Com. v. Lombard

• Decision Date: 03 March 1995
• Citation: 646 N.E.2d 400,419 Mass. 585
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH, v. Lisa M. LOMBARD (and three companion cases 1 ).

Page 400

646 N.E.2d 400

419 Mass. 585

COMMONWEALTH, v. Lisa M. LOMBARD (and three companion cases ¹).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Worcester.

Argued Jan. 12, 1995.

Decided March 3, 1995.

Edward C. Bryant, Jr., Springfield, for Anita M. Sargent.

Brian J. Buckley, Worcester, for Lisa M. Lombard.

James P. McKenna, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Commonwealth.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, NOLAN, LYNCH, & GREANEY, JJ.

GREANEY, Justice.

In Commonwealth v. Lombard, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 43, 636 N.E.2d 1345 (1994), the Appeals Court reversed the robbery convictions of the defendants, Lisa M. Lombard and Anita M. Sargent, on the ground that the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient to warrant a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants had participated as joint venturers in a robbery committed by Henry Lombard, the brother of Sargent and the husband of Lombard. ² The Appeals Court affirmed the defendants' convictions of assault and battery. We granted the Commonwealth's application for further appellate review. We conclude, as did the Appeals Court, that the Commonwealth's proof on the critical point of intent was insufficient as matter of law to convict the defendants of robbery. Accordingly, we reverse their robbery convictions. The convictions of assault and battery, which apparently were placed on file without the consent of the defendants, are affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Paniaqua, 413 Mass. 796, 797 n. 1, 604 N.E.2d 1278 (1992).

Immediately prior to the commencement of trial, Henry Lombard entered guilty pleas to charges of robbery, larceny from a person, assault by means of a dangerous weapon shod foot), and assault and battery. The defendants proceeded to trial. The evidence in the Commonwealth's case, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677, 393 N.E.2d 370 (1979), was summarized by the Appeals Court. We repeat that summary with certain additions which we have placed in brackets.

"Ronald Corriveau testified that [just after 9 p.m. on June 22, 1992] he was seated in his [automobile], which was parked along the curb outside a Sears store in [the Auburn] shopping mall. The engine was running, and he was waiting for his wife, Georgette Corriveau, to come out of the store. Upon seeing her, he reached over and pushed open the passenger door. Before she could slip into her seat, her purse was pulled from her shoulder by Henry Lombard. Georgette Corriveau told her husband what had happened, and he told her to wait on the sidewalk. Because Corriveau had left the engine running while he waited for his wife, he was able to give immediate pursuit to Henry Lombard, who was running among the [automobiles] parked in the lot. [The chase covered a fair amount of ground in the mall parking lot, which contained a number of parked vehicles. Lombard and the pursuing automobile were soon out of Georgette Corriveau's view.]

"Eventually, Henry Lombard apparently tired and slowed his pace. Corriveau got out of his [automobile] and ran toward him. Lombard held to the strap of the purse and swung at Corriveau. The strap broke, and the purse sailed past Corriveau. Corriveau lunged for Lombard [and held him around the legs, immobilizing him].

"Two or three people, seeing the chase [or] the struggle, started toward the two men.... Each testified that, as they came upon the scene of the [struggle], a van pulled up. Two women, the defendants, got out of the van and began to kick and hit Corriveau, who was holding Henry Lombard's legs. [Corriveau and one of the bystanders heard one of the women say, as she got out of the van, 'You're assaulting ("mugging") my brother ("my husband").' Corriveau heard Henry Lombard say to the women, 'He's holding my legs. I can't move. Get him off of me.'] Henry Lombard was beating Corriveau about the head. Corriveau testified that when he was no longer able to withstand the pain from the blows he was receiving, he let go of Henry Lombard and assumed a fetal position as the kicking continued. [Corriveau's injuries from this beating were extensive and painful.]

"Upon being released, Henry Lombard jumped up ... got into the van, and drove off with the defendants. [None of the bystanders remembered seeing the purse in the hands of Henry Lombard or either of the defendants. After the van drove away, as the bystanders were tending to Corriveau, one of them thought she heard Corriveau say, "A woman tried to take my wife's purse."] One of the witnesses to the [beating] followed the van for a short time and then alerted the police, giving them a description of the vehicle. [This witness testified that while she was following the van, she saw two persons in the front seat, with their heads close together, apparently looking through something. She also saw them throw some papers out of the passenger window of the van.] The defendants and Henry Lombard were arrested shortly thereafter. Georgette Corriveau's purse was in the van." ³ 37 Mass.App.Ct. at 44-45, 636 N.E.2d 1345.

1. The robbery convictions. The legal principles applicable to a case of this type are well settled. "The test [for participation in a joint venture] is whether each defendant was (1) present at the scene of the crime, (2) with knowledge that another intends to commit the crime or with intent to commit a crime, and (3) by agreement is willing and available to help the other if necessary." Commonwealth v. Bianco, 388 Mass. 358, 366, 446 N.E.2d 1041, S.C., 390 Mass. 254, 454 N.E.2d 901 (1983). See Commonwealth v. Longo, 402 Mass. 482, 486, 524 N.E.2d 67 (1988). The defendants were companions of Lombard, and they were present somewhere in the general vicinity when his crimes were committed. See Commonwealth v. Amaral, 13 Mass.App.Ct. 238, 241-244, 431 N.E.2d 941 (1982). They also were in a position to, and did, render some aid to Lombard, at least in the aftermath of the robbery of Georgette Corriveau. See Commonwealth v. Giang, 402 Mass. 604, 608, 524 N.E.2d 383 (1988) (driver in getaway vehicle rendered aid to principal in case of attempted armed robbery); Commonwealth v. Longo, supra.

"The only issue is whether [the defendants] acted with knowledge of the ... robbery and an intent to assist in committing the crime." Commonwealth v. Giang, supra. "A person's knowledge or intent is a matter of fact, which is often not susceptible of proof by direct evidence, so resort is frequently made to proof by inference from all the facts and circumstances developed at trial." Commonwealth v. Casale, 381 Mass. 167, 173, 408 N.E.2d 841 (1980). "The inferences drawn by the jury need only be reasonable and possible and need not be necessary or inescapable." Id. However, "the evidence and the inferences permitted to be drawn therefrom must be 'of sufficient force to bring minds of ordinary intelligence and sagacity to the persuasion of [guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Commonwealth v. Latimore, supra, 378 Mass. at 677, 393 N.E.2d 370, quoting Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 368, 373, 162 N.E. 729 (1928). See Commonwealth v. Bianco, supra, 388 Mass. at 366-367, 446 N.E.2d 1041. When "conflicting inferences are possible from the evidence, 'it is for the jury to determine where the truth lies.' " Commonwealth v. Wilborne, 382 Mass. 241, 245, 415 N.E.2d 192 (1981), quoting Commonwealth v. Amazeen, 375 Mass. 73, 81, 375 N.E.2d 693 (1978). However, when conflicting inferences bearing on the question of intent, an essential element of proof of joint venture, are of equal force or probability, the choice between them may amount to impermissible conjecture, an insufficient basis for a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Bianco, supra, 388 Mass. at 363, 446 N.E.2d 1041.

Although the case is a close one, we agree with the Appeals Court that the judge should have granted the defendants' motions for required findings of not guilty on the robbery charges. There was no evidence that either defendant was present when Henry Lombard selected his victim, or that, while in the van, he was in possession of a weapon (other than his shod foot), a disguise, or anything else which might have given rise to an inference of knowledge of his plans on the part of the defendants. Contrast Commonwealth v. Amaral, supra, 13 Mass.App.Ct. at 243, 431 N.E.2d 941. The defendants waited for Henry Lombard in a mall parking lot during business hours, a common and normally blameless course of conduct. Contrast Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 405 Mass. 326, 328, 540 N.E.2d 179 (1989) (defendant parked in deserted business parking lot at 5 A.M. in vicinity of crime). The evidence does not warrant a finding that either defendant had acted as a lookout for Henry Lombard, or, in view of the apparent size of the parking lot and lack of visibility across it, a finding that the defendants were well positioned to facilitate his rapid escape. Contrast Commonwealth v. Giang, supra, 402 Mass. at 609, 524 N.E.2d 383; Commonwealth v. Pringle, 22 Mass.App.Ct. 746, 750, 498 N.E.2d 131 (1986). Obviously, since there was no conference between the defendants and Henry Lombard while he was in the mall, there was no basis for an inference that he was keeping the defendants apprised of his plans. Contrast Commonwealth v. Giang, supra. Thus, this case is distinguishable from others in which the evidence has justified an inference that a defendant knew in advance of plans for a robbery, and participated by standing by in a vehicle, prepared to abet the principal's flight.

The Commonwealth asserts that the lack of evidence that "the defendants knew that Henry Lombard entered the mall intending to commit a robbery," 37 Mass.App.Ct. at 47, 636 N.E.2d 1345, is irrelevant, because, at the crucial moment, "the parties consciously acted together in carrying out the criminal endeavor, each thereby becoming responsible for the acts of the others." Commonwealth v. Fidler, 23 Mass.App.Ct. 506, 513, ...