Com. v. Richmond

• Decision Date: 03 January 1911
• Citation: 207 Mass. 240,93 N.E. 816
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. RICHMOND.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

207 Mass. 240

93 N.E. 816

COMMONWEALTH v. RICHMOND.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

January 3, 1911

Jan. 3 1911.

COUNSEL

J. J Higgins, Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

R. W. Gloag, for defendant.

OPINION

RUGG J.

The defendant was indicted for murder.

1. The defendant filed no motion to quash the indictment. Hence the faint suggestion now made that it is defective, in that it is uncertain whether the assault and murder are charged of one and the same person, because 'said' does not precede the second mention of the name of the person alleged to have been murdered, is not open to her. We do not intimate that there would be anything in the point even if seasonably presented. The indictment followed the form prescribed in Rev. Laws, c. 218, § 67. Com. v. Min Sing, 202 Mass. 121-132, 88 N.E. 918; Com. v. Jordan, 93 N.E. 809.

2. One motive suggested for the commission of the crime was robbery. A considerable amount of evidence was introduced by the commonwealth tending to show that prior to the alleged homicide the defendant was heavily in debt and in need of ready money, and that immediately thereafter she had bills in her possession. When the evidence as to the financial embarrassment of the defendant was offered, although not objected to, the jurors were instructed in substance that it was admitted only as bearing upon the motive of the defendant in the commission of the offense charged, and that, in order to be material for their final consideration, 'certain other evidence must appear, and if that evidence does not appear, then this evidence which is now being admitted should be disregarded.' No exception was taken, but at the close of the evidence the defendant asked for an instruction that this evidence should be disregarded. Subject to exception, this prayer was denied, and the instruction was given that although the commonwealth was not required to show any motive for the commission of the crime, evidence tending to show such motive was always competent. After referring to evidence that 'the prisoner was pressed for money prior to the finding of the body of the deceased,' and 'that on that day she had a roll of bills,' the court further instructed the jurors that in order to consider the evidence at all they must be satisfied that the deceased had money in his possession immediately before his death, and thereafter the defendant had this money in her possession. These instructions were in accordance with well-settled principles. Com. v. O'Neil, 169 Mass. 394, 48 N.E. 134; Com. v. Williams, 171 Mass. 461, 50 N.E. 1035; Com. v. Devaney, 182 Mass. 33, 64 N.E. 402; Com. v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457-467, 76 N.E. 127, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1056. The chief argument urged is that there was no sufficient evidence that the deceased possessed any money shortly before his death. But this contention cannot be sustained. It might have been found that the murdered man was young, active, able-bodied, and had been at work for many months in a state institution in a country town. Although the amount of his compensation was not shown the jury might have used their general knowledge in drawing an inference in this respect. Maynard v. Royal Worcester Corset Co., 200 Mass. 1-8, 85 N.E. 877. There was also evidence that he was in Cambridge for the purpose of attending the wedding of his sister, was on his way to spend a vacation in Prince Edward's Island, whither he had checked his trunk and had bought his ticket, was a guest at a public house where he had given coin as a gratuity to a waiter, had manifested great care to keep near him a dress suit case, had said to a friend that he was sorry he had before asked him for money, that he had money 'enough to see him through,' and that no money whatever was found upon his remains. If these circumstances were found by the jury, the inference would have been warranted that the deceased had money to the amount of which the defendant was possessed after the homicide. It is argued also that there was error because the district attorney said in his argument to the jury that the deceased had been working for $30 per month when there was no evidence of it. But the argument was not interrupted, and no ruling was requested on this point, and no exception taken respecting it. Under these circumstances, it cannot be assumed that the defendant suffered any harm of which she can now complain.

3. The presence of the defendant in her bed room or parlor, rooms which were connected, in the early evening of a certain day, was a material fact upon the trial. Against the exception of the defendant one Hannigan was permitted to testify that she overheard one Paige while standing near the bedroom door, and after the defendant had been called without any response, say, in a loud voice, in the course of talk with a servant of the defendant in which he demanded money or some satisfaction as to a disagreement about the hire of a room, 'I shall bring an officer,' and that next morning the defendant asked the witness not to let Paige bring an officer, and that 'there was no need of any officer being brought about the room rent.' There was no evidence that the defendant learned of this threat as to an officer in any other way than by being in the bedroom or parlor at the time it was uttered and thus hearing it. The evidence plainly had some tendency to prove that she was there. It was competent to this end, and was carefully limited by the court to this purpose. If there were inconsistencies in some details of the testimony, its weight only and not its competency were affected. It is also urged that this testimony tended to contradict that given by other witnesses called by the commonwealth. It was not introduced for that purpose, but was the direct statement of the witness of the records of her own senses. Even if pointedly contradicting other evidence, it was still competent. Rev. Laws, c. 175, § 24.

4. One Clifford, a witness called by the commonwealth, having testified at length concerning the people in the house where the deceased met his death, and their actions and some of their conversation, and that one Drohan had said in reply to his question a short time before the lifeless body of the deceased was discovered that MacTavish was in the house, was asked on cross-examination, 'When was MacTavish again mentioned by any of you?' This question was properly excluded. It was indefinite as to persons, and appears to bear no relation to any issue in the case.

5. The chief inspector of police of Cambridge, who had been active in the investigation of the crime, was asked by the defendant whether after the defendant was indicted he had not 'procured the putting of one of the government witnesses on probation after he had pleaded guilty to a crime.' There was no error in the exclusion of this inquiry unsupported by any suggestion of inducement to a definite person. It was objectionable in form. The placing on probation of one charged with crime is the independent act of the court, and cannot be 'procured' by anybody.

6. It was developed by the cross-examination of one Shannon, a police officer called by the commonwealth, that certain men in the house of the defendant were placed under arrest on the day when the body of MacTavish was found. The arresting officer was permitted to testify on redirect examination, subject to the defendant's exception, that the purpose of putting them under arrest was for witnesses. This inquiry was permissible in the discretion of the court for the purpose of refuting any inference that they were suspected of having committed the murder.

7. Other exceptions as to evidence were taken, which have not been argued, although it is stated that none of them are waived. They have all been examined with care, and no error appears to have been committed in respect to any of them. The statements made by the defendant to the officers after her arrest appear to have been made voluntarily after a caution, and were admissible. The instructions that they could not be considered unless made freely and without inducement were ample and correct. Com. v. Storti, 177 Mass. 339, 58 N.E. 1021; Com. v. Killion, 194 Mass. 153, 80 N.E. 222.

8. At the close of the evidence the defendant requested that a verdict of not guilty be ordered. The evidence connecting the defendant with the commission of the crime was not from any eyewitness, but was made up of many different facts, which linked themselves together in a chain so strong as to convince the jury of her guilt under adequate instructions as to the degree of certainty to which their minds must be led before they could reach that result. Circumstantial evidence may be a thoroughly satisfactory basis for conviction of the highest crimes. Men commonly act in the most important concerns of life upon that kind of evidence. It is constantly applied in courts of justice, and has been commended by most eminent judges. Com v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295-310, 52 Am. Dec. 711 et seq.; Com. v. Williams, 171 Mass. 461, 50 N.E. 1035; Perovich v. U. S., 205 U.S. 86-91, 27 S.Ct. 456, 51 L.Ed. 722. It is not necessary to state in detail the circumstances which pointed to the guilt of this defendant. They were numerous, closely connected and might well have persuaded a jury. A minute analysis of the entire record shows that this prayer was properly refused. The chief argument urged in its support is that it might have been found that others had an opportunity, and that there were contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses called by the commonwealth, who were frequenting the house at about the time the murder was committed. These considerations could only affect the weight of the evidence, and were proper for the jury to pass upon. They...