Commonwealth v. Buford
Decision Date | 08 October 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 3297 EDA 2012,3297 EDA 2012 |
Citation | 101 A.3d 1182,2014 PA Super 224 |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Nasir BUFORD, Appellant. |
Mitchell S. Strutin, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Hugh J. Burns, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
BEFORE: ALLEN, OLSON, and OTT, JJ.
Nasir Buford, (“Appellant”), appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction by a jury of first degree murder, possessing an instrument of crime, and violating the Uniform Firearms Act.1 We affirm.
The trial court provided the following background relative to this action:
Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/14, at 1. The trial court and Appellant have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
Appellant's first issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Specifically, Appellant contends:
The Commonwealth's evidence failed to establish the appellant's identity as a shooter or as a participant in the incident resulting in the victim's death ... Even if the Commonwealth did, in fact, prove the appellant's involvement in the crime, it failed to prove that the appellant acted with the specific intent to kill, malice or premeditation, that he fired weapon or that he was responsible for the victim's death. The Commonwealth's evidence in this regard was speculative, conjectural and inherently unreliable and did not sustain the Commonwealth's burden beyond a reasonable doubt.
Further, Appellant maintains:
[T]he Commonwealth failed to sustain its burden of proving the appellant's guilt of a violation of the Uniform Firearms Act, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106. Barrel length is an essential element of the crime defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106. In this matter, the Commonwealth presented absolutely no evidence to establish barrel length.
Id. at 25–26 (citations omitted).
We recognize:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 886 A.2d 689, 704 (Pa.Super.2005) (citations omitted).
We have expressed:
Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for first-degree murder where the Commonwealth has established that the defendant acted with a specific intent to kill, that a human being was unlawfully killed, that the defendant committed the killing, and that the killing was deliberate. A specific intent to kill may be inferred from the defendant's use of a weapon on a vital part of the victim's body.
Commonwealth v. Ramos, 573 Pa. 605, 827 A.2d 1195, 1196 (2003) (internal citations omitted).
Our crimes code defines possessing an instrument of crime as follows:
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a) -(b), and (d).
Moreover, the Uniform Firearms Act provides in pertinent part:
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1)-(2), (e)(1) (footnote omitted).
Here, the trial court determined:
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