Com. v. Nicholas

• Decision Date: 30 April 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-P-822.,08-P-822.
• Citation: 905 N.E.2d 118,74 Mass. App. Ct. 164
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Jaala NICHOLAS.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

905 N.E.2d 118

74 Mass. App. Ct. 164

COMMONWEALTH v. Jaala NICHOLAS.¹

No. 08-P-822.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued January 8, 2009.

Decided April 30, 2009.

David J. Nathanson, Boston, for the defendant.

John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: KANTROWITZ, KAFKER, & MEADE, JJ.

KANTROWITZ, J.

Today we hold that where the judge did not see or hear the conduct that created a courtroom disturbance, the use of summary contempt, while understandable, was nonetheless improper.

Facts. On October 23, 2007, the defendant, Jaala Nicholas, testified for the Commonwealth in the murder trial of Anthony Davis. At the conclusion of Nicholas's testimony, he walked toward the exit of the courtroom and made a gesture with his hand in the direction of Davis's father and brother. In response to the gesture, the father stood up and an altercation ensued. The judge promptly removed the jury from the courtroom and Boston police officers arrived to quell the disruption. While the judge witnessed the fight, she did not see the gesture that had caused it.

After calm was restored, the judge conducted a voir dire. One juror testified that she had seen the defendant make his hand look like a gun, point his hand in the direction of Davis's father and brother, and say, "[P]op, pop, pop." That juror was excused.

The following day a second juror, who had not seen the gesture but was fearful of her safety, was excused. Davis's trial resumed. Sometime during that day, the judge issued an order requiring the defendant to appear and show cause why he should not be held in contempt for "making a threatening gesture to spectator(s) attending [Davis's] trial ... thereby initiating disruption in the courtroom which threatened the fair administration of justice." The order required the defendant to attend a hearing on October 29, 2007. The defendant appeared in court as scheduled and received appointed counsel. At that time, he also received an amended order of notice to appear and show cause that rescheduled the contempt hearing for October 31, 2007.²

At the summary contempt proceedings on October 31, the judge asked the defendant and his counsel why she "should not impose a penalty for that conduct and that disruption, which was precipitated by the gesture that was made." In describing the incident, the judge relied upon the statement from the juror who witnessed the gesture and a report in a local newspaper.³

The defendant, through counsel, apologized for the incident and emphasized that it was not aimed at any court personnel or jurors. After considering the loss of two jurors and the emotional intensity of the murder trial, the judge found the defendant "in contempt of Court under Rule 43 of the Massachusetts Criminal Rules of Procedure" and sentenced him to forty-five days at the Suffolk County house of correction. After a stay, the sentence was imposed on November 16, 2007.⁴ On March 18, 2008, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider and vacate his summary contempt adjudication, arguing that "[d]ue process and the rules of criminal procedure prohibit the finding of summary contempt unless the judge personally observed the contemptuous conduct." The following day the judge denied the motion without a hearing, reasoning that she "observed the disruption precipitated by [the defendant's] departure and ... ha[d] to excuse two sitting jurors who were compromised by having seen the gesture precipitating the disruption." The defendant timely appealed the denial of his motion.

The defendant sets forth several arguments on appeal, only one of which we need address. He argues that because due process and Mass.R.Crim.P. 43, 378 Mass. 919 (1979), prohibit summary contempt unless the judge personally observed the contemptuous conduct, the judge erred in basing the summary contempt finding on a juror's observation and a newspaper article, instead of on her own observation.⁵

Contempt. "Longstanding precedent confirms the power of courts to find summary contempt and impose punishment." Pounders v. Watson, 521 U.S. 982, 987, 117 S.Ct. 2359, 138 L.Ed.2d 976 (1997). "To preserve order in the court room for the proper conduct of business, the court must act instantly to suppress disturbance or violence or physical obstruction or disrespect to the court when occurring in open court. There is no need of evidence or assistance of counsel before punishment, because the court has seen the offense. Such summary vindication of the court's dignity and authority is necessary." Id. at 987-988, 117 S.Ct. 2359, quoting from Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534-535, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925).

In Massachusetts, criminal contempt is covered by Mass.R.Crim.P. 43 ("Summary Contempt Proceedings") and Mass.R.Crim.P. 44, 378 Mass. 920 (1979) ("Contempt").⁶ Rule 43 establishes several conditions or requirements that must exist before a judge may enter summary contempt. As per the rule, a judge may act when she determines that summary punishment is necessary to maintain order in the courtroom and "(1) the contemptuous conduct could be seen or heard by the presiding judge and was committed within the actual presence of the court; (2) the judgment of contempt is entered upon the occurrence of the contemptuous conduct; and (3) the punishment imposed for each contempt does not exceed three months imprisonment or a fine of five hundred dollars."⁷ Mass.R.Crim.P. 43(a). If any one of these conditions is not met, the contempt must be tried pursuant to Mass. R.Crim.P. 44.⁸ See Mass.R.Crim.P. 44(a); Commonwealth v. Brunnell, 65 Mass.App. Ct. 423, 424, 840 N.E.2d 1005 (2006).

"Summary" contempt "does not refer to the timing of the action with reference to the offense but refers to a procedure which dispenses with the formality, delay and digression that would result from the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial." Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952).

As basic criminal protections are inherently preferable in all criminal proceedings, summary contempt is disfavored and narrowly construed. See Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 387 Mass. 1, 7, 438 N.E.2d 805 (1982). Compare Commonwealth v. Rogers, 46 Mass.App.Ct. 109, 110-111, 703 N.E.2d 1199 (1999). The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that summary contempt is only appropriate where the judge observes the contemptuous conduct. See Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 535, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275-276, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). See also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 204-205, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968). In Ex parte Terry, supra at 298, 9 S.Ct. 77, the judge witnessed the petitioner, an attorney, assault a U.S. marshal in the courtroom with a deadly weapon. The petitioner then forcibly left the courtroom before the judge ordered him in contempt. Id. at 310-311, 9 S.Ct. 77. In denying the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus, the Court set forth the principle that "[i]f the contempt be committed in the face of the court, the offender may be instantly apprehended and imprisoned ... without any further proof or examination." Id. at 307, 9 S.Ct. 77, quoting from 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 286. The Court went on to state that, in contrast, summary contempt proceedings are inappropriate for "matters that arise at a distance, and of which the court cannot have so perfect a knowledge...." Ibid.

Sixty years later, the Supreme Court reiterated this point in In re Oliver, supra at 274-275, 68 S.Ct. 499, stating that "for a court to exercise the extraordinary but narrowly limited power to punish for [summary] contempt ... the court-disturbing misconduct must not only occur in the court's immediate presence, but ... the judge must have personal knowledge of it acquired by his own observation of the contemptuous conduct." 333 U.S. at 274-275, 68 S.Ct. 499. Citing the reasoning of Ex parte Terry, supra, the Court held that the use of summary contempt proceedings where the judge depended on others to learn of the contemptuous conduct violated due process. In re Oliver, supra at 277-278, 68 S.Ct. 499.

These principles have been addressed and adopted in the Commonwealth. "The narrow exception to these due process requirements includes only charges of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of the judge, which disturbs the court's business, where all of the essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court, are actually observed by the court, and where immediate punishment is essential to prevent `demoralization of the court's authority' before the public" (emphasis added). Garabedian v. Commonwealth, 336 Mass. 119, 124-125, 142 N.E.2d 777 (1957), quoting from In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 275, 68 S.Ct. 499. "If some essential elements of the offense are not personally observed by the judge, so that he must depend upon statements made by others for his knowledge about these essential elements, due process requires ... that the accused be accorded notice and a fair hearing...." Garabedian v. Commonwealth, supra at 125, 142 N.E.2d 777, quoting from In re Oliver, supra at 275-276, 68 S.Ct. 499.⁹

Rule 43 was promulgated in 1979. The Oliver requirement that the judge observe the contemptuous conduct is addressed in the phrase "the contemptuous conduct could be seen or heard by the presiding judge." See Mass.R.Crim.P. 43(a)(1). The Reporters' Notes to Mass.R.Crim.P. 43, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1727 (LexisNexis 2008) indicate the judge must have "personally viewed the contemptuous conduct" before applying summary contempt proceedings.¹⁰

The common scenario in which summary contempt is...