Com. v. Senati

Decision Date28 May 1975
Citation3 Mass.App.Ct. 304,327 N.E.2d 906
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Frank SENATI.
CourtAppeals Court of Massachusetts

Robert Snider, Framingham, for defendant.

Robert J. McKenna, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before HALE, C.J., and GOODMAN and GRANT, JJ.

HALE, Chief Judge.

Following a jury trial the defendant was convicted on indictments charging unlawful possession of a Class A controlled substance (heroin) with intent to distribute (No. 77802) and unlawful distribution of a Class B controlled substance (cocaine) (No. 77803). The case comes to us by way of a bill of exceptions. The defendant argues that it was error for the judge to have denied his motions for directed verdicts on No. 77803 and on so much of No. 77802 as charged intent to distribute. The motions were made at the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case and were renewed at the conclusion of all the evidence.

We summarize the facts disclosed in the bill of exceptions.

On the evening of September 25, 1973, a group of four police officers, at least one of whom was experienced in the investigation of narcotic drug cases, was on patrol in Boston. At about 10:30 P.M. while proceeding on Shawmut Avenue in the neighborhood of Blackstone Park they observed the defendant enter the park with two other men. They recognized the defendant by his distinctive clothing--a long gray coat and an unusual hat--which they had seen him wearing earlier that evening. Their cruiser was driven around the block, where it was parked facing Blackstone Park. From their position the officers had an unobstructed view of the defendant and the others who were beneath a light in the center of the park.

The defendant and one of the men, later identified as one Diaz, touched hands, but the police did not observe what, if anything, was passed between them. Diaz immediately started to walk away. At that moment the officers drove into the park. As they approached the defendant and Diaz, each of the latter threw something to the ground. Five bags of heroin were found near where the defendant stood, and a small quantity of cocaine was found near Diaz. The defendant had $41 on his person and Diaz had $146. The defendant testified that he had been a heroin addict for eighteen years and had gone to the park to purchase heroin.

1. Assuming that it could have been inferred from that evidence that the defendant had just sold cocaine and was about to sell heroin to Diaz, it was at least equally inferable that the defendant had purchased the heroin from Diaz and that Diaz had had possession of the cocaine throughout the transaction (if there was one). The evidence as to the touching of hands was inconclusive both as to the passage of either drug and as to the direction of any such passage. 'When the evidence tends equally to sustain either of two inconsistent propositions, neither of them can be said to have been established by legitimate proof.' Commonwealth v. Croft, 345 Mass. 143, 144--145, 186 N.E.2d 468, 469 (1962). The motion for a directed verdict as to the indictment charging distribution of cocaine (No. 77803) should have been allowed. As to the other indictment (No. 77802), the motion should have been allowed as to so much thereof as charged intent to distribute.

2. The evidence in the case was concluded in one day, and the case was continued for arguments and charge. On the following morning, after the jury were seated and prior to arguments, the defendant summoned his attorney and demanded to be allowed to tell the jury that the police officers had lied and that the transcript of the District Court hearing would prove it. He was informed by his attorney that it was his understanding that there was no District Court transcript. The substance of that conversation was reported to the judge, who was also informed that the defendant was excited and insisted on making a statement to the jury. The judge had the defendant brought to the side of the bench and inquired what he wanted. The defendant reiterated his contention that the police had lied and that he wanted a transcript of the District Court hearing. Defense counsel again informed his client of his understanding that no such transcript existed; whereupon the defendant became excited and in a voice loud enough for the jury to hear, repeated his allegation that the police had lied. He was cautioned to speak softly by the judge, the court officers, and defense counsel. The defendant continued to talk loudly, several times stating 'I declare this case a mistrial.' 1 He was thereupon instructed to return to the dock and to remain silent during arguments. The defendant refused to do so. After instructing the defendant four or five times to return to the dock, and after receiving no answer from the defendant to his...

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33 cases
  • Com. v. Angiulo
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • June 11, 1993
    ...in Robichaud and its progeny.28 The Commonwealth's attempt to draw a parallel between the present case and Commonwealth v. Senati, 3 Mass.App.Ct. 304, 307, 327 N.E.2d 906 (1975), is misplaced. In Senati, the defendant forfeited his right to be present at his trial by repeatedly refusing to ......
  • Commonwealth v. Colon
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • May 3, 2019
    ...writing down information about them, and saw him giving them "[the] whammy" or "[the] evil eye"). Contrast Commonwealth v. Senati, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 307, 327 N.E.2d 906 (1975) (defendant forfeited right to be present by refusing to obey court order to refrain from leaving dock and shout......
  • Commonwealth v. Rodriguez
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • April 27, 2010
    ...cocaine inside the building from Cherizard and received something other than cocaine from the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Senati, 3 Mass.App.Ct. 304, 306, 327 N.E.2d 906 (1975) (acquittal of cocaine distribution charge required where “it was at least equally inferable” that alleged buyer......
  • Commonwealth v. Hernandez
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • July 16, 2010
    ...misplaced because the circumstances of this case are not consistent with a typical street sale of cocaine. In Commonwealth v. Senati, 3 Mass.App.Ct. 304, 306, 327 N.E.2d 906 (1975), we held that a motion for a directed verdict should have been allowed where police officers observed an excha......
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