Com. v. Howze, 01-P-601.

• Decision Date: 16 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-P-601.,01-P-601.
• Citation: 788 N.E.2d 586,58 Mass. App. Ct. 147
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Brad A. HOWZE.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

788 N.E.2d 586

58 Mass. App. Ct. 147

COMMONWEALTH v. Brad A. HOWZE.

No. 01-P-601.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Argued November 13, 2002.

Decided May 16, 2003.

Peter M. Onek, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant.

Brian A. Wilson, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: BROWN, BERRY, & COHEN, JJ.

BROWN, J.

The defendant was convicted of rape of a child, G.L. c. 265, § 23, and indecent assault and battery on a child, G.L. c. 265, § 13B. On appeal, the defendant alleges that (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an indecent assault and battery independent of the statutory rape, and therefore his convictions and sentences with respect to these offenses were duplicative; (2) the judge failed to instruct the jury that in order to convict the defendant of indecent assault and battery they had to find sufficient evidence of that offense independent of the evidence relating to statutory rape; and (3) the trial judge considered improper factors in fixing the defendant's sentence on the rape conviction.

Facts. To address the relatively narrow claims raised by the defendant, we set out only the cardinal facts pertinent to the issues raised. The victim, a thirteen year old girl, ran away from home after an argument with her parents. After a further argument with her boyfriend, she found herself alone at a bus depot in a nearby town. There, the defendant approached her in his car and offered to find a place for her to stay overnight.

The defendant drove the victim to a nearby motel, where he rented a room. Once inside the room, the defendant assaulted the victim. According to the victim, he threw her down on the bed on her back, got "on top of [her]," and pulled her jeans halfway off as she screamed and kicked at him. He stubbed his toe and yelled, "ouch." At that point, someone knocked on the door. The defendant opened the door slightly, and a woman asked, "Is everything okay?" He talked to her a few minutes. During that time the victim ran into the bathroom. After the woman left, the defendant banged on the bathroom door and warned the victim "to come out of the bathroom or he would kill [her]." When she came out, he threw her back down on the bed, pulled her jeans, the skirt she was wearing under her jeans, and her underwear down to her ankles, and engaged in vaginal intercourse with her. The defendant then left the room after warning the victim that he would kill her if she reported the incident.

The next morning the victim was reunited with her family through means not relevant here. After some delay, she reported the rape to her parents. A rape kit was prepared at a local hospital, and forensic testing ultimately linked the defendant (at least statistically) to semen recovered from the victim's body and clothing. The victim also identified the defendant as her attacker.

Other relevant details are included in our analysis as necessary.

Analysis. The defendant contends that the convictions of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen and statutory rape are duplicative because there is insufficient evidence of an act constituting indecent assault and battery separate from the rape, and the former crime is a lesser included offense of the latter. In Massachusetts, a single act may provide the basis for multiple convictions and penalties so long as none of the offenses involved is a lesser included crime of the other. See Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 44 Mass.App.Ct. 382, 386-388, 691 N.E.2d 585 (1998). See also Commonwealth v. Valliere, 437 Mass. 366, 371, 772 N.E.2d 27 (2002). For the purposes of determining whether an offense is included within another, a strict elements-based analysis is used. See Commonwealth v. Arriaga, supra; Commonwealth v. Valliere, supra. See also Commonwealth v. Buckley, 410 Mass. 209, 222, 571 N.E.2d 609 (1991), citing Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871). Stated simply, where each of two crimes has an element the other does not, neither is a lesser included offense of the other, regardless of any subjective similarity of the offenses or unity of the criminal act on which they are based. See Commonwealth v. Valliere, 437 Mass. at 371, 772 N.E.2d 27. See also Commonwealth v. Crocker, 384 Mass. 353, 357, 424 N.E.2d 524 (1981). The rationale for permitting multiple punishments in such situations derives from the view that where "neither crime is a lesser-included offense of the other, ... convictions on both are deemed to have been authorized by the Legislature and hence not [duplicative]" for double jeopardy purposes. Commonwealth v. Jones, 382 Mass. 387, 393, 416 N.E.2d 502 (1981). See Commonwealth v. Crocker, 384 Mass. at 360, 424 N.E.2d 524; Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 53 Mass.App.Ct. 480, 482-484, 760 N.E.2d 308 (2002).

Where the elements of one offense are wholly a subset of those of another, however, the crimes are deemed lesser and greater offenses. Double jeopardy principles ordinarily¹ forbid the imposition of multiple penalties for such cognate crimes, provided they arise out of a single criminal act. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366-369, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983); Shabazz v. Commonwealth, 387 Mass. 291, 293-295, 439 N.E.2d 760 (1982). Here, the crimes at issue, indecent assault and battery of a child and statutory rape, are cognate offenses; specifically, indecent assault and battery is a lesser included offense of statutory rape, at least as G.L. c. 265, § 13B, is codified since its amendment by St.1986, c. 187.² As amended, G.L. c. 265, § 13B, does not require proof of lack of consent. Thus, it contains no element not subsumed within the elements of statutory rape.³ As a result, if there is any possibility that the jury's verdicts here were premised on a single act, reversal as to the lesser offense (indecent assault and battery on a child) would be required. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 400 Mass. 676, 681-682, 511 N.E.2d 1095 (1987); Commonwealth v. Pinero, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 397, 399-400, 729 N.E.2d 679 (2000).

On appeal, the Commonwealth contends that the jury were, in fact, presented with discrete acts with respect to the two offenses; namely, the defendant's acts of "climbing on top of the victim ... and pulling her jeans, skirt and underwear down to her ankles ... together constituted"⁴ the indecent assault and battery, and that the subsequent penetration of her vagina was the basis for the rape conviction. There are, however, multiple problems with this approach.

First, the trial judge failed to inform the jury in his charge — either explicitly or through implication — that in order to find the defendant guilty of both offenses they were required to find independent acts sufficient to satisfy the elements of each crime. See Commonwealth v. Juzba, 46 Mass.App.Ct. 319, 325, 705 N.E.2d 1148 (1999) (no need to determine on appeal whether sufficient separate evidence existed to support distinct act, because judge did not instruct jury that conviction of indecent assault and battery must be based on separate act from rape; indecent assult and battery conviction vacated as duplicative). See also Commonwealth v. Thomas, 400 Mass. at 681-682, 511 N.E.2d 1095 (no need to consider whether evidence of separate act existed, because judge did not instruct jury that convictions must be based on separate acts; that instruction was law of the case, and conviction of indecent assault and battery was vacated as duplicative). Compare Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 429 Mass. 502, 501-510, 709 N.E.2d 809 (1999) (multiple convictions and sentences for cognate offenses permissible where judge expressly charged jury that each conviction must be predicated on discrete act). On the basis of the instructions given, it is impossible for us to know on what facts each convicttion rests. It is entirely possible that the criminal act relied upon by the jury with respect to both verdicts was the rape. See Commonwealth v. Zane Z., 51 Mass.App. Ct. 135, 141, 743 N.E.2d 867 (2001). Contrast Commonwealth v. Black, 50 Mass. App.Ct. 477, 479, 738 N.E.2d 751 (2000) (reversal not required where manner of presentation of evidence and instructions overall adequately identified separate conduct on which cognate counts were based).

In urging the opposite view, the Commonwealth lays much emphasis on the fact that the prosecutor told the jury that the rape count was based on the evidence of penetration and the indecent assault and battery charge was based on "sexual[] touching." In context, however, it is certainly plausible — if not probable — that the jury might have understood the reference to "sexual touching" to relate to the rape itself.⁵ Moreover, it was not argued to the jury that the acts in the first incident — lying top of the victim and pulling her jeans halfway down — constituted an indecent assault and battery, and an average juror might not have considered whether those acts amounted to an indecent assault and battery.⁶ For these reasons, we find that the requisite substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice was created by the potential confusion, and reversal of the conviction of indecent assault and battery on a child is required on this basis alone. See Commonwealth v. Juzba, 46 Mass.App.Ct. at 325, 705 N.E.2d 1148 (reversal required where judge did not instruct that convictions for indecent assault and battery and rape must be based on separate acts; unnecessary to determine whether there was sufficient evidence of potentially described adequate independent act); Commonwealth v. Zane Z., 51 Mass.App.Ct. at 141, 743 N.E.2d 867. See also Commonwealth v. Thomas, 400 Mass. at 681-682, 511 N.E.2d 1095. See generally Commonwealth v. Jones, 382 Mass. at 394-395, 416 N.E.2d 502.

With regard to the removal of the victim's underpants in the second incident (after the interruption), even had the jury been charged that the statutory rape count rested...