Com. v. Saia

Decision Date23 February 1977
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. James J. SAIA (and a companion case 1 ).
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

William P. Homans, Jr., Boston (Michael A. Ponsor, Cambridge, with him), for defendants.

Peter W. Agnes, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, WILKINS and LIACOS, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

James J. Saia (James) and Charles J. Saia (Charles), having been indicted on various charges, each filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence, which motions were denied after hearing by a judge of the Superior Court. Their applications for interlocutory appeal of the judge's rulings (G.L. c. 278, § 28E) were thereafter allowed by a single justice of this court who reported the matters without decission for the consideration of the full court.

We conclude that there was no error in the Superior Court judge's denial of the motions to suppress evidence.

The facts are these. At 4:49 P.M. on April 13, 1974, an unidentified female called the Watertown police and complained that 'a madman was fighting in the house at 28 Hardy Avenue.' The police dispatcher directed two police cruisers to investigate the call.

The premises at 28 Hardy Avenue consisted of a two-family dwelling. Ten steps led from the street to a combination storm door and a solid door leading to a vestibule. Inside the vestibule area were mailboxes and doorbells. Two doors led from the vestibule. One door led to the first floor apartment, occupied by James's daughter; the other door led to a landing from which a flight of stairs gave access to the second floor apartment occupied by James, his wife, and three sons, one of whom was Charles.

When the first cruiser arrived at 28 Hardy Avenue the police officer heard loud shouting which appeared to come from the second floor. The first officer approached the front doors; the combination storm door was closed but unlocked, and the inner solid door was ajar, so that the officer could see into the vestibule area which he entered. The officer sought admittance to investigate the situation.

In response to the officer's request for admission, Charles came to the door leading to the second floor and opened it. When he saw the officer, he asked, 'What the . . . are you doing here?' or, 'What the . . . do you want?' The officer responded by telling Charles that there had been a complaint and to 'keep it cool, keep it down.' Charles continued speaking in an emotional an boisterous manner and asked, 'Have you got a . . . warrant?' The officer again told Charles to '(k)eep it down.'

The officer them heard more shouting from the second floor. When he attempted to go beyond the inner door, Charles began to struggle with him. This struggle took place either entirely within the vestibule or partially on the landing immediately inside the door leading to the second floor. After a short period of time James came downstairs and joined in the struggle. A second officer who was responding in another cruiser to the original dispatch arrived and assisted the first officer who was then struggling with both Charles and James in the vestibule. The second officer and James eventually fought on the stairs leading to the second floor.

At not time did the officers possess a search warrant for the premises or an arrest warrant for any occupant of the premises. The first officer testified that at no time did he intend to conduct a search or to make an arrest and that the police came, in response to a citizen's complaint, for the purpose of keeping the peace.

We assume for purposes of this opinion, but we do not decide, that the incidents which gave rise to the indictments occurred at a place where James and Charles could have a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Commonwealth v. Hall, --- Mass. ---, --- - --- a, 323 N.E.2d 319 (1975).

James was indicted for unarmed robbery of a police revolver; for assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon; for assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to murder; for assault and battery on two police officers; and for disturbing the peace. Charles was indicted for assault and battery on two police officers; and for disturbing the peace.

James and Charles filed identical motions to suppress evidence which alleged a warrantless entry on April 13, 1974, onto premises lawfully occupied by each defendant at 28 Hardy Avenue, Watertown, and sought suppression of any testimony as to observations or occurrences inside the premises.

The details of the physical confrontation between the police officers and James and Charles are not before us. In view of the limited issues which we now consider, those details are not necessary or relevant.

After a hearing on the motions to suppress, the Superior Court judge found and ruled as follows: 'I am going to deny the motions(s) to suppress. Without passing at this time on the legality of the presence of the police officers on the premises, I would find as a fact that Officer Montgomery did receive an anonymous phone call that there was a madman in the premises involved; that he requested the Watertown police officers in the cruiser to check out the premises or investigate whether or not there was any disturbance going on; that they went to the premises and they heard loud noises and they entered the premises, and that they did not have a warrant.'

The principal arguments of James and Charles may be summarized as follows: The occupants of the Saia house were constitutionally protected from unjustified invasions of their privacy; in the absence of probable cause to believe that a felony was being committed, or had been committed, there was no justification for the warrantless entry; James and Charles had a right to resist entry and arrest and their doing so did not justify further intrusion; all observations made by the police officers, including their observations of the alleged conduct of James and Charles following the unlawful entry, should be suppressed. They rely on the principel ('fruits of the unwarranted intrusion') of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963...

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    • December 21, 2004
    ...defense may be found in the fact of the [police conduct] itself. The exclusionary rule does not reach this far. Commonwealth v. Saia, 372 Mass. 53, 360 N.E.2d 329, 332 (1977). We agree with the overwhelming weight of authority on this issue, and therefore hold that, if a person engages in n......
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    ...35 Wash.App. at 132, 665 P.2d 443 (quoting State v. Burger, 55 Or.App. 712, 716, 639 P.2d 706, 708 (1982)). Commonwealth v. Saia, 372 Mass. 53, 58, 360 N.E.2d 329, 332 (1977), quoted in State v. Aydelotte, 35 Wash.App. 125, 133, 665 P.2d 443 Mierz urges us, however, to adopt Division Three'......
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