Com. v. Jones

• Decision Date: 24 October 2005
• Citation: 886 A.2d 689
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Kelvin O. JONES, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

886 A.2d 689

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Kelvin O. JONES, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted January 24, 2005.

Filed October 24, 2005.

Richard A. Webster, Allentown, for appellant.

James B. Martin, Asst. Dist. Atty., Allentown, for Com., appellee.

BEFORE: BENDER, GANTMAN, and JOHNSON, JJ.

OPINION BY GANTMAN, J.:

¶ 1 Appellant, Kelvin O. Jones, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas, following his conviction for first degree murder.¹ Appellant asks us to determine whether the Commonwealth violated his speedy trial rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD")² and Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600. Additionally, Appellant challenges the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence used to support his conviction for first degree murder. We hold the Commonwealth did not violate Appellant's speedy trial rights under either the IAD or Rule 600. Further, we hold the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant's conviction, and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.

¶ 2 The trial court fully and correctly set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal as follows:

1. A complaint charging [Appellant] with criminal homicide in Pennsylvania was filed ... on October 10, 1999. The complaint listed [Appellant's] address as Riker's Island Prison, New York City, New York.

2. Appellant was then being held by the New York authorities on a homicide charge arising from another homicide in the state of New York.

3. On December 10, 1999, a warrant was issued for [Appellant's] arrest on the Pennsylvania homicide charge.

4. Between December 21, 1999 and March 25, 2002, the Pennsylvania authorities, through Lehigh County Chief Detective Steckel, maintained telephone contact with New York authorities concerning [Appellant's] status in New York and his availability for transfer to Pennsylvania to stand trial for the Pennsylvania homicide. There were over fifty contacts made between the Pennsylvania and New York authorities during this time period.

5. On January 12, 2000, the Pennsylvania authorities lodged a detainer against [Appellant] in New York.

6. Shortly after the detainer was lodged, specifically on January 24, 2000, the New York prosecuting attorney informed Detective Steckel that [Appellant] was not available for transfer to Pennsylvania because of his ongoing New York homicide case.

7. On July 16, 2001, [Appellant] entered a plea of guilty to the New York homicide charge and was sentenced on September 25, 2001 to a term of imprisonment of not less than fifteen years to life.

8. Upon learning that [Appellant] had been sentenced in New York, Detective Steckel mailed [IAD] Form V to the New York authorities requesting that they deliver temporary custody of [Appellant] to the appropriate authorities in Pennsylvania for trial on the Pennsylvania homicide charge.

9. However, [Appellant] further delayed his transfer to Pennsylvania by contesting his extradition.

10. Eventually, [Appellant] was extradited to Pennsylvania on March 26, 2002.

11. A preliminary hearing on the Pennsylvania homicide charge was scheduled initially for April 2, 2002. However, at the request of defense counsel the hearing was continued to May 15, 2002. When defense counsel requested a second continuance, the hearing was rescheduled to June 21, 2002.

12. The Commonwealth requested continuances of the preliminary hearing on June 21, 2002 and July 22, 2002. As a result, the preliminary hearing was again rescheduled and was finally held on August 29, 2002.

13. After the preliminary hearing, [Appellant] was bound over for trial, and his arraignment was scheduled for September 13, 2002.

14. On September 13, 2002, [Appellant] appeared for his arraignment in the company of his then counsel, Maureen Coggins, Esq.

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15. On September 20, 2002, [Appellant] filed [a motion for] pretrial [discovery and inspection], which [was] decided on October 11, 2002.

16. On January 9, 2003, at the request of [Appellant's new counsel], the trial was continued from January 21, 2003 to April 21, 2003.

17. On February 26, 2003, also at the request of [Appellant's] counsel, the trial was continued to September 15, 2003.³

18. On September 12, 2003, the ... trial [court] was still engaged in the trial of a lengthy products liability case, which was to last an additional one or two weeks. Therefore, the trial of [Appellant's] case was rescheduled by the court to begin on September 29, 2003.

19. On September 22, 2003, on the Commonwealth's motion, the trial was continued to November 3, 2003, because the September 29th trial date conflicted with the prosecuting attorney's impending marriage. The continuance was granted in open court in the presence of [Appellant] and his counsel, who indicated they had no objection to the continuance.

(Trial Court Opinion, dated October 23, 2003, at 2-5).

¶ 3 Jury selection for Appellant's trial commenced on November 3, 2003. On November 12, 2003, the jury found Appellant guilty of first degree murder. Appellant received a lifetime prison sentence on November 13, 2003. On November 21, 2003, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion which challenged his conviction based upon the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence. By order entered March 11, 2004, the trial court denied Appellant's post-sentence motion. This timely appeal followed.

¶ 4 Appellant raises four issues for our review:

DID THE COMMONWEALTH VIOLATE THE [IAD], IN THAT THE TRIAL WAS NOT SCHEDULED WITHIN THE 120-DAY LIMIT?

DID THE COMMONWEALTH VIOLATE [APPELLANT'S] RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL PURSUANT TO PENNSYLVANIA RULE 600 BY FAILING TO EXERCISE DUE DILIGENCE IN [BRINGING] THE CASE TO TRIAL WITHIN THE APPLICABLE TIME PERIOD?

WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO SUPPORT A FIRST DEGREE MURDER CONVICTION BASED UPON THE LACK OF ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE KILLING WAS WILLFUL, DELIBERATE OR PREMEDITATED?

WHETHER THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE JURY'S VERDICT OF GUILTY TO MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE SHOULD BE OVERTURNED?

(Appellant's Brief at 3-4).

¶ 5 In his first issue, Appellant asserts that under Article IV(c) of the IAD, a defendant who contests his extradition must be brought to trial within 120 days of his arrival in the receiving state. Appellant avers he contested his extradition from New York to Pennsylvania, and the 120-day time period for his trial began to run on March 26, 2002. Appellant insists, however, that the Commonwealth "failed to act in any way to bring to the court's attention the possibility of a violation of [the] 120-day time period" when the court discussed potential trial dates with the parties at Appellant's arraignment. (Appellant's Brief at 15). Moreover, Appellant contends he did not waive this claim by agreeing to a trial date outside of the 120-day period. Appellant concludes the Commonwealth violated Article IV(a) of the IAD, and he asks this Court to overturn the verdict and dismiss his case. We disagree.

¶ 6 "The IAD is an agreement between forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the United States, that establishes procedures for the transfer of prisoners incarcerated in one jurisdiction to the temporary custody of another jurisdiction which has lodged a detainer against a prisoner." Commonwealth v. McNear, 852 A.2d 401, 405 n. 3 (Pa.Super.2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 567 Pa. 135, 138-39, 786 A.2d 173, 175 (2001)).

Unlike a request for extradition, which is a request that the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated transfer custody to the requesting state, a detainer is merely a means of informing the custodial jurisdiction that there are outstanding charges pending in another jurisdiction and a request to hold the prisoner for the requesting state or notify the requesting state of the prisoner's imminent release.

Id. (quoting Davis, supra).

¶ 7 Article IV of the IAD sets forth the procedure by which the authorities in the requesting state initiate the transfer:

(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with Article V(a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated....

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(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be commenced within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state....

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9101, Article IV.

¶ 8 "[T]he IAD may be tolled by the defendant's own actions." Commonwealth v. Montione, 554 Pa. 121, 126, 720 A.2d 738, 741 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1098, 119 S.Ct. 1575, 143 L.Ed.2d 671 (1999).⁴ Article VI(a) of the IAD also addresses periods of delay which do not count toward the 120-day calculation:

In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods provided in Article III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9101, Article VI(a).

¶ 9 Significantly, a defendant may waive his rights under the IAD by agreeing to a trial date outside the time periods mandated by the statute. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 120 S.Ct. 659, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000). In Hill, both defense counsel and the prosecution agreed on a trial date, which fell outside of the 180-day period mandated by Article III of the IAD.⁵ Upon expiration of the 180-day period, and prior to trial, defense counsel moved to dismiss the charges on Article III grounds. The Supreme Court held that the prior...