Com. v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 24 June 1981
• Citation: 11 Mass.App.Ct. 835,420 N.E.2d 34
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Linda JOHNSON.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 34

420 N.E.2d 34

11 Mass.App.Ct. 835

COMMONWEALTH v. Linda JOHNSON.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Jan. 19, 1981.

Decided May 14, 1981.

Further Appellate Review Denied June 24, 1981.

Gordon A. Oppenheim, Boston, for defendant.

Kevin Connelly, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before PERRETTA, ROSE and KASS, JJ.

PERRETTA, Justice.

The defendant pleaded guilty to one indictment charging her with assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G.L. c. 265, § 15A, and to so much of a second indictment for armed robbery as charged her with larceny from the person. G.L. c. 266, § 25. After the judge imposed a sentence greater than the defendant had anticipated she would receive, the defendant moved for leave to withdraw her pleas, but the judge denied her motion. On appeal she alleges, in essence, that her attorney had advised her that if she were to plead guilty and the judge should decline to impose the sentence that the prosecutor had agreed to recommend, she would be able either to withdraw her guilty pleas or refuse to plead guilty in the first instance, depending upon the judge's election under Mass.R.Crim.P. 12(c)(2), 378 Mass. --- (1979). ¹ She argues that as a result of her misunderstanding of what the prosecutor's recommendation was to be and the judge's alleged failure to comply with rule 12(c)(2), "she was not fully informed as to her rights and alternatives regarding the sentence." We hold that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty to the charges, and we affirm the judge's order denying her motion for leave to withdraw her pleas.

The defendant's motion was accompanied by affidavits from her attorney in which he set out the advice he had given the defendant on the question whether to change her pleas to the charges. The judge concluded that an evidentiary hearing on the motion was unnecessary because even though there was a misunderstanding between the prosecutor and defense counsel as to the terms of the Commonwealth's recommendation and notwithstanding what defense counsel had advised the defendant, he (the judge) had correctly and thoroughly informed her of the consequences of her plea as required by rule 12(c).

We recite the facts as they appear in defense counsel's affidavits and in the transcripts of the proceedings in which the defendant pleaded and in which she moved to vacate her pleas. ² The prosecutor and defense counsel entered into plea negotiations which concluded in an agreement that upon the defendant's change of her pleas, the prosecutor would recommend that she be incarcerated for five years and defense counsel would recommend that a sentence of probation be imposed. ³ Based on his understanding of the agreement, defense counsel advised the defendant that if she accepted the terms of the agreement and the Commonwealth's recommendation were followed, she would be eligible for parole after serving six months of the sentence; on the other hand, if the judge would not abide by the recommendation, the defendant could either refuse to plead guilty or withdraw her pleas. ⁴ Mass.R.Crim.P. 12(c) (2) & (6), 378 Mass. --- (1979). ⁵

The defendant decided to plead guilty, and when she offered her pleas to the judge, he asked the prosecutor whether there was "a joint recommendation." The prosecutor replied that there was not, and neither he nor defense counsel informed the judge that the pleas were, however, contingent upon an agreement under rule 12(b)(1)(C), --- Mass. --- (1979). ⁶ Additionally, they did not advise the judge of the substance of the agreement, as each understood it to be, until after the judge had accepted the pleas, contrary to the provisions of rule 12(b)(2) and (c)(1), 378 Mass. --- (1979). ⁷ See also Commonwealth v. Stanton, 2 Mass.App. 614, 619, 317 N.E.2d 487 (1974); Reporter's Notes to Mass.R Crim.P. 12, Mass.Ann.Laws, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 203-204. The judge, as evidenced by his remarks to counsel during agreements on the defendant's motion, understood the prosecutor's response and defense counsel's acquiescence in it to mean that the defendant's pleas were not contingent upon an agreement made pursuant to rule 12(b)(1). He next proceeded to engage in a dialogue with the defendant, eliciting from her responses to those questions pertinent to a determination whether she was voluntarily and knowingly pleading guilty. ⁸ Upon completion of his interrogation of the defendant, the judge accepted her pleas and asked the prosecutor and defense counsel what sentence each was seeking. The prosecutor replied, "at least five years in state's prison to be served at Framingham"; defense counsel urged that a sentence of probation be imposed in light of the defendant's self-rehabilitation since the time of the 1973 offenses. [11 Mass.App.Ct. 840] The judge then imposed two terms of incarceration at MCI, Walpole, for periods of not less than three years and not more than five years, to be served concurrently at Framingham. Thus, the defendant would not be eligible for parole until after she had been incarcerated for two years. G.L. c. 127, § 133.

It was at this point that defense counsel spoke up, told the judge of the agreement, as he understood it, and of his advice to the defendant, see note 4, supra, and moved for leave to withdraw the guilty pleas. Although the judge would not allow the defendant to withdraw her pleas, "based upon what I have just gone through," see note 8, supra, he was willing to, and in fact did, revise the sentence he had just imposed. The revised sentence consisted of two terms of incarceration to be served consecutively at Framingham. One term was for a period of ten years and the second was for a period of five years. ⁹

It is the defendant's claim that the judge did not comply with rule 12(c) and that because she received a sentence in excess of what she understood the prosecutor's recommendation to be, see Blaikie v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 375 Mass. 613, 616 n.2, 378 N.E.2d 1368 (1978), due process considerations require that she be allowed to withdraw her pleas. Unlike the circumstances in Commonwealth v. Stanton 2 Mass.App. 614, 317 N.E.2d 487, and in Commonwealth v. Cepulonis, --- Mass.App. ---, ^a 400 N.E.2d 1299 (1980), here the plea procedures are controlled by rule 12(c). That does not, however, change the focus of our review: "The real issue in cases like the present one is whether a waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made." Commonwealth v. Stanton, 2 Mass.App. at 620, 317 N.E.2d 487. See also Reporter's Notes to Mass.R.Crim.P. 12(c), Mass.Ann.Laws, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 204-208. Thus, while compliance with the procedures set out in rule 12(c) is mandatory, adherence to or departure from them is but one factor to be considered in resolving this issue.

To appreciate the gist of the defendant's claim, we consider first what should have occurred in the defendant's case, as contemplated by rule 12(b) and (c). Because there was a rule 12(b)(1)(C) agreement, the judge should have been informed of the existence and the substance of that agreement at the outset of the proceedings. Mass.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2) & (c)(1). If this had been done, it is possible that the misunderstanding would have been avoided at that time; but we proceed on the basis that it would not have. The judge, having been informed that the defendant's pleas were contingent upon the agreement, would next have informed the defendant of his election under rule 12(c)(2)(A) or (B). Assuming that the judge had elected to proceed under alternative (B), according to defense counsel's affidavit the proceedings would have ended there because the defendant would not have gone on to tender her pleas under rule 12(c)(4). However, had the judge selected alternative (A) and so advised the defendant, he next would have instructed her as to the consequences of her pleas. Mass.R.Crim.P. 12(c)(3). "To this point the court has been informed of the existence of and substance of a plea arrangement, has indicated a willingness to entertain that arrangement, and has informed the defendant or caused him to be informed of the consequences of acceptance of the plea. The defendant now formally tenders his plea to the court, which then conducts a hearing to determine the voluntariness thereof (rule 12(c)(4) and (5))." Reporter's Notes to Mass.R.Crim.P. 12(c), supra at 206.

In view of the sentence originally imposed by the judge, or even if it had been consistent with what the prosecutor had intended and had requested, it is reasonable to assume that the defendant would have been allowed to withdraw her pleas at that time pursuant to rule 12(c)(6). See Reporter's Notes to Mass.R.Crim.P. 12(c)(6), supra at 208-209; ABA Standards, Pleas of Guilty § 2.1(a)(i) (Approved Draft, 1968).

These simple and express procedures went awry when the prosecutor and defense counsel failed to comply with rule 12(b)(2), despite the judge's inquiry under rule 12(c)(1). Because of their noncompliance, the judge understandably, but erroneously, assumed that the defendant's pleas were not contingent upon any agreement under 12(b)(1). Since rule 12(c)(2) is mandatory only "(i)f there were sentence recommendations contingent upon the tender of the plea," the judge bypassed this subdivision of rule 12(c). Thus, the defendant tendered her pleas, she was advised of the consequences of her act, she was questioned about the voluntariness of her decision, and her pleas were then accepted. Had there not in fact been a plea agreement, there could be no attack on the procedure used in accepting the defendant's pleas. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 370 Mass. 141, 144-145, 345 N.E.2d 695 (1976); Commonwealth v. Stanton, 2 Mass.App. at 615-617 n.1, 622, 317 N.E.2d 487. Cf. Reporter's Notes to Mass.R.Crim.P. 12(c), supra at 204. Contrast factually, Commonwealth v. CEPULONIS, --- MASS.APP. AT ---, 400 N.E.2D 1299^B.

We consider now the adverse...