Com. v. Whitaker

• Decision Date: 18 March 1975
• Citation: 461 Pa. 407,336 A.2d 603
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Tony WHITAKER, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 603

336 A.2d 603

461 Pa. 407

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Tony WHITAKER, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 18, 1975.

[461 Pa. 409] Allan M. Tabas, Philadelphia, for appellant.

F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Jr., Dist. Atty., Richard A. Sprague, First Asst. Dist. Atty., David Richman, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., John H. Isom, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

POMEROY, Justice.

After a trial by jury, Tony Whitaker, the appellant, was found guilty of murder in the second degree in connection with the fatal stabbing of one Benjamin Simmons. Post-trial motions were denied, and appellant was sentenced to imprisonment of not less than seven nor more than twenty years. This appeal centers on the admissibility of two statements which appellant had made to the police and which constituted, substantially, the only evidence presented by the Commonwealth at trial. We conclude that, because of the illegality of appellant's original arrest, the admission of the statements was constitutional error, and therefore reverse.

On August 31, 1972, Simmons was found stabbed to death on South 59th Street in Philadelphia. After several months of fruitless investigation the police learned through questioning members of various street gangs that 'Pops' Barton and a person named Tony, two members of the Master Street Moon Gang, had been 'involved' in the incident. At approximately noon on November 22, 1972, Tony Whitaker, then seventeen years old, was taken into custody by a Detective Ross and another detective and transported to the Police Administration Building for questioning. There he was given Miranda warnings and he signed a written waiver of his constitutional rights. In the course of the ensuing interview, appellant gave an oral statement in which he admitted that on August 31st he had accompanied John 'Pops' Barton, whom he knew to be armed with a butcher knife, to the 'turf' of a rival gang on South 59th Street. There Whitaker and Barton walked on separate sides of the street. Appellant heard Barton yell '58th Street' (an apparent reference to a member of the 58th Street gang), and turned to see Barton stabbing a man. Whitaker denied having participated in the assault and stated that he had immediately run from the scene. At 10:00 p.m. Whitaker's mother arrived at the station and in her presence the substance of the oral statement was reduced to writing. After signing this statement, appellant was released from custody.

Two days later, on November 24, 1972, acting upon the information provided by Whitaker, the police arrested Barton. Barton made a full confession in which he stated that Whitaker had participated in the attack by beating the victim, Benjamin Simmons, with his fists. Possessed of this additional information, the police went to appellant's home on November 27, 1972 and, with Whitaker's consent, took him to the Police Administration Building for further questioning. There Detective Grose informed Whitaker that Barton had been arrested and had given a statement accusing appellant of striking Simmons several times before Barton had used the knife. Whitaker was then again advised of his constitutional rights and again waived them in writing. He quickly then admitted, first orally and later in writing, that the events had occurred as Barton had described. After signing the written statement, appellant was formally placed under arrest.

A motion was made to suppress Whitaker's two oral and two written statements. At the suppression hearing Detective Ross testified that at the time Whitaker was first apprehended on November 22 the police had no information that he had committed a crime; they had merely 'picked up' Whitaker for questioning. The suppression judge found that the detention of appellant on November 22 constituted an arrest, and that the arrest was unlawful as without probable cause. He further held that the two statements made on that day were gained through exploitation of the illegal arrest and were, therefore inadmissible as 'fruit of the poisonous tree.' A contrary result was reached, however, as to the two statements made on the 27th. The court reasoned that although the taking of Whitaker into custody on that day amounted to an arrest, probable cause for it was supplied by the confession of Barton, and the later statements were, therefore, untainted. It is this latter determination which appellant challenges today.

We note, preliminarily, that the Commonwealth, having prevailed as to the admissibility of the statements made on November 27, had no occasion to challenge the findings of the suppression judge with respect to Whitaker's arrest and statements of November 22. Without belaboring the point, we think the record amply sustains these determinations. The Commonwealth does not dispute that the detention to which Whitaker was subjected on that day--twelve hours of intermittent interrogation--constituted an arrest. See Commonwealth v. Bishop, 425 Pa. 175, 181, 228 A.2d 661, 665 (1967). Neither does it argue that the arrest was valid. The police had no information about Tony Whitaker; they had merely learned, months previously, that a person known as 'Tony' had been 'involved' in the episode in which Simmons was killed. This may be thought to cast suspicion upon anyone in the vicinity going by that name, but mere suspicion is insufficient to support any arrest, with or without a warrant. See Hanry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101, 80 S.Ct. 168, 170, 4 L.Ed.2d 134, 137 (1959); Conner v. Commonwealth, 3 Bin. 38, Pa. (1810). The suppression court was also correct in concluding that the statements which appellant gave during the interrogation of November 22 stemmed directly and immediately from the illegal arrest and were impermissibly tainted by it. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1965); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 455 Pa. 552, 558, 317 A.2d 237, 240 (1974); Betrand Appeal, 451 Pa. 381, 389--91, 303 A.2d 486, 491 (1973). ¹ See and compare Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 445 Pa. 461, 466, 285 A.2d 93, 96 (1971); Commonwealth v. Marabel, 445 Pa. 435, 449, 283 A.2d 285, 292 (1971); Commonwealth v. Bishop, Supra; Commonwealth ex rel. Craig v. Maroney, 348 F.2d 22, 29 (3rd Cir. 1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 1019, 86 S.Ct. 1966, 16 L.Ed.2d 1042 (1966); Leonard v. United States, 391 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1968).

Accepting, therefore, as we do the premise that the statements given by appellant on the 22nd were fruits of an unlawful arrest made on that day, we proceed to consider his claim that the statements of the 27th were also tainted by that same unconstitutional arrest.

In its well-known decision in Wong Sun v. United States, Supra, the Supreme Court of the United States restated the principle that the exclusionary rule which prohibits the use of evidence obtained from an accused in violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amendments prohibits also the indirect use of such evidence. On the question as to what evidence must be considered as obtained as a direct result of an unlawful invasion, and so excluded, the Court said, in a frequently quoted passage: 'We need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is 'whether, granting the establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. '' Wong Sun, supra, 371 U.S. at 487--88, 83 S.Ct. at 417, 9 L.Ed.2d at 455, quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt (1959). See also Commonwealth v. Garvin, 448 Pa. 258, 293 A.2d 33.

Whether challenged evidence has been sufficiently purged of an impermissible taint, here the clearly unlawful arrest, to render it admissible must be determined from the totality of the circumstances surrounding each particular case, Commonwealth v. Marabel, Supra; Commonwealth v. Bordner, 432 Pa. 405, 247 A.2d 612 (1968); the burden of proof rests with the Commonwealth. Betrand Appeal, Supra, 451 Pa. at 389, 303 A.2d at 490; Commonwealth v. Bishop, Supra. See also Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 225, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 2011, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047, 1053 (1968).

In virtually all of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' cases which this Court has considered, there have existed only two links in the alleged causal chain, i.e., the initial illegality and the challenged physical or verbal evidence resulting therefrom. In the present case the progression is more complex, but the fact that there are several links and a five-day time span in this chain of events is not significant; what is of critical importance for constitutional purposes is that there exists a real and direct causal connection between appellant's unlawful arrest on November 22 and his ultimate confession on November 27. As the Commonwealth acknowledges in its brief, '(a)s a result of appellant's initial statements on November 22, 1972, the police arrested John Barton, and on November 24, 1972, he (Barton) confessed to the murder and implicated Tony Whitaker, appellant, as a participant in the crime. . . . As a result of this information, appellant was arrested and on November 27, 1972 confessed his participation in the crime.' (Commonwealth's brief, p. 6; emphasis added). Again it is said, '(o)n the strength of this evidence (i.e. Barton's statement that Whitaker had taken part in the murder), appellant was arrested anew on November 27th, and After being confronted with Barton's accusation, confessed his participation in the stabbing.' (Commonwealth's brief, p. 8; emphasis added).

The Commonwealth contends that our decision in Commonwealth v. Garvin, Supra, indicates a contrary result. It is argued that because the...