Com. v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 03 May 1888 |
| Citation | 146 Mass. 571,16 N.E. 452 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. ROBINSON. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
J.B. Goodrich and D.F. Crane, for defendant.
This court has settled, in Com. v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16 that the proof of distinct offences, at different times against different persons, although similar, cannot, except under very special circumstances, be introduced for the purpose of proving either the commission of the offense charged, or the knowledge or intent with which it was committed. An exception to this general rule is applied, of necessity, in cases where the act charged is not significant of the intent,--as in cases of embezzlement, and of passing counterfeit money; and does not apply to cases of homicide where the intent is inferable from the act, (Com. v. Hersey, 2 Allen, 173,) unless to meet some special defense of accident or mistake. Whart.Crim.Ev. (8th Ed.) 49 et seq. In the indictment in this case there is no allegation of intent to kill, and none was necessary. The case of Reg. v. Geering, 18 Law J. (N.S.) 215, extending this exception to a case of homicide where no defense of accident was set up, was a decision by a single judge at the Old Bailey, a tribunal referred to by this court in Com. v. Call, 21 Pick. 520, as "more remarkable for its promptitude than its deliberation in such trials." Late English cases have refused to follow it. Reg. v. Winslow, 8 Cox, Crim.Cas. 397; Reg. v. Hall, 4 Law Rev.Quar. 71, (supreme court of New Zealand.) The case was not reserved, and is not recognized as authority. Another exception to the general rule is found in that class of cases where acts are shown to have been done in pursuance and as part of some plan or scheme to accomplish a particular result. In such cases, all the acts shown must appear to be one transaction, of which the act alleged in the indictment is a part. The acts must be shown to be connected by unity of plan and motive, and there must be an open and visible connection between the principal and evidentiary fact. Whart.Crim.Ev., supra; Best, Ev. §§ 38, 90; Jordan v. Osgood, 109 Mass. 457; Farrer v. State, 2 Ohio St. 54; Reg. v. Hall, supra; Com. v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16; Reg. v. Oddy, 5 Cox, Crim.Cas. 210; Com. v. Abbott, 130 Mass. 472; U.S. v. Ross, 92 U.S. 280, 284; Douglass v. Mitchell, 35 Pa.St. 440, 446; Shaffner v. Com., 72 Pa.St. 60; Com. v. Sherman, Whart.Crim.Ev. (8th Ed.) § 50, note; People v. Sharp, 14 N.E. 319; State v. Lapage, 57 N.H. 245. But in such cases preliminary evidence must always be given, to show that the two crimes are parts of one transaction. It is the exclusive province of the trial judges to decide all preliminary questions of fact, however intricate, the solution of which may be necessary to enable the court to determine the other question of admissibility. Gorton v. Hadsell, 9 Cush. 508; 1 Phil.Ev. (N.Y.Ed.1849,) pt. 1, c. 1; Shaffner v. Com., supra; Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229. The finding of the trial judges upon the preliminary evidence is subject to revision whenever a bill of exceptions has been allowed in which (as in this case) the full evidence is reported. Foster v. Mackay, 7 Metc. 531, 538; Dole v. Thurlow, 12 Metc. 157; Bartlett v. Smith, 11 Mees & W. 483; Com. v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122; Bank v. Hobbs, 11 Gray, 250; Gossler v. Refinery, 103 Mass. 331; Com. v. Salmon, 136 Mass. 431; Com. v. Campbell, 7 Allen, 541; Campbell v. Russell, 139 Mass. 278, 1 N.E. 345; Chase v. Breed, 5 Gray, 440; Baxter v. Abbott, 7 Gray, 71; Hatch v. Carpenter, 9 Gray, 271. Whether different acts are so connected together that they may be properly deemed to form a part of one and the same transaction, being question of fact, proof of such fact is required before the same can be used as a foundation for other evidence. That there is some evidence of such connection is not sufficient; it must amount to proof. Com. v. Campbell, 7 Allen, 541; Shaffner v. Com., supra; Reg. v. Hall, supra. See opinion of THURMAN, J., in Farrer v. State, 2 Ohio St. 54; and People v. Sharp, 14 N.E. 319. The evidence leaves the alleged scheme a mere conjectural hypothesis, and not the proved fact which the law requires as the foundation for the introduction of evidence of an independent crime.
Andrew J. Waterman, Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.
The evidence introduced and admitted clearly showed a sufficient motive for the commission of the crime. Com. v. Merriam, 14 Pick. 518; Com. v. Turner, 3 Metc. 19, 23, 24; Com. v. Stone, 4 Metc. 43, 47; Com. v. Stearns, 10 Metc. 256, 257; Com. v. Eastman, 1 Cush. 189, 216; Com. v. Miller, 3 Cush. 243, 250; Com. v. Tuckerman, 10 Gray, 173, 197, 200; Com. v. Price, Id. 472, 476; Com. v. Shepard, 1 Allen, 575; Jordan v. Osgood, 109 Mass. 457, 461; Com. v. Coe, 115 Mass. 481, 501; Com. v. Bradford, 126 Mass. 42; Com. v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16, 18, 19; Com. v. McCarthy, 119 Mass. 354; Com. v. Blood, 141 Mass. 571, 575, 6 N.E. 769; Com. v. Scott, 123 Mass. 222, 234; Com. v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122; Com. v. White, 145 Mass. 392, 395, 14 N.E. 611; People v. Wood, 3 Park.Crim.R. 681; Goerson v. Com., 99 Pa.St. 388; Swan v. Com., 104 Pa.St. 220; Bottomley v. U.S., 1 Story, 143; Rosc.Crim.Ev. *88; 1 Archb.Crim.Pl. 392, 475, 619; Best, Ev. 487; 1 Greenl.Ev. § 53; Rex v. Whiley, 2 Leach, 983, 985; Reg. v. Richardson, 2 Fost. & F. 343; Rex v. Ellis, 6 Barn. & C. 145; Whart.Hom. §§ 725, 726; "Presumptions," Id. § 731, and notes; "Inference in Poisoning Cases," 3 Greenl.Ev. § 135; Whart.Hom. §§ 599, 736, 737. As to other poisonings, Whart, Hom. § 692; preparations by having dreams, etc., 1 Starkie, Ev. 565; State v. Nugent, 71 Mo. 136; Reg. v. Geering, 18 Law J. (N.S.) 215; Reg. v. Cotton, 12 Cox, Crim.Cas. 400; Reg. v. Flannagan, 15 Cox, Crim.Cas. 404; Coleman v. People, 58 N.Y. 555; People v. Corbin, 56 N.Y. 363; People v. Marion, 29 Mich. 31; Com. v. Ferrigan, 44 Pa.St. 386; Castle v. Bullard, 23 How. 172, 186; State v. Zellers, 7 N.J.Law, 220; People v. Hendrickson, 1 Park.Crim.R. 406; State v. Watkins, 9 Conn. 47; State v. Ford, 3 Strob. 517; People v. Greenwall, 15 N.E. 404. See State v. Lapage, 57 N.H. 245. It does not render such evidence inadmissible because the facts which proved the plan or scheme tended to prove that the defendant was guilty of a crime other than the one for which she was being tried. Wills, Circ.Ev. 47; Com. v. Choate, 105 Mass. 451, 458; Com. v. Scott, 123 Mass. 222, 235; Com. v. Blood, 141 Mass. 571, 575, 6 N.E. 769.
OPINION
We have given to this case a degree of attention commensurate with its importance, and have come to the conclusion that there was no error in the conduct of the trial. While it is well settled in this commonwealth that, on the trial of an indictment, the government cannot be allowed to prove other independent crimes, for the purpose of showing that the defendant is wicked enough to commit the crime on trial, this rule does not extend so far as to exclude evidence of acts or crimes which are shown to have been committed as part of or in pursuance of the same common purpose. Com. v Jackson, 132 Mass. 16, 18; Com. v. Blood, 141 Mass. 575, 6 N.E. 769. In such cases there is a distinct and significant probative effect resulting from the continuance of the same plan or scheme, and from the doing of other acts in pursuance thereof. It is somewhat of the nature of the acts or declarations of intention, but more especially of preparations for the commission of the crime which is the subject of the indictment. If, for example, it could be shown that a defendant had formed a settled purpose to obtain certain property, which could only be got by doing several preliminary things, the last of which in the order of time was criminal, the government might show, on his trial for the commission of that last, criminal act, that he had formed the purpose to accomplish the result of obtaining the property, and that he had done all of the preliminary things which were necessary to that end. This would be quite plain if the evidence of the purpose were direct and clear; as if a letter in the defendant's handwriting should be discovered, stating in terms to a confederate his purpose to obtain the property by the doing of the several successive acts, the last of which was the criminal act on trial. In such case no one would question that proof might be offered that the defendant had done all the preliminary acts referred to, which were necessary steps in the accomplishment of his purpose. But such purpose may also be shown by circumstantial evidence. It is, indeed, usually the case that intentions, plans, purposes, can only be shown in this way. Express declarations of intention, or confessions, are comparatively rare; and therefore all the circumstances of the defendant's situation, conduct, speech, silence, motives, may be considered. The plan itself, and the acts done in pursuance of it, may all be proved by circumstantial evidence if they are of themselves relevant and material to the case on trial. And in such a case it makes no difference whether the preliminary acts are criminal or not. Otherwise the greater the criminal the greater his immunity. Such preliminary acts are not competent because they are criminal, but because they are relevant to the issue on trial; and the fact that they are criminal does not render them irrelevant. Suppose, for further example, one is charged with breaking a bank, and there is evidence that he had made preliminary examinations from a neighboring room; the fact that his occupation of such room was accomplished by a criminal breaking and entering would not render the evidence incompetent. It is sometimes said that such evidence may be introduced where the several crimes form part of one entire transaction; but it is perhaps...
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