Com. v. Scott
Decision Date | 19 June 2000 |
Citation | 561 Pa. 617,752 A.2d 871 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Nathan SCOTT, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Henry S. Hilles, III, Norristown, for Nathan Scott.
Bruce Castor, Patricia E. Coonahan, Norristown, for Commonwealth.
Robert A Graci, Harrisburg, for Office of Atty. General.
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.
Following a bench trial, Appellant Nathan Scott was convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses1 on September 16, 1998. On September 18, 1998, following a penalty phase hearing, the trial court determined that the one aggravating circumstance2 it found outweighed the two mitigating circumstances3 it found and, therefore, imposed a sentence of death. Appellant filed post-trial motions, which the trial court denied. The instant appeal followed.4
Though Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court is required to independently review the record to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict of first-degree murder in all capital cases. Commonwealth v. Mikell, 556 Pa. 509, 514-16, 729 A.2d 566, 569 (1999). In conducting this review, we must view the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, and determine whether the fact-finder could find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Gibson, 553 Pa. 648, 660-61, 720 A.2d 473, 479 (1998). Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for first-degree murder where the Commonwealth establishes that a human being was unlawfully killed; that the defendant did the killing; that the defendant acted with a specific intent to kill; and that the killing was done with deliberation. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a),(d); Commonwealth v. Fletcher, ___ Pa. ___, 750 A.2d 261, 267 (2000). Specific intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence and may be inferred by the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body.5Commonwealth v. Puksar, 559 Pa. 358, 365, 740 A.2d 219, 223 (Pa. 1999).
With these standards in mind, the record below establishes that on February 22, 1998, Appellant burglarized Joan DeMarco's dance studio, stealing two portable phones and some stereo equipment. During the burglary, Appellant looked in the refrigerator for something to eat. At that point, Ms. DeMarco walked into the dance studio and saw Appellant. She screamed and tried to escape, but Appellant prevented her from leaving, and subsequently tied her up with rope and duct tape. Appellant then hit Ms. DeMarco over the head with a five-pound dumbbell, killing her.
A few days later, police went to Appellant's place of employment and asked if they could speak with him about Joan DeMarco's murder. Appellant agreed and accompanied the police to the station. Eventually, Appellant confessed his involvement in Ms. DeMarco's murder to the police, stating that he did not mean to kill her, but that she surprised him when she walked into her studio. The police were also able to positively identify Appellant's fingerprints and palm prints at the scene of the crime. Viewing the foregoing in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was clearly sufficient for the trial court to have found each element of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
On appeal to this Court, Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his pre-trial motion to suppress his confession because it was obtained after a period of time in which he believes he was entitled to be rewarned of his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).6 Appellant contends that the confession elicited from him was a direct result of the police detectives' unconstitutional failure to rewarn him of his rights and, therefore, should have been suppressed. This claim fails. At approximately 10:30 a.m. on March 3, 1998, Detectives Jeffrey McCabe and Edmund Justice went to Appellant's workplace in order to interview him in connection with the murder of Joan DeMarco. The detectives advised Appellant that they were investigating Ms. DeMarco's murder and he agreed to go with the detectives and to be interviewed at the police station. At 10:57 a.m., the detectives began to take Appellant's statement, in which he denied any involvement in Ms. DeMarco's murder. After stopping for a short break at 12:35 p.m., the detectives resumed taking Appellant's statement at 12:50 p.m. and concluded the conversation at 1:05 p.m. At that point, Detective Justice asked for Appellant's consent to have his fingerprints taken and Appellant consented. Appellant was then instructed to review his non-incriminating statement and make corrections. The corrections were made from 1:25 p.m. until 1:37 p.m.
At 2:00 p.m., Appellant was advised of his constitutional rights and signed a form indicating that he understood his rights, but that he was nevertheless willing to speak to the detectives. Approximately five minutes later, Appellant signed a permission form to have his finger and palm prints taken and he was then printed. At about 2:40 p.m., Appellant was given something to eat. During this time, Detective Justice told Appellant that he was not telling the truth in his statement because surveillance indicated that Appellant did not live in the house he had told the detectives he lived in. The detectives then informed Appellant that they had a reasonable belief that he was involved in Ms. DeMarco's murder. Appellant did not respond, but placed his head down on the table. At 3:50 p.m., Appellant was advised that his palm print was identified as being the same as a latent palm print from the interior wall of the burglarized building, and he was placed under arrest for burglary. At 4:30 p.m., Appellant made his first incriminating statement and confessed to his involvement in the burglary. From about 5:11 p.m. until 7:30 p.m., Appellant made several unsolicited inculpatory statements regarding his involvement in the murder.
Appellant argues that although he was given Miranda warnings at 2:00 p.m., he should have been rewarned of his constitutional rights before his first incriminating statement was given at 4:30 p.m. We disagree.
This Court has never created a prophylactic rule that a suspect must be rewarned of his constitutional rights every time a custodial interrogation is renewed. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 445 Pa. 8, 15, 282 A.2d 276, 279 (1971). Rather, we view the totality of the circumstances in each case to determine whether repeated warnings are necessary where the initial warnings have become stale or remote. Id. Factors that are relevant to such an inquiry are:
[T]he length of time between the warnings and the challenged interrogation, whether the interrogation was conducted at the same place where the warnings were given, whether the officer who gave the warnings also conducted the questioning, and whether the statements obtained are materially different from other statements that may have been made at the time of the warnings.
Id. These criteria, though not mandatory, guide us in determining whether there has been a "clear continuity of interrogation." See Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98, 112, 283 A.2d 58, 66 (1971)
.
This Court has had ample opportunity to apply the Bennett factors in order to delineate what constitutes a "clear continuity of interrogation." See Commonwealth v. Jones, 478 Pa. 172, 178, 386 A.2d 495, 498 (1978)
( ); Commonwealth v. Gray, 473 Pa. 424, 432, 374 A.2d 1285, 1289 (1977) ( ); Commonwealth v. Bennett, 445 Pa. 8, 15-16, 282 A.2d 276, 280 (1971) ( ); Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 444 Pa. 478, 481, 282 A.2d 378, 379-80 (1971) ( ). But see Commonwealth v. Wideman, 460 Pa. 699, 708-09, 334 A.2d 594, 599 (1975) ( ); Commonwealth v. Riggins, 451 Pa. 519, 527-28, 304 A.2d 473, 478 (1973) ( ).
With the Bennett factors in mind, we find that there was a clear continuity of interrogation in the instant case and thus, that the detectives were not required to rewarn Appellant of his rights. Appellant was read his rights two and one-half hours before he gave his first incriminating statement. Immediately after his rights were read, he signed a waiver form. During the period of time before his first incriminating statement, there were only momentary lapses in the interview process to allow Appellant time to take short breaks. Appellant confessed in the same room where he was read his rights. Though Appellant confessed to a different officer than the one who had previously read him his rights, we believe this solitary factor does not compel a...
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