Com. v. Knap
Decision Date | 29 May 1992 |
Citation | 412 Mass. 712,592 N.E.2d 747 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Andre T. KNAP. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Andrew Silverman, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for defendant.
Ariane D. Vuono, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Com.
Before LIACOS, C.J., and NOLAN, LYNCH, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.
Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant was found guilty of rape of a child, G.L. c. 265, § 23 (1990 ed.), and indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, G.L. c. 265, § 13B (1990 ed.). The defendant appeals claiming that the trial judge erred when he refused to instruct the jury that a reasonable mistake of fact as to identity is a defense to charges of statutory rape and indecent assault and battery on a child. 1 He also claims that the judge committed reversible error by instructing the jury only as to consciousness of guilt, when there was evidence of both consciousness of innocence, as well as guilt. We allowed the defendant's application for direct appellate review, and we affirm the convictions.
The defendant testified that there was only one sexual episode between himself and the victim. One night in September of 1989, after he had taken his girl friend to work and returned home, he went to bed for a nap which was his usual custom. He was awakened by someone massaging him, and then felt a hand go between his legs. The bedroom was kept very dark. He assumed his girl friend was in bed with him. He responded by licking her breasts and "went between her legs" and "licked the outside of her vagina." He then realized that the person was not his girl friend. He jumped up and turned on the light and saw the babysitter, who was naked. He knew she was thirteen years old. He told her to get out of the bed.
The victim testified that they had had sexual relations for several months.
1. Reasonable mistake of fact as to identity. We have held that a reasonable mistake as to the age of the victim is not a defense to the crime of statutory rape. Commonwealth v. Miller, 385 Mass. 521, 522, 432 N.E.2d 463 (1982). The defendant argues that a reasonable mistake of fact as to identity, unlike a reasonable mistake of fact as to age, should be a defense to a charge of statutory rape and indecent assault and battery with a child under fourteen because if the facts were as the defendant believed, he would have committed no crime. We see no reason to differentiate between a mistake as to age, and a mistake as to identity. As we stated in Miller, supra, a
2. Strict liability. The defendant argues that neither statutory rape nor indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen are strict liability crimes. We pass over the question whether this issue is properly preserved merely by the defendant's objection to the judge's refusal to charge as requested. Statutory rape is a strict liability crime. Commonwealth v. Miller, supra. The only elements the Commonwealth must prove are (1) sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with (2) a child under sixteen years of age.
With respect to indecent assault and battery on a child, the Commonwealth must prove only (1) indecent assault and battery on (2) a child under the age of fourteen. In 1986 the Legislature amended G.L. c. 265, § 13B, 2 by eliminating consent as a defense to the crime involving children under the age of fourteen, thus placing this offense in the same category as statutory rape. (footnote omitted). Commonwealth v. Miller, supra at 524, 432 N.E.2d 463.
3. Erroneous instructions. The defendant argues that, where there was evidence of both consciousness of innocence and consciousness of guilt, the judge committed reversible error when he instructed the jury only as to consciousness of guilt. At a side bar conference, the judge, sua sponte, asked if an instruction on consciousness of guilt ought to be given. When the defendant indicated he wanted an instruction concerning consciousness of innocence, the judge suggested that was a matter for closing argument. The judge's instruction was as follows:
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