Com. v. Stokes

• Decision Date: 06 October 1992
• Citation: 532 Pa. 242,615 A.2d 704
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Ralph Trent STOKES, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 704

615 A.2d 704

532 Pa. 242

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Ralph Trent STOKES, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Oct. 21, 1991.

Decided Oct. 6, 1992.

Norris E. Gelman, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Deputy Dist. Atty., Ronald Eisenberg, Chief, Appeals Div., Hugh Burns, Philadelphia, Robert A. Graci, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ.

OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

CAPPY, Justice.

Three consecutive sentences of death were imposed upon Ralph Trent Stokes on June 9, 1987. Further cumulative consecutive sentences of ten to twenty years for robbery, ¹ two and one-half to five years for possessing instruments of crime, ² and five to ten years for criminal conspiracy ³ were also imposed. As this case culminated in a penalty of death it is subject to direct automatic review by this Court. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(1). In accordance with our statutory duty we will begin with a review of the sufficiency of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327, reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1236, 104 S.Ct. 31, 77 L.Ed.2d 1452 (1983).

Appellant's convictions resulted from his participation, along with Donald Jackson, in the robbery of Smokin' Joe's Korner on March 12, 1982. Smokin' Joe's is a restaurant and bar, where the appellant had been previously employed, located at 5100 City Line Avenue in the city of Philadelphia. At trial Mr. Jackson testified that he and appellant had donned blue jumpsuits and ski masks and equipped themselves with weapons in anticipation of the robbery. Jackson was armed with an automatic pistol and appellant carried a .38 caliber revolver.

The two men entered the restaurant through the unlocked rear kitchen door with their guns drawn. They confronted two restaurant employees in the kitchen, Renard Mills and Pierre Blassingame. A third restaurant employee, Eugene Jefferson, entered the kitchen from another part of the building about the same time. Appellant locked the three employees into a walk-in refrigerator, then proceeded into the restaurant office where he encountered Mary Figueroa, the restaurant manager and wife of one of the owners of Smokin' Joe's. Jackson joined appellant and Mrs. Figueroa in the office as appellant was forcing Mrs. Figueroa to open the safe. At that point Jackson noticed appellant's ski mask was pulled up off his face. Jackson told appellant to cover his face, to which appellant replied that he had already been recognized by Mrs. Figueroa. After Mrs. Figueroa opened the safe she was placed in the walk-in refrigerator with the other three employees. Mrs. Figueroa told the others that she had recognized "Trent." She then attempted to exert a calming influence upon the others in the refrigerator.

With everyone in the refrigerator, Jackson and appellant proceeded with their looting of the restaurant. Unfortunately, while these activities were in progress, Peter Santangelo, a mailman, happened upon the scene. Jackson opened the kitchen door a fraction sufficient enough to accept delivery of the mail, and then closed the door. Appellant, afraid of being discovered, chased after the mailman, bringing him into the restaurant and ordering him, at gun point, to lie on the kitchen floor. With Mr. Santangelo on the floor, appellant placed his ear against the refrigerator door in an effort to overhear the conversation among the persons therein.

Appellant then announced to Jackson that he had been identified and would have to "off" the witnesses. Whereupon, appellant opened the refrigerator and fired three shots, killing Eugene Jefferson and Mary Figueroa. Upon witnessing this event, Peter Santangelo ran from the kitchen. Appellant cornered Mr. Santangelo at the locked front door and fired three more shots, leaving Mr. Santangelo as his third fatality.

Jackson, upon witnessing the murders, ran out the rear door and started the car. The vehicle was difficult to start, leaving sufficient time for appellant to join Jackson in the car. The two men then fled the scene. Appellant and Jackson went to the home of Jackson's friend, Eric Burley, where they divided the proceeds of the robbery and directed Burley to dispose of appellant's gun, the jumpsuits, and the ski masks worn during the commission of the crimes.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to establish appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of each element on all three charges of murder in the first degree, robbery, possessing instruments of crime and criminal conspiracy. Commonwealth v. Rollins, 525 Pa. 335, 580 A.2d 744 (1990). We shall address the issues as raised by appellant in two sections, first those pertaining to the guilt phase, and then those issues raised in the penalty phase.

The Guilt Phase

Appellant was afforded new counsel during the post-trial proceedings. Counsel for appellant raises six issues in the guilt phase, five of which are framed as ineffectiveness of trial counsel. This Court originally established a three prong standard for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967). Recently, that standard was succinctly delineated in Commonwealth v. Chester, 526 Pa. 578, 587 A.2d 1367 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 959, 112 S.Ct. 422, 116 L.Ed.2d 442 (1991): "1) is the issue underlying the claim of ineffectiveness of arguable merit; 2) does the course chosen by counsel have a reasonable basis designed to serve appellant's interest; and 3) has the appellant suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's ineffectiveness." Id. 526 Pa. at 609, 587 A.2d at 1382. With this standard in mind we begin our review of the allegations of trial counsel's ineffectiveness.

Appellant raises two allegations of error concerning the trial court's instructions to the jury. The first pertains to the presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent, and the second relates to the definition of reasonable doubt. In each instance appellant focuses on a small portion of the court's charge, to which he claims trial counsel should have objected. In Commonwealth v. Prosdocimo, 525 Pa. 147, 578 A.2d 1273 (1990), this Court reiterated the standard of review regarding the wording of a trial court's charge to the jury.

When evaluating jury instructions, the charge must be read as a whole to determine whether it was fair or prejudicial. The trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its instructions, and may choose its own wording so long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its consideration.

Id. at 150, 578 A.2d at 1274.

In the instant case the trial court expanded on the standard jury instructions by using its own words to set forth further illustrations of the legal points to be considered. First, we will address the objections to the charge on the presumption of innocence and the right of a defendant in a criminal case to remain silent.

The court repeated the language at issue in the opening instructions to the jury and in the final instructions before deliberation. The relevant section of the charge as fully given at the close of trial is as follows, with the portion complained of underlined.

It's not the defendant's burden to prove his innocence or that he is not guilty. The defendant who is the person accused of crime is not required to present evidence or prove anything in his own defense. There is no burden or responsibility to prove anything.

Further, as you recall, you must not presume, infer, conclude, or entertain any idea, inference, presumption, negative inference, or inkling of his guilt of the charges to which he stands accused from the fact that he has not testified in his own behalf in this case.

The defendant has a right to remain silent and not to testify. You are not by the indirect mental process of assertion to his right to silence to conclude that he is in any respect guilty, done anything wrong, or is hiding anything by the assertion of his right not to incriminate himself and to remain silent and not to take the witness stand as a party defendant.

Again, the defendant, as a person accused of the crime, is not required to present evidence or prove anything in his own defense.

Appellant asserts that the word incriminate creates the impression in the minds of the jurors that had appellant taken the stand his own testimony would have proven his involvement in the crimes charged. Unfortunately, the words chosen by the trial judge were not the best that could have been used to proclaim the rights at issue. We take this opportunity to caution trial judges that this phrasing is inappropriate.

However, we will not review a charge to the jury by focusing on one or two words taken out of the context within which they were spoken. Clearly, the charge as a whole reflects the emphasis upon a defendant's right to remain silent and the sincere efforts by the trial court to convey to this jury that no adverse inference must be drawn from the fact that a person charged with a crime exercises his constitutional right not to speak in his own defense. ⁴ As the charge, in its entirety, "sufficiently and accurately" apprised the jury of the law it was to consider, we cannot find trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the improper choice of a few words. ⁵ Prosdocimo, 525 Pa. at 154, 578 A.2d at 1276.

The second objection to the trial court's charge to the jury focuses on the use of the word substantial in defining reasonable doubt. During a rather lengthy charge on reasonable doubt, the court did at one point use the word substantial, in the following context: "A reasonable doubt is not merely an imagined or passing fancy that may come into the mind of a juror. It...