Com. v. Williams
| Decision Date | 26 February 1980 |
| Citation | 379 Mass. 874,401 N.E.2d 376 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Jesse WILLIAMS. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Hugh W. Samson, Salem, for defendant.
Brian J. Dobie, Sp. Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.
Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and BRAUCHER, KAPLAN, WILKINS and LIACOS, JJ.
The defendant was convicted on four counts of rape of a child under sixteen years of age. In this appeal, he argues that he was denied his right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States because the judge excluded the public from his entire trial.
The defendant and the Commonwealth appear to agree on the extent of the defendant's right to a public trial in the circumstances. The defendant concedes that his rights were not infringed unconstitutionally by the closing of the trial to the public during the testimony of the thirteen-year-old victims. The Commonwealth, in turn, concedes that the defendant had a constitutional right to have the balance of his trial open to the public. The record, including the transcript of the trial, does not show whether the public was excluded from the entire trial.
Before any evidence was introduced, out of the presence of the jury but apparently in open court in the defendant's presence, the prosecutor asked for a closed hearing at the request of the minor witnesses. Counsel for the defendant requested an open hearing. From the discussion with the judge, it appears that legal interns in the district attorney's office and relatives of the defendant were to be permitted in the courtroom. The judge told defense counsel that he could put on the record why he thought the hearing should be open. Defense counsel simply took an exception to the judge's ruling, although at that point the judge had in fact made no ruling. When offered a further opportunity to state his reasons, defense counsel stated that "the defendant is entitled to an open hearing to face these accusations." The prosecutor referred to the witnesses's indication of "a certain amount of embarrassment." The judge then said, The defendant claimed an exception.
At no time did defense counsel argue that the trial should be closed only during the testimony of the minor victims. When the victims finished testifying as the Commonwealth's first two witnesses, the defendant did not move that the public then be permitted into the courtroom. As we have noted, we do not know whether in fact the public was excluded from the courtroom thereafter. 1 No express mention was made of any constitutional rights. No reference was made at any time to G.L. c. 278, § 16A, which concerns the exclusion of "the general public from the court room" where the trial involves a rape in which the victim is a minor.
The burden is clearly on the defendant to demonstrate that the public was excluded from his trial after the minor victims testified. We agree with the defendant that he need not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the closing of the balance of his trial. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 356 Mass. 432, 435, 253 N.E.2d 333 (1969).
Without acknowledging the soundness or the effect, if any, of the Commonwealth's concession that the defendant was entitled constitutionally to have his trial public, apart from the minor victim's testimony, 2 we conclude that the defendant has not demonstrated that his trial was impermissibly closed. The case must be remanded for a determination of the extent to which his trial was closed to the public, and, if it was, for consideration whether the defendant properly waived his right to a public trial, through his actions or the actions of his counsel. Consideration can be given to (a) the extent to which, if at all, the defendant's constitutional right to a public trial was waived by what may have been a trial tactic of counsel in this case, and (b) the extent, if any, of the defendant's understanding of his right to a public trial or of his waiver of that right. See Martineau v. Perrin, 601 F.2d 1196, 1200 (1st Cir. 1979); United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125, 128-129 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, ...
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