Com. v. Truesdale

• Decision Date: 17 November 1972
• Citation: 449 Pa. 325,296 A.2d 829
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Petitioner, v. Mack TRUESDALE, Respondent.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 829

296 A.2d 829

449 Pa. 325

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Petitioner, v. Mack TRUESDALE, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Nov. 17, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 28, 1972.

James D. Crawford, Deputy Dist. Atty., Herman Rosenberger, II, Asst. Atty. Gen., Philadelphia, for petitioner.

A. Benjamin Johnson, Jr., Abraham T. Needleman, Dennis H. Eisman, Joseph Michael Smith, Louis Lipschitz, Joel D. Caney, Gerald A. Stein, Needleman, Needleman, Tabb & Eisman, Philadelphia, for respondent; Jack Levine, Philadelphia, of counsel.

Before JONES, C. J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION

EAGEN, Justice.

On October 20, 1971, Blanche Buchler was shot and killed in front of her home in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Three days later respondent, Mack Truesdale, was arrested by the Philadelphia police and charged with murder and conspiracy in connection with the killing. Thereafter, on October 27, 1971, Truesdale was afforded a preliminary hearing and, after the presentation of evidence, was bound over for the grand jury. At this hearing it was further determined that bail should be denied because the proof was evident and the presumption great, and the offense rose to the level of murder in the first degree, and pursuant to Article 1, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. the offense being a capital one was not bailable. On November 8, 1971, Truesdale petitioned the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia for a writ of habeas corpus alleging he was improperly being detained; the petition was subsequently denied with the court finding that his detention was proper. On December 2, 1971, Truesdale was indicted on the charges of murder and conspiracy, in connection with the death of Blanche Buchler, by a grand jury and is now awaiting trial on the indictments.

Thereafter, certain pretrial proceedings took place and on June 30, 1972, Truesdale made another application for his release on bail. The foundation of his new application rested on the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), which abolished the death penalty as it theretofore had existed in Pennsylvania. A hearing was held, and the trial court granted bail in the amount of ten thousand dollars.

The Commonwealth immediately filed a petition in this Court requesting the assumption of plenary jurisdiction pursuant to Section 205 of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, No. 223, Art. II § 205, 17 P.S. § 211.205, ¹ and Truesdale joined in the request. A rule to show cause issued and argument was held on Saturday, July 29, 1972. The sole question presented is whether a defendant who is awaiting trial on the charge of murder, which rises to the level of murder in the first degree, has a right to bail pending trial. We assume plenary jurisdiction and now proceed to a determination of the issue on the merits.

Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania of 1968 ² provides the following with respect to bailable offenses:

'All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident or presumption great . . ..' ³

Consequently, the Constitution of the Commonwealth mandates all persons have a right to be released on bail prior to trial in all cases except those involving capital offenses. In the recent past this has meant that all persons, except those charged with murder in the first degree, ⁴ had a right to bail while awaiting trial, subject to the accused giving adequate assurance he would appear for trial. If a person was charged with murder which rose to the level of murder in the first degree, he could be denied bail when the proof was evident or the presumption great. ⁵ This result was dictated by the decisions of this Court which have consistently interpreted the constitutional phrase 'capital offense' to mean only murder in the first degree, since this was the only crime for which the death penalty could be imposed. In Commonwealth ex rel. Alberti v. Boyle, 412 Pa. 398, 195 A.2d 97 (1963), ⁶ this Court stated:

'A 'capital offense' within the meaning of the Constitution means a crime of such a character that the penalty or sentence of death May be imposed even though the crime is punishable by death or life imprisonment, or by a lesser sentence. . . . In other words, a capital offense is a crime for which the death penalty may, but need not, be inflicted.' Id. at 400, 195 A.2d at 98.

See also Commonwealth v. Caye, 447 Pa. 213, 290 A.2d 244 (1972) and Commonwealth v. Keller, 433 Pa. 20, 248 A.2d 855 (1969).

With the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, supra, and Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 408 U.S. 934, 92 S.Ct. 2852, 33 L.Ed.2d 747 (1972), as well as this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Bradley, Pa., 295 A.2d 842 (1972), which cases have invalidated the death penalty as it presently exists in Pennsylvania, we are left to decide if the definition of 'capital offense' which we adopted in Alberti requires that the bail set for Truesdale was proper.

After extensive study and reflection we rule that the constitutional phrase 'capital offense' is a definition of a penalty, i.e., the death penalty, rather than a definition of the crime of murder in the first degree. In Alberti, we stated: 'In other words, a capital offense is a crime for which the death penalty may, but need not, be inflicted' 412 Pa. 400, 195 A.2d at 98, and in our recent decision of Commonwealth v. Caye, supra, Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court stated: "A capital offense is a crime for which the death penalty May . . . be inflicted.' . . . Only murder in the first degree is so Punishable.' 447 Pa. 216, 290 A.2d 246 (emphasis added.) ⁷ A reading of these cases leads to the conclusion that 'capital offense' refers to the punishment or penalty which may be imposed upon the person found guilty of a crime, rather than a definition of a particular crime. Consequently, since there are presently no criminal offenses in the Commonwealth for which the death penalty may be imposed, there are no 'capital offenses'; hence, by mandate of our Constitution, all offenses are bailable prior to trial.

Not only is this result dictated by our own Constitution and the case law interpreting that document, it also follows from a reading of cases from other jurisdictions which have interpreted similar constitutional provisions. In State v. Johnson, 61 N.J. 351, 294 A.2d 245 (1972), and in Ex Parte Contella, 485 S.W.2d 910 (1972), ⁸ the Supreme Court of New Jersey and the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, respectively, both found by interpretation of constitutional provisions similar to our own that bail was a matter of right in all cases now that the United States Supreme Court has invalidated the death penalty. Moreover, in State v. Pett, 253 Minn. 429, 92 N.W.2d 205 (1958), the Supreme Court of Minnesota was faced with the exact same question we are confronted with after the Minnesota legislature had abolished the death penalty. After determining the term 'capital offense' strictly referred to the death penalty, the Court stated:

'Where words used in our constitution have a clear and well-defined meaning, there is no room for construction. Neither the courts nor the legislature have a right to substitute for words used in the constitution having a well-defined meaning other words having a different meaning. That is exactly what we would be doing were we to substitute 'murder in the first degree' for 'capital offense.' Murder in the first degree is not a capital offense when it cannot be punished by death. The right to amend the constitution rests exclusively with the people, and, if, constitutionally, bail is to be withheld in cases other than capital offenses at the discretion of the trial court, that change must be brought about by an amendment of the constitution. As the constitution now reads, all crimes are bailable.' Id. at 432--433, 92 N.W.2d 207--208. ⁹

Lastly, the Supreme Court of Kansas reached the same result in the case of Ex Parte Ball, 106 Kan. 536, 188 P. 424 (1920), finding that once the legislature had abolished the death penalty in cases involving murder in the first degree, this crime was no longer a 'capital offense' and therefore it was bailable as a matter of right, under the Kansas Constitution. ¹⁰ Moreover, an analysis employed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Johnson, supra, also dictates this result. In Johnson, the Court noted that in a prior decision, State v. Williams, 30 N.J. 105, 152 A.2d 9 (1959), it had held when a man is found guilty of murder in the second degree, such a finding constituted an acquittal of murder in the first degree and if the party won a reversal on appeal, he had a right to bail awaiting retrial because he was no longer subject to a 'capital offense.' The Johnson Court then went on to discuss its decision in State v. Wolf, 46 N.J. 301, 216 A.2d 586 (1966) stating:

'Wolf was convicted of murder in the first degree and the jury recommended life imprisonment. The conviction was reversed for trial errors . . . and retrial was ordered. Prior to retrial on defendant's application the trial court ruled that the State was barred from again seeking the death penalty. On appeal by the State we affirmed, holding that the jury having rendered a judgment against infliction of the death penalty, the issue must be considered as adjudicated and binding for purposes of the forthcoming trial. The distinction drawn between a verdict of guilt of first degree murder which carried the death penalty and such a verdict which imposed life imprisonment obviously signified that murder which can produce only life imprisonment is not a capital offense, within the meaning of the Constitution.' 61 N.J. at 356, 294 A.2d at 248.

The decision of this Court in Commonwealth v. Caye, supra, and ...