Com. v. Whiting

• Decision Date: 08 January 1963
• Citation: 187 A.2d 563,409 Pa. 492
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Charles Edward WHITING, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 563

187 A.2d 563

409 Pa. 492

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Charles Edward WHITING, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Jan. 8, 1963.

Herbert Maris (Deceased), Charles Edward Whiting, in pro. per., Daniel E. Beren, Abington, for appellant

Harold W. Spencer, Dist. Atty., Norristown, George C. Corson, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Vincent A. Cirillo, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, and KEIM, JJ.

EAGEN, Justice.

The defendant, Charles Edward Whiting, was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to life imprisonment. From the judgment of conviction and sentence, this appeal is prosecuted.

The first assignment of error concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, and whether or not the defendant was entitled to have the judgment arrested after verdict. In evaluating the merit of the question, the testimony must be read in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Deyell, 399 Pa. 563, 160 A.2d 448 (1960). On appeal, we must accept as true all of the Commonwealth's evidence upon which, if believed, the jury could have properly based its verdict, Commonwealth v. Kravitz, 400 Pa. 198, 161 A.2d 861 (1960). The test of the sufficiency of the evidence, irrespective of whether it is direct or circumstantial, is whether accepting as true all of the evidence upon which, if believed, the jury could properly have based its verdict, it is sufficient in law to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged: Commonwealth v. Kravitz, supra; Commonwealth v. Hart, 403 Pa. 652, 170 A.2d 850 (1961).

The testimony read in this light may be briefly summarized as follows:

Juan Otero operated a tailor shop at 56 East Spring Avenue, Ardmore, Pennsylvania, and lived in a small connecting apartment to the rear thereof. Shortly after 9:15 p. m. o'clock on June 14, 1956, Mrs. Isabel Strickland, who lived in an apartment above, heard sounds of a quarrel, scuffling and screams emanating from the apartment connected with the tailor shop below. She went to her bedroom window overlooking a rear entrance leading from the tailor shop premises to an alley, and saw a colored man, whom she did not recognize, start out of the Otero apartment and then immediately re-enter. It was dark and she could not see his face. Within seconds, the same individual came out again. He was dressed in a light 'T' shirt, dark trousers, light baseball cap, and carried a paper clothing bag. Immediately alerating neighbors, together with Mrs. Strickland, they hurried to the Otero premises and saw Juan Otero lying on the floor of the kitchen in a pool of blood. No one else was on the premises. Mrs. Strickland called the police at exactly 9:28 p. m. They arrived within minutes and found the victim dead as a result of six stab wounds in his body. Otero had been seen alive by another neibhbor about 9:10 p. m. o'clock, standing in front of his tailor shop.

Within minutes thereafter, Mrs. Strickland went by automobile to the home of her family, three blocks away. After a very brief stop, she started home again and en route saw a colored man of the same build and appearance as the man she saw leaving the Otero premises. He was walking along the street about a block and one-half from the scene of the killing, still wearing the same type of clothing described, but was not carrying a bag. She reported this fact to the police. At first, when she saw this individual she could not remember his name, but shortly thereafter she realized that it was the defendant, Charles Edward Whiting, and so told the police.

The appellant-defendant was taken into custody and questioned about the killing early the next morning. A search of the room where he lived revealed a white 'T' shirt, dark trousers, shorts, socks, a military fatigue cap, shoes and a paper clothing bag. Blood spots and blotches of blood were readily discernible on each of the items of clothing and on the clothing bag. The defendant admitted wearing this clothing on the night before.

In midmorning of June 15th, the defendant gave a statement to the police wherein he stated that he had been in the Otero tailor shop between 7:30 and 8 o'clock p. m. the night before to pick up some clothes previously left for attention. He said that he received his clothes, departed and did not return. Subsequently, he learned about the assault upon Otero and watched from nearby as the police placed the victim's body in the ambulance.

Later on the same day, the defendant gave another statement to the police, which was substantially different than the one previously given. Therein, he said he went to the tailor shop at 7:30 p. m., paid for his clothing but decided to leave it there until he was going home. He returned to the shop about 9:30 p. m. o'clock, saw the body of the victim lying on the floor in a pool of blood. He knelt alongside the body, rolled it over, jumped up shaking the blood off his hands, grabbed his clothes and ran out of the rear entrance.

He explained his unusual actions as being due to fright and emotional disturbanc based upon his recollection of a related experience while serving in the armed forces during the Korean War.

Laboratory tests disclosed that the specimens of blood found on the clothing, shoes and bag found in defendant's room were the same blood type as that of the victim's and of a different type than that of the defendant's.

Certainly, this evidence, when viewed in totality, is amply sufficient to warrant the conclusion of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant argues that it constitutes only a series of suspicious circumstances, proving only that the defendant was on the scene at or about the time of the killing. It adds up to much more than that. The testimony of the witness, Strickland, places the defendant in the death room at the exact time of the killing. Other than the victim no one else was seen on or leaving the premises. The blood on the defendant's clothing is strong proof that he was there and participated in the knifing. His hurried exit and subsequent false and misleading statements to the police indicate consciousness of guilt. See Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 94 A.2d 743 (1953); Commonwealth v. Sauders, 390 Pa. 379, 134 A.2d 890 (1957); and Commonwealth v. Kravitz, supra.

True, the Commonwealth's case is based completely on circumstantial evidence, but 'Proof by eye witnesses or direct evidence of the corpus delecti or of identity or of the commission by the defendant of the crime charged is not necessary.' Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 508, 113 A.2d 464, 469 (1955). It has been well said, that 'Circumstantial evidence is, in the abstract, nearly, though perhaps not altogether, as strong as positive evidence; in the concrete, it may be infinitely stronger'. Commonwealth v. Kravitz, supra, 400 Pa. at page 215, 161 A.2d at page 869, repeating what was said in Commonwealth v. Kovovic, 209 Pa. 465, 468, 58 A. 857 (1904).

The failure to prove the existence of motive is not fatal to the Commonwealth's case, Commonwealth v. Nasuti, 385 Pa. 436, 123 A.2d 435 (1956).

There is no doubt in our minds that, under the evidence, the question of defendant's guilt was for the jury.

TRIAL ERRORS

These assignments of error concern three portions of the charge of the...