Com. v. Merritt
Decision Date | 14 January 1983 |
Citation | 14 Mass.App.Ct. 601,441 N.E.2d 532 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Larry MERRITT. |
Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Muriel Ann Finnegan, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.
Paul H. Carrigan, Boston, for defendant.
Before GREANEY, PERRETTA and KASS, JJ.
This case is before us on the Commonwealth's interlocutory appeal from the decision of a judge of the Boston Municipal Court, which allowed the defendant's motion to suppress oral statements made to a Boston police officer following an automobile accident. G.L. c. 278, § 28E, as appearing in St. 1979, c. 344, § 45. Mass.R.Crim.P. 15(a)(2), 378 Mass. 882-883 (1979). After an evidentiary hearing, the judge made findings of fact from which she concluded, insofar as material to this appeal, that statements made by the defendant that he had been driving the automobile that struck a pedestrian, who later died, had been obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
At the hearing on the motion, Officer Joseph Keane of the Boston police department testified that, about 2:15 P.M. on April 8, 1981, he arrived at the scene of an automobile accident on East Brookline and Washington Streets in Boston, where he learned that a pedestrian had been struck by an automobile. In the course of his investigation, Officer Keane spoke to a young woman whose name he did not ascertain. She told him that her father had been driving the automobile that struck the victim and that he (her father) had the green light at the time of the accident. She also told the officer that her father had gone home to a nearby housing project on Monsignor Reynolds Way. She refused, however, to go to the residence and bring her father back to the scene. A second officer pointed out a Cadillac to Officer Keane as the vehicle involved in the accident.
Officer Keane went to the address given by the woman and met the defendant outside of the building. The officer asked the defendant if he owned the vehicle that had struck the pedestrian. The defendant replied that he did. The officer then asked the defendant if he had been driving the vehicle. The defendant answered that he had. The officer testified that after this exchange he placed the defendant under arrest, gave him Miranda warnings, and had him taken to the police station. The judge also found, apparently relying on the defendant's affidavit accompanying the motion, that the officer had asked the defendant whether he had been drinking and the defendant had responded affirmatively. According to the judge's findings, the defendant was placed under arrest and taken to the police station after the question about drinking had been asked and answered.
At the station, the defendant was booked and advised of his Miranda rights. The defendant was questioned again by Officer Keane. In response to this questioning, the defendant admitted, in Keane's words, that he was driving the car, that he had "hit the person," and that he was "on a drunk program." Officer Keane also testified that the defendant appeared "quite intoxicated." Another officer then asked the defendant whether he wished to take a breathalyzer examination. The defendant consented and scored a .20 on the examination. He was subsequently charged under G.L. c. 90, § 24G, with vehicular homicide, and under G.L. c. 90, § 24, with operating under the influence.
The judge concluded that the question concerning ownership of the vehicle was proper as an aid in investigation. She determined, however, that questioning beyond that point, including the question about the defendant's operation of the automobile, was improper because the investigation had focused on the defendant and the "interrogation ... was custodial within the meaning of Miranda." She also suppressed the defendant's statements at the police station, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his constitutional rights and that the defendant made the statements because the "cat was already out of the bag" as a result of the previous questioning. On this appeal, the Commonwealth challenges only that part of the judge's order which suppresses the defendant's statement, made to Officer Keane near the defendant's home, that he was driving the automobile. 1 The Commonwealth contends that this statement, which it deems critical to its case in chief at trial, was properly obtained.
The mandates of Miranda apply to motor vehicle violations of the type in issue here. See Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772, 775, 438 N.E.2d 60 (1982). See also Commonwealth v. Burke, 6 Mass.App.Ct. 697, 383 N.E.2d 76 (1978); Commonwealth v. Doyle, --- Mass.App. ---, Mass.App.Ct.Adv.Sh. (1981) 2077, 429 N.E.2d 346. Its application is triggered by "custodial interrogation," i.e. "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 1097, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969). Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 551, 369 N.E.2d 692 (1977). There is no requirement that warnings be given prior to "[g]eneral on-the scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process." Miranda v. Arizona, supra 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S.Ct. at 1629. The boundaries of custodial interrogation were sketched in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 713, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977), as follows: (Emphasis original.) We have previously explained that ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Com. v. Burbine
...evidence that a driver is intoxicated is still permitted to ask questions without Miranda warnings. See Commonwealth v. Merritt, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 601, 603-606, 441 N.E.2d 532 (1982); Commonwealth v. Seymour, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 672, 678-680, 660 N.E.2d 679 (1996); Commonwealth v. Becla, 74 Mass.......
-
Com. v. Smith, 92-P-1805
...when the person questioned has been taken into custody or, as a practical matter, is not free to move away. Commonwealth v. Merritt, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 601, 604, 441 N.E.2d 532 (1982). To be sure, when a police officer makes a motor vehicle pull over, the driver is not free to move away, but i......
-
Commonwealth v. Bigley
...as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process.’ ” Commonwealth v. Merritt, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 601, 604, 441 N.E.2d 532 (1982), quoting from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). See Vanhouton v. Commo......
-
Com. v. Dias
...building, where they properly conducted noncustodial questioning, for voluntary identification. See Commonwealth v. Merritt, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 601, 604, 441 N.E.2d 532 (1982). After learning that there was an outstanding default warrant for Edward, police then lawfully arrested Similarly, the......