consideration. ⁴

The defendant argues that filing with the clerk, under Mass.R.A.P. 4(b), in the case of an incarcerated pro se inmate, should be deemed to have occurred on the inmate's relinquishment of control of his notice of appeal to the prison authorities. We agree.

The Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure were intended to simplify the procedure by which individuals take a case from the trial court to the appellate court, removing many of the traps for the unwary which previously prevented a litigant from having his appeal heard on the merits. See Pentucket Manor Chronic Hosp., Inc. v. Rate Setting Comm'n, 394 Mass. 233, 237 n. 8, 475 N.E.2d 1201 (1985), quoting Giacobbe v. First Coolidge Corp., 367 Mass. 309, 315, 325 N.E.2d 922 (1975). A flexible approach to the rules, which takes into account the peculiar facts of a case, is particularly appropriate here. See Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139, 142, 84 S.Ct. 1689, 1691, 12 L.Ed.2d 760 (1964). The defendant, acting without the aid of an attorney, wasincarcerated in a correctional facility when he placed his notice of appeal in the institutional mailbox. It would be unfair to hold the defendant accountable for the vagaries, if any, of the prison mail system.

In reaching our conclusion, we have looked to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of a parallel Federal rule. See Feltch v. General Rental Co., 383 Mass. 603, 613, 421 N.E.2d 67 (1981) ("In construing Mass.R.A.P. 4(a) ... we look at the construction of the parallel Federal rule"); Farley v. Sprague, 374 Mass. 419, 423, 372 N.E.2d 1298 (1978). In Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988), the Supreme Court decided that, under Fed.R.A.P. 4(a)(1), a pro se inmate's notice of appeal is to be considered filed at the moment it is delivered to the prison authorities. ⁵ The Supreme Court's reasoning bears quoting at length:

"The situation of prisoners seeking to appeal without the aid of counsel is unique. Such prisoners cannot take the steps other litigants can take to monitor the processing of their notices of appeal and to ensure that the court clerk receives and stamps their notices of appeal before the 30-day deadline. Unlike other litigants, pro se prisoners cannot personally travel to the courthouse to see that the notice is stamped "filed" or to establish the date on which the court received the notice. Other litigants may choose to entrust their appeals to the vagaries of the mail and the clerk's process for stamping incoming papers, but only the pro se prisoner is forced to do so by his situation.... [T]he pro se prisoner has no choice but to entrust the forwarding of his notice of appeal to...