Com. v. Lanoue

• Decision Date: 30 July 1984
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. James LANOUE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 159

467 N.E.2d 159

392 Mass. 583

COMMONWEALTH v. James LANOUE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued May 7, 1984.

Decided July 30, 1984.

William P. Homans, Jr., Boston, for defendant.

Robin A. Pearl, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and LIACOS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.

NOLAN, Justice.

The defendant, James Lanoue, was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant claims the following errors: (1) the denial of his motion to suppress; (2) the denial of his motion for a required finding of not guilty on so much of the indictment as charges murder in the first degree; (3) the questioning of prospective jurors; ¹ and (4) the trial judge's instructions to the jury on reasonable doubt. The defendant seasonably objected to both the judge's questioning of prospective jurors and his instructions on reasonable doubt. On the basis of these errors, the defendant requests a new trial. In the alternative, he requests that we exercise our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict to murder in the second degree. We find no reversible error at trial. However, we believe that this case presents an appropriate occasion to exercise our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, and we reduce the verdict to guilty of murder in the second degree.

We review briefly the evidence presented at trial. On the evening of February 14, 1980, Elizabeth Creamer, the victim, was murdered at 14 Temple Street in Boston. At approximately 9:30 P.M. on that evening, Ida Lanoue, the defendant's mother, walked to the police station and sought the aid of the Boston police department. She requested that they proceed to 14 Temple Street. Officers Albert Charbonnier and Patrick Russel accompanied Mrs. Lanoue there.

Upon their arrival, the police officers initially saw the defendant in the kitchen sweeping up debris from the floor. As the officers approached the defendant, they observed blood on his forearms and hands. Officer Charbonnier inquired whether anything was wrong, and the defendant stated that he had cut himself shaving.

From his position in the kitchen, Officer Charbonnier noticed blood in an adjacent bedroom. Upon investigation he found large amounts of blood on the bed and the pillow. He also found blood on a piece of clothesline, on a hairdryer and its cord. After further investigation, Charbonnier noticed that the door leading to the courtyard was blocked by a heavy chest of drawers surrounded by broken glass and other debris. After removing the chest and opening the door, he saw a steamer trunk with a piece of cloth protruding from it. The victim's partially clothed body was found in the trunk.

Sergeant James Curran, who had arrived at the scene in response to a radio dispatch, placed the defendant under arrest. As the officer started to recite the Miranda warnings, the defendant blurted out, "Who gives a .... I'll only get twelve years, anyhow." The defendant was then taken to the police station and booked. He again received the Miranda warnings. Detective Sergeant James P. Chaisson thereafter proceeded to interrogate the defendant, but only after reciting the Miranda warnings a third time. The defendant indicated that he was willing to make a statement.

He related that in the early evening of February 14, he invited the victim to his apartment for a few drinks. He asked the victim to purchase some vodka at the liquor store. When she returned, they started drinking the vodka straight from the bottle. At some point the victim began to undress and said "no ... money, no fun." After she said this, the defendant stated that he "passed out" or went "blank" and remembered nothing until he awoke and saw the victim lying bloodied in the corner of the room.

He stated he listened for her heart beat and found no pulse. He also said that it looked as though he had "beat[en] her ... head in." The defendant then went to the basement to get a trunk. He tried to dress the victim, placed her in the trunk and put the trunk in the courtyard. At some point he remembered telling his mother that he thought he had hurt the victim and that he wanted his mother to get the car in order to dump the trunk somewhere. When the police arrived the defendant said that he tried to make up a story to conceal what had happened.

The medical examiner who conducted the autopsy testified that the victim died as a result of asphyxia due to ligature and manual strangulation. Prior to her death the victim incurred numerous injuries. The external observations revealed bruises and cuts around her neck, on the left side of her face, and on her lips, right shoulder, spine, and right buttock. Her nose was broken also. The internal examination revealed bruises in the left frontal area and on the back of the head.

1. The motion to suppress. The defendant asserts two grounds of error in the denial of his motion to suppress: (1) that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the voluntariness of his spontaneous, inculpatory statement made at the time of his arrest; and (2) that the Commonwealth failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his statement made during interrogation was the product of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. The defendant bases each argument on the evidence which indicated that he was intoxicated at the time each statement was made.

a. The defendant first claims that the statement, "Who gives a .... I'll only get twelve years, anyhow," was inadmissible because it was not the product of a rational intellect. The defendant was tried prior to Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 152, 430 N.E.2d 1198, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137, 102 S.Ct. 2967, 73 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1982), which imposes on the Commonwealth the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the voluntariness of a statement before such statement is placed before the jury. We have not extended this holding retroactively, and therefore it is inapplicable in this case. Commonwealth v. Parham, 390 Mass. 833, 838 n. 3, 460 N.E.2d 589 (1984).

The present case involves the question whether the defendant was so intoxicated at the time he uttered the spontaneous, inculpatory statement as to preclude a finding that the statement was "the product of a rational intellect and a free will." ² Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208, 80 S.Ct. 274, 280, 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960). See Commonwealth v. Vick, 381 Mass. 43, 45, 406 N.E.2d 1295 (1980). In determining voluntariness, we must examine the totality of the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Garcia, 379 Mass. 422, 428, 399 N.E.2d 460 (1980). Intoxication is an important factor which bears on the issue of voluntariness. Commonwealth v. Wampler, 369 Mass. 121, 124, 337 N.E.2d 892 (1975). However, "[i]ntoxication alone is not sufficient to negate an otherwise voluntary act." Commonwealth v. Doucette, 391 Mass. 443, 448, 462 N.E.2d 1084 (1984).

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the evidence concerning the extent of the defendant's inebriation was conflicting. On one hand, the defendant's mother testified about the defendant's long history of alcohol abuse. She also described the defendant's periodic ingestion of prescription medication. In the early evening of February 14, she saw the defendant about to take a handful of pills which, she assumed, were pain killers. She testified that at various times that evening the defendant was perspiring heavily, mumbling incoherently, and unable to sit on her bed without falling to the floor. In her opinion, the defendant was under the influence of both alcohol and drugs.

The defendant testified that for some time he had been ingesting Darvon, Librium, Dalmane, Inderal, and Pro-Bathine approximately four times a day. He stated also that he consumed at least one pint of vodka daily. On February 14, he began drinking at 10:45 A.M. and consumed his regular heavy dosage of pills during the day. He gave a detailed account of his whereabouts that day until the time the victim uttered the provocative remark. At that point his memory failed.

On the other hand, Officer Charbonnier, who was first to arrive at the scene, stated that the defendant had no trouble standing, staying awake, or conversing with the officers. He did not observe the defendant's speech as being slurred or his eyes as being glassy. In his opinion, the defendant was sober. Sergeant James Curran and Officer Robert MacAleese, who went to 14 Temple Street in response to a radio dispatch, also testified that in their opinion the defendant was sober. An assistant district attorney who first saw the defendant in the interrogation room at the police station on the night of the arrest noticed that the defendant's speech was slightly slurred, and admitted that the defendant appeared to have been drinking. Detective Sergeant James Chaisson, who also first saw the defendant at the police station, testified that the defendant looked as if "he had been drinking" and that his eyes were glassy. However, each stated that, in his opinion, the defendant was sober.

On the basis of this evidence, the judge denied the defendant's motion to suppress the spontaneous, inculpatory statement. This determination clearly lay in the judge's assessment of the witnesses' credibility. In the absence of subsidiary findings, we assume that the judge's determination of credibility was adverse to the losing party, the defendant. Commonwealth v. Quigley, 391 Mass. 461, 463, 462 N.E.2d 92 (1984). We shall not disturb this determination because the judge had the unique opportunity to observe and evaluate the witnesses and resolve the issue of credibility. See Commonwealth v. Hooks, 375 Mass. 284, 289, 376 N.E.2d 857 (1978).

b. The defendant also argues that the statements made during the interrogation were not the product of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the defendant's Miranda rights....