Com. v. Leis

• Citation: 243 N.E.2d 898,355 Mass. 189
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Joseph D. LEIS. (and five companion cases 1 ).
• Decision Date: 09 January 1969
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 898

243 N.E.2d 898

355 Mass. 189

COMMONWEALTH v. Joseph D. LEIS. (and five companion cases ¹).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 2, 1968.

Decided Jan. 9, 1969.

Joseph S. Oteri, Boston (Harvey A. Silverglate, Cambridge, with him), for defendants.

James D. St. Clair, Sp. Asst. Dist. Atty. (Robert Y. Murray, Asst. Dist. Atty., with him), for the Commonwealth.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and SPALDING, WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, KIRK, SPIEGEL and REARDON, JJ.

SPIEGEL, Justice.

There were complaints against the defendants for unlawfully having in their possession a certain narcotic drug, marihuana, ² and for conspiracy to violate the Narcotic Drugs Law. ³ They were found guilty in the District Court and appeals were filed in the Superior Court. In addition the defendants were indicted for illegal possession of marihuana with intent to sell it unlawfully. ⁴ In the Superior Court the defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaints and the indictments, asserting that the statutory provisions regulating the possession, use and sale of marihuana in this Commonwealth are unconstitutional. After a lengthy hearing at which eighteen expert witnesses testified, ⁵ the trial judge denied the defendants' motions and reported the cases on the following question: 'Are the provisions of G.L. chapter 94, sections 205, 213A and 217B constitutional as applied to the defendants, or either of them under the provisions of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, part 1; Article IV, part 2; Article VII, part 1; Article XIV, part 1; and Article XXVI, part 1, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts?' The transcript of the hearing is before us.

The parties have stipulated to the following facts. 'The defendants were arrested at Logan International Airport * * * on March 11, 1967 by * * * members of the Boston Vice Squad when one of the defendants presented a claims check for a trunk at an airline baggage terminal. The trunk contained fifty pounds of sand and five pounds of marihuana. * * * (N)either of the defendants has been convicted previously for any violation of the narcotic drug laws of the Commonwealth.'

1. The defendants allege that the Narcotic Drugs Law of the Commonwealth is 'arbitrary and irrational and not suited to achieve any valid legislative end in that * * * it imposes harsh penalties upon mere possession of marihuana, or possession with intent to sell, or being present where marihuana is kept, without a showing that use of this substance poses a threat to the public health, safety, welfare or morals.' They conclude that it therefore violates Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth ⁶ and the Due Process Clause of the Fourtenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. ⁷ The defendants contend that the law, 'as applied to marihuana, goes beyond the police power of the Commonwealth in that it is not and cannot be aimed at achieving any valid legislative end, namely protection of the health, safety, welfare and morals.' They assert that it therefore violates, in addition to Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, art. 7 ⁸ and art. 1 ⁹ of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth.

The defendants first argue that the law is 'irrational and unreasonable' because the Legislature did not thoroughly investigate the available scientific and medical evidence concerning marihuana when enacting and revising the law.

We know of nothing that comples the Legislature to thoroughly investigate the available scientific and medical evidence when enacting a law. The test of whether an act of the Legislature is rational and reasonable is not whether the records of the Legislature contain a sufficient basis of fact to sustain that act. The Legislature is presumed to have acted rationally and reasonably. See Commonwealth v. Finnigan, 326 Mass. 378, 379, 96 N.E.2d 715; Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 348 Mass. 414, 422, 204 N.E.2d 281. 'Unless the act of the Legislature cannot be supported upon any rational basis of fact that reasonably can be conceived to sustain it, the court has no power to strike it down as violative of the Constitution.' Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Director of the Div. on the Necessaries of Life of Commonwealth, 307 Mass. 408, 418, 30 N.E.2d 269, 274, 131 A.L.R. 1254. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234.

The defendants then argue that the law is irrational and unreasonable and that it serves no legitimate State interest because there is no evidence that marihuana endangers the health, safety, welfare or morals of the community. They assert, inter alia, that there is no evidence to support the 'allegations' that the smoking of marihuana causes psychotic reactions or 'psychotic breaks' and that the use of marihuana leads to the use of more dangerous drugs. They summarily dispose of '(t)he charge that marihuana causes disorientation, psychomotor discoordination, excitement and confusion' as merely a statement that marihuana causes a state of intoxication if used to excess, and of the 'charge' that marihuana causes automobile accidents as pure 'speculation.'

The testimony of the experts fully justifies the conclusion that marihuana is a 'mind-altering' drug. There was evidence that the effect of such a drug is 'a complex interaction between the physical or pharmacological properties of that drug * * * and most importantly the personality or character structure of the person consuming that drug, and * * * the social setting or context in which the drug is taken, including expectations, attitudes, et cetera.' The smoking of marihuana may cause a state of euphoria and hallucinations or mental confusion and acute panic. It tends to exacerbate an underlying mental condition and to accentuate the smoker's basic personality makeup. When used by persons who have personality disorders or who are predisposed to 'psychotic breaks,' it may contribute to the onset of a 'psychotic break.' ¹⁰ The problem is magnified by the fact that persons having personality disorders and predispositions to 'psychotic breaks' are more likely to experiment with marihuana and to become psychologically dependent upon it. Although the smoking of marihuana triggers only 'acute (short-term) psychotic breaks' and does not apparently cause permanent psychotic injury or mental deterioration, an acute psychotic break, while it lasts, is as serious as a chronic mental disorder.

Essentially the experts do not point to any evidence of a direct, causal relationship betwen the smoking of marihuana and the use of more dangerous drugs. The studies that do exist discount the once prevalent belief that the smoking of marihuana inevitably leads to the use of more dangerous drugs. ¹¹ However, it it not necessary to show such a direct, causal relationship. There is considerable evidence that marihuana does lead some people to the use of more dangerous drugs. The progression from marihuana to heroin or LSD is a frequent sequence.

In an attempt to disprove the claim that the use of marihuana may cause automobile accidents, the defendants say that 'no evidence (was) produced linking marihuana use with * * * (such) accidents.' The evidence, however, showed there is no accurate, reliable scientific means of determining whether the operator of a motor vehicle has recently smoked marihuana. A person 'high on marihuana is unlikely to stagger or weave when he walks. While the smoking of marihuana may cause dilatation of the conjunctival blood vessels, there is recent evidence that it does not cause pupillary dilatation. ¹² The burning of marihuana does produce a recognizable odor, but that odor could be easily disguised. These properties of the drug undoubtedly account for the unavailability of statistical data. However, there is agreement among the experts that marihuana causes an alteration of sensory perception, a degree of psychomotor discoordination and an inability to concentrate. All of these effects of marihuana would interfere with the operation of a motor vehicle.

We do not think that the present unavailability of or inability to collect absolute, statistical and scientific proof that the smoking of marihuana (1) triggers 'psychotic breaks,' (2) leads to the use of more dangerous drugs and (3) causes automobile accidents prevents the Legislature from acting to prohibit its use. Surely the defendants would not contend, for example, that unless experiments absolutely establish that thalidomide causes birth defects the Legislature could not prevent the distribution of that drug. To prevent 'psychotic breaks,' to guard against the use of more dangerous drugs and to eliminate a cause of automobile accidents are valid State interests.

The defendants insist that the right to smoke marihuana is guaranteed by the Constitutions of the Commonwealth and of the United States and must be balanced against the interests of the State in prohibiting its use. No such right exists. It is not specifically preserved by either Constitution. The right to smoke marihuana is not 'fundamental to the American scheme of justice * * * necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty.' Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1447--1448, n. 14, 20 L.Ed.2d 491. It is not within a 'zone of privacy' formed by 'penumbras' of the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510. The defendants have no right, fundamental or otherwise, to become intoxicated by means of the smoking of marihuana. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758. Cf. ...