Com. v. Santiago

• Decision Date: 17 August 2004
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Salvador Carlos SANTIAGO, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

855 A.2d 682

579 Pa. 46

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Salvador Carlos SANTIAGO, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted February 7, 2000.

Decided August 17, 2004.

Reargument Denied October 29, 2004.

Robert Brett Dunham, Christina Swarns, Philadelphia, for Salvador Carlos Santiago.

Sally K. Kaye, Pittsburgh, for Com. of PA.

Before: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN and BAER, JJ.

OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

Chief Justice CAPPY.

Salvador Carlos Santiago ("Appellant") appeals from the denial of his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.¹

On January 17, 1985, Appellant robbed and murdered Patrick Huber ("Huber") at the Minuteman Press, a print shop located on the South Side of Pittsburgh. Cindy Pasternak ("Pasternak"), a co-employee of Huber's, observed Appellant in the Minuteman Press during the commission of the crimes.

Appellant was tried before a jury on charges related to this murder. His defense was that he was insane at the time of the commission of the crime. The jury rejected this defense and found Appellant guilty of, inter alia, first degree murder.² After penalty phase, the jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances and fixed the penalty for the murder conviction at death.

On appeal, this court found that Appellant's Fifth Amendment right to counsel had been violated when Appellant invoked his right to counsel with regard to a different offense, but was questioned by police concerning the murder of Huber. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 528 Pa. 516, 599 A.2d 200 (1991) ("Santiago I"). We therefore vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded the matter for a new trial.

A new trial was held in September of 1992. Rather than once again presenting a mental defect defense, a defense which failed to persuade the jury in Santiago I, Appellant's guilt phase counsel at the second trial attempted to establish to the jury that reasonable doubt existed in this matter. The jury rejected this defense, and Appellant was found guilty of first degree murder and robbery.³

A penalty phase hearing then commenced at which Appellant was represented by new counsel. The jury found three aggravating circumstances: the killing was committed during the perpetration of a felony;⁴ Appellant had a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person;⁵ and Appellant had been convicted of another federal or state offense committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue for which a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable.⁶ The jury also found two mitigating circumstances: Appellant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;⁷ and Appellant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired.⁸ The jury determined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and fixed the penalty at death.

Appellant, represented by a new attorney, appealed to this court. We affirmed. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 541 Pa. 188, 662 A.2d 610 (1995) ("Santiago II"). In August of 1996, represented by yet another attorney, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition raising a myriad of claims. Via an order dated December 31, 1996, the PCRA court declared that it was denying relief without a hearing on all claims except for Appellant's claims that Appellant was incompetent at the time of trial and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, develop and produce evidence of his incompetence. The PCRA court held hearings regarding Appellant's competency at the time of trial. The PCRA court subsequently denied relief on the remaining issues.

Appellant then filed the instant appeal with this court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order of the PCRA court.

The first claim that must be addressed is Appellant's contention that the trial and PCRA proceedings were conducted by a biased jurist and therefore Appellant's constitutional rights were violated. Appellant contends that he is entitled to either a new trial, a new PCRA hearing before a different jurist, or an evidentiary hearing at which this issue of alleged bias can be explored.

This claim, however, was not raised in Appellant's PCRA petition. In an apparent effort to explain this failing, Appellant asserts that he did not know of the facts establishing the judge's alleged bias until after the jurist had disposed of the PCRA petition.

Regardless of the reasons for Appellant's belated raising of this issue, it is indisputably waived. We have stressed that a claim not raised in a PCRA petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. We have reasoned that "[p]ermitting a PCRA petitioner to append new claims to the appeal already on review would wrongly subvert the time limitation and serial petition restrictions of the PCRA." Commonwealth v. Bond, 572 Pa. 588, 819 A.2d 33, 52 (2002). The proper vehicle for raising this claim is thus not the instant appeal, but rather is a subsequent PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Lark, 560 Pa. 487, 746 A.2d 585 (2000)

.

Appellant next contends that a hearing should have been held on all the issues he presented in his PCRA petition, and not just on the claim that he was incompetent to stand trial. The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a PCRA court judge is to hold a hearing where a PCRA petition raises any material issues of fact. Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2); see also Commonwealth v. Banks, 540 Pa. 143, 656 A.2d 467, 473 (1995)

. Where a PCRA court determines that a hearing is required as to only some, but not all, of the issues raised in the PCRA petition, a hearing may be limited as to those issues; there is no requirement that a hearing be held as to all of the issues raised in the PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 555 Pa. 434, 725 A.2d 154, 170 (1999).

In the matter sub judice, the PCRA court determined that there were issues of material fact only as to the claim that Appellant was incompetent to stand trial. The PCRA court found that it could resolve the other issues on the record presently before it. Appellant's scant argument as to this issue, which amounts to nothing more than the bald claim that there were material issues of fact relating to his other claims, does not establish that the PCRA judge improperly refused to hold a hearing on the remaining issues.

We now turn to examining Appellant's assertion that he was incompetent at the time of trial. At the outset, we note that the issue of Appellant's competency was not raised at trial or on appeal. Usually, a claim that is not raised at trial or on appeal is waived. Commonwealth v. Pirela, 556 Pa. 32, 726 A.2d 1026, 1030 (1999). Yet, the issue of whether a defendant was competent to stand trial is an exception to that rule. We have stated that it would be "`contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly and intelligently `waive' his right to have the court determine his capacity to stand trial.'" Commonwealth v. Marshall, 456 Pa. 313, 318 A.2d 724 (1974) (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966)). See also Commonwealth v. Tyson, 485 Pa. 344, 402 A.2d 995 (1979)

. Thus, we hold that this issue has not been waived.⁹

Appellant argues that it is impossible to determine his competency at the time of trial via a retrospective PCRA hearing. He contends that since the issue of competency was not litigated in his September of 1992 trial, a new trial must perforce be awarded. He asserts that the PCRA court abused its discretion when it held a hearing on this issue and did not simply award Appellant a new trial.

We first address Appellant's assertion that the PCRA court abused its discretion when it held a hearing on the issue of Appellant's competence at the time of trial rather than automatically awarding a new trial. Apparently, Appellant is of the belief that whenever a claim regarding a defendant's ability to stand trial is raised for the first time after the trial has ended, a new trial should be awarded. He argues that such a rule is compelled by the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975) and Pate, supra.

The defendants in both of these matters claimed that they had been incompetent at the time of trial. The high Court found that in those matters, retrospective hearings could not adequately determine whether the defendants had been competent at the time of their respective trials. The Court therefore awarded new trials to the defendants. Drope, 420 U.S. at 183,

95 S.Ct. 896; Pate, 383 U.S. at 386-87,

86 S.Ct. 836.

There are decisions of this court in which we have accepted, without discussion, that the issue of the defendant's competency at trial may be decided via a retrospective hearing. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 490 Pa. 312, 416 A.2d 485, 487 (1980)

(court held a retrospective hearing on whether defendant was competent to stand trial; court determined, via the testimony of trial counsel and appellant, that appellant understood the nature of the trial proceedings); Commonwealth v. Marshall, 456 Pa. 313, 318 A.2d 724, 726 (1974) (remand to the trial court to hold a retrospective hearing to determine whether defendant was competent to stand trial). However, prior to this date, we have not squarely addressed the issue as to whether a retrospective hearing may be held as to a defendant's competency.

We do not agree with Appellant that the United States Supreme Court has flatly stated that retrospective hearings are forbidden, and that a new trial must perforce be awarded whenever claims like Appellant's are advanced. Rather, we find that the decisions from the high Court act simply as an admonition...