Com. v. Richards, 96-P-0885

• Decision Date: 24 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-P-0885,96-P-0885
• Citation: 691 N.E.2d 991,44 Mass.App.Ct. 478
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Edward F. RICHARDS.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 991

691 N.E.2d 991

44 Mass.App.Ct. 478

COMMONWEALTH v. Edward F. RICHARDS.

No. 96-P-0885.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts Worcester.

Argued Sept. 9, 1997.

Decided March 24, 1998.

Edward F. Richards, pro se.

Claudia R. Sullivan, Special Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Before WARNER, C.J., and GILLERMAN and GREENBERG, JJ.

GREENBERG, Justice.

The primary issue on appeal in this case is whether the judge's order denying the defendant's motion under Mass.R.Crim.P. 29, 378 Mass. 899 (1979), ¹ is properly before us. The procedural background in which this issue has arisen unfolded as follows.

After the Commonwealth completed presentation of its case against the defendant at a bench trial in the Central District Court of Worcester on July 13, 1989, a judge found the defendant guilty of three counts of open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior in violation of G.L. c. 272, § 16. The judge then conducted a sentencing hearing. Parts of the proceeding are apparently inaudible on the taped record, but it appears that defense counsel asked that the case against the defendant be continued without a finding. The judge was not so inclined. She placed the defendant on two years supervised probation with counselling as a special condition. Based upon defense counsel's comments at a later hearing, we surmise that the judge intended that, if the defendant stayed out of trouble while on probation, the guilty finding might later be revoked and the complaint dismissed. This potential outcome may account for the judge's invitation to the defendant's counsel to file a motion to revise and revoke the sentence that would be considered after his discharge from probation. However, the defendant declined to do so and took his appeal for a trial de novo in the jury session of the court conformably with G.L. c. 278, § 18, as appearing in St.1978, c. 478, § 302.

On September 12, 1989, while at the jury session, the defendant withdrew his appeal pursuant to G.L. c. 278, § 25, and received the original sentence at the District Court. He filed a timely motion to revise and revoke his sentence on October 11, 1989. Over six years elapsed before the judge was asked to rule upon the outstanding motion. On January 22, 1996, after hearing arguments, the judge denied the motion. From that order, the defendant, pro se, has appealed.

Nothing in Mass.R.Crim.P. 29, 378 Mass. 899 (1979), provides for a direct appeal, and we have found no case on point. In McGuinness v. Commonwealth, 420 Mass. 495, 496, 650 N.E.2d 780 (1995), however, both the Superior Court and the clerk of the Appeals Court refused to file the defendant's notice of appeal from the denial of his rule 29 motion by a Superior Court judge ²; review under G.L. c. 211, § 3, was also denied by the Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Judicial Court declined to review the disposition of the motion principally on the premise that "[p]arties seeking review must demonstrate that they have no other legal remedy to pursue and, therefore, a petition under c. 211, § 3, is the only alternative." Id. at 497, 650 N.E.2d 780, citing cases. The court pointed out that, after the denial of the petition by the single justice, "[t]he defendant properly raised [the judge's ruling on his rule 29 motion] in his motion for leave to withdraw his guilty plea and for a new trial, pursuant to rule 30(b)." Id. at 497-498, 650 N.E.2d 780. The issues were then encompassed by the defendant's motion for leave to withdraw his guilty plea and for a new trial, the disposition of which was appealable. The Supreme Judicial Court subsequently affirmed the lower court's denial of the Mass. R.Crim. P. 30(b), 378 Mass. 900 (1979), motion in the successor case, Commonwealth v. McGuinness, 421 Mass. 472, 658 N.E.2d 150 (1995), on the ground that the defendant had not been illegally sentenced as the judge made no promises to induce his plea of guilty. When considered together, these decisions suggest that appellate review of the denial of a rule 29 motion filed by a defendant would be encompassed by a motion for new trial pursuant to Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(b), 378 Mass. 900 (1979). Unless the defendant can show some illegality, appellate review is unavailing.

In Commonwealth v. Amirault, 415 Mass. 112, 114-115, 612 N.E.2d 631 (1993), S.C., 424 Mass. 618, 677 N.E.2d 652 (1997), the Supreme Judicial Court permitted the Commonwealth to appeal a Superior Court judge's allowance of a rule 29 motion, but the vehicle was G.L. c. 278, § 28E, a statute that allows only the Commonwealth to appeal an "order or judgment of the court." In an appeal from a District Court judge's allowance of a rule 29 motion, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Commonwealth v. Cowan, 422 Mass. 546, 547, 664 N.E.2d 425 (1996), held that a petition under G.L. c. 211, § 3, was the appropriate statute under which the Commonwealth could seek review because G.L. c. 278, § 28E, only applies to appeals from orders or judgments of the Superior Court. The Supreme Court noted that it would be inconsistent to allow the Commonwealth to appeal from the allowance of rule 29 motions in the Superior Court but to deny the Commonwealth the right to appeal from similar orders issued at the District Court level. Ibid.

Rule 29 is drawn in part from G.L. c. 278, § 29A, as inserted by St.1959, c. 167, § 1, ³ which was repealed by St.1979, c. 344, § 46. It is instructive to review the pre-1979 cases which involved appeals of revision or revocation decisions. Although neither the language of paragraph 29A or of paragraph 29C mentioned appellate review, the case law reveals that the right appears to have been available to both parties. Nearly all of the cases came up through bills of exceptions, former G.L. c. 278, § 31. See Commonwealth v. Burrone, 347 Mass. 451, 452, 198 N.E.2d 407 (1964); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 370 Mass. 141, 142, 345 N.E.2d 695 (1976); Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 370 Mass. 217, 219-220, 346 N.E.2d 874 (1976); Commonwealth v. Stanton, 2 Mass.App.Ct. 614, 617, 317 N.E.2d 487 (1974). See and compare Commonwealth v. Sitko, 372 Mass. 305, 314, 361 N.E.2d 1258 (1977), where review of a revision that increased a sentence was one of several issues decided upon direct appeal. In that case, the court held "[t]he right to seek a revocation and revision of sentence under G.L. c. 278, § 29C, is not limited to the defendant " (emphasis added). These cases collectively stand for the proposition that, prior to the adoption of the criminal rules of procedure in 1979, both the Commonwealth and the defendant could obtain appellate review of revision or revocation decisions.

With this historical perspective in mind and in view of the reality that the Commonwealth is permitted to appeal from the allowance of a rule 29 motion, we conclude that the order of the District Court judge that denied the defendant's motion to revise or revoke his sentence under rule 29 was immediately appealable. ⁴ If the circumstances reveal that the judge imposed a sentence contrary to law, it would be unfair to deny relief at the appellate level. Of course, appellate review is usually limited to errors of law. For example, review includes whether the strict jurisdictional limits for the filing of such motions have been met, see Commonwealth v. Layne, 386 Mass. 291, 295, 435 N.E.2d 356 (1982); Commonwealth v. Cepulonis, 18 Mass.App.Ct. 919, 920, 465 N.E.2d 794 (1984); or whether the judge has considered improper factors in formulating a sentence, see Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 370 Mass. at 219-220, 346 N.E.2d 874; Commonwealth v. Sitko, 372 Mass. at 313-314, 361 N.E.2d 1258; Aldoupolis v. Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 260, 275-276, 435 N.E.2d 330, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 864, 103 S.Ct. 142, 74 L.Ed.2d 120 (1982) (judge required to give notice to defendant and state reasons when increasing original sentence pursuant to rule 29). Beyond these outer limits, sentencing decisions and consequences are matters with which an appellate court has no concern.

In the circumstances presented here there is no question that the judge committed no...