Com. v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 27 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-P-1691,96-P-1691
• Citation: 700 N.E.2d 848,45 Mass.App.Ct. 666
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Wayne JACKSON.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 848

700 N.E.2d 848

45 Mass.App.Ct. 666

COMMONWEALTH v. Wayne JACKSON.

No. 96-P-1691.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 2, 1998.

Decided Oct. 27, 1998.

Josephine H. Ross, Boylston, for defendant.

John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth.

Before PERRETTA, JACOBS and LENK, JJ.

PERRETTA, Justice.

On appeal from his convictions on a complaint charging him with distributing cocaine within a school zone, the defendant argues that the credibility of his sole witness was improperly and prejudicially undermined by impeachment with convictions inadmissible under G.L. c. 233, § 21, and profile evidence indicating that the witness was lying. We reverse the convictions.

1. The evidence. In the early morning hours of August 19, 1994, two Boston police officers were hiding behind bushes in the Beechland Street housing project. Sharing binoculars, the officers saw the defendant and Victor Kipping ¹ walk over to a car that had pulled up and stopped. The officers were about 250 feet from the car.

Officer Joseph Cheevers testified that he saw Kipping go to the driver's window, lean in, and appear to have a conversation. The defendant was standing about three feet behind Kipping. Cheevers stated that he saw Kipping turn to the defendant, reach out and take something from him, and then lean back into the car. After Kipping and the defendant left the area, Cheevers and his fellow officer, Jerry Barkowski, went to their car and followed and stopped the car that they had been watching. Upon looking into the car, Cheevers saw three plastic bags in a container lodged between the two front seats. Cheevers believed the substance in the bags was cocaine, and he and Barkowski quickly apprehended the defendant and Kipping.

Barkowski's testimony concerning his observations of the events did not differ in any material way from that of Cheevers. Both officers stated that they did not see drugs or money change hands between the occupants of the car and Kipping or the defendant. Nor were any drugs found on them when they were arrested.

Cheevers was allowed to testify that, in his experience, based upon over 300 drug arrests, it was very common for a drug buyer to refuse to reveal the identity of the seller because of fear of retribution.

Robert J. Leary, the driver of the car pulled over by the police, testified that he had not purchased any drugs from either the defendant or Kipping. He admitted to being a user of drugs and stated that he had met his passenger, Jeff Fox, at a bar that night and had agreed to give him a ride to West Roxbury in exchange for drugs. En route to Fox's home, Fox had him stop on Washington Street near Roslindale Square. Fox got out of the car, told Leary to wait for him, and went inside a three-family house. About five minutes later, Fox returned to the car and directed Leary to drive to the Beechland Street housing project. They drove through the project twice. On the second trip, they saw a group of men and pulled over. Fox leaned over Leary and yelled out to them from the driver's window. Kipping came over to the car, and Fox asked him if he had any drugs. Kipping said, "No," turned to the group behind him, and then told Leary that "there was nothing going on." After Leary repeated Kipping's statement to Fox, he started to drive back toward Washington Street when they were pulled over by the police.

As the police walked toward the car, Leary noticed that Fox began "squirming around," reaching into his back pocket and down inside his pants. When the police opened the passenger door, Fox handed them bags of cocaine.

2. Impeachment of Leary. After Leary's direct testimony and over the defendant's objection, the prosecutor was allowed to impeach his credibility with his record of convictions in 1981. ² As provided by G.L. c. 233, § 21, second par., those records would be inadmissible for impeachment purposes unless Leary had "subsequently been convicted of a crime within ten years of the time of his testifying." The last sentence of the second paragraph of the statute also provides that "[f]or the purpose of this paragraph, a plea of guilty or a finding or verdict of guilty shall constitute a conviction within the meaning of this section."

It is the Commonwealth's position that Leary's 1981 convictions were revitalized on September 16, 1994, when he appeared in West Roxbury District Court on a criminal complaint charging him with possession of a class B substance on August 19, 1994, the drug sale here in dispute. The Commonwealth argues that Leary testified on cross-examination at the defendant's trial that, on September 16, he pleaded guilty to the crime set out in the complaint against him.

We do not think the Commonwealth's characterization of Leary's testimony at the defendant's trial is entirely accurate. The transcript shows that, in response to the prosecutor's questions, Leary stated: "I went to court. I pleaded no contest or guilty, under the advice of counsel. Basically they're the same." After the prosecutor objected and the trial judge made an inaudible ruling, Leary stated, "I pleaded guilty." The trial judge then made another inaudible statement. In any event, Leary was then asked what happened with the case, if he knew, and he replied that "[i]t was continued without a finding for six months."

Having offered nothing in contradiction of Leary's version of the events of September 16, the Commonwealth isolates Leary's statement, "I pleaded guilty," and argues that it disposes of the question whether the proceedings against Leary on that date resulted in a conviction within the meaning of the last sentence of G.L. c. 233, § 21, second par. ³

As we read Leary's testimony and probation record, we conclude that the proceedings against him on September 16 were conducted in accordance with the procedures set out in G.L. c. 278, § 18, as amended by St.1992, c. 379, § 193, which provides, in pertinent part:

"A defendant who is before ... a district court ... on a criminal offense within the court's final jurisdiction shall plead not guilty or guilty, or with the consent of the court, nolo contendere. Such plea of guilty shall be submitted by the defendant and acted upon by the court; provided, however, that a defendant with whom the commonwealth cannot reach agreement for a recommended disposition shall be allowed to tender a plea of guilty together with a request for a specific disposition. Such request may include any disposition or dispositional terms within the court's jurisdiction, including, unless otherwise prohibited by law, a dispositional request that a guilty finding not be entered, but rather the case be continued without a finding to a specific date thereupon to be dismissed, such continuance conditioned upon compliance with specific terms and conditions or that the defendant be placed on probation pursuant to the provisions of [G.L. c. 276, § 87]. If such a plea, with an agreed upon recommendation or with a dispositional request by the defendant, is tendered, the court shall inform the defendant that it will not impose a disposition that exceeds the terms of the agreed upon recommendation or the dispositional request by the defendant, whichever is applicable, without giving the defendant the right to withdraw the plea.

"If a defendant, notwithstanding the requirements set forth herein before, attempts to enter a plea or statement consisting of an admission of facts sufficient for finding of guilt, or some similar statement, such admission shall be deemed a tender of a plea of guilty for purposes of the procedures set forth in this section." ⁴

These procedures allow a defendant to offer a "plea of guilty, together with a request that a guilty finding not be entered and that the case be continued without the entry of such a finding on specific terms or on probation...." Commonwealth v. Pyles, 423 Mass. 717, 721, 672 N.E.2d 96 (1996). As explained in the Pyles case, "[s]ection 18 represents the delineation by the Legislature of a dispositional option, similar to that offered by a pretrial diversion program." Id. at 722, 672 N.E.2d 96. See Commonwealth v. Norrell, 423 Mass. 725, 728, 673 N.E.2d 19 (1996).

The very purpose of a pretrial diversion program is to save a deserving defendant from the "consequences of having a criminal conviction on his record." Commonwealth v. Duquette, 386 Mass. 834, 843, 438 N.E.2d 334 (1982). Pretrial diversion is, however, unavailable as a dispositional option after there has been a conviction. As discussed in analogous precedent, a...