Com. v. Wood

• Decision Date: 23 September 2003
• Citation: 833 A.2d 740
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Colleen WOOD, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

833 A.2d 740

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Colleen WOOD, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued April 8, 2003.

Filed September 23, 2003.

Richard T. Brown, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Peter Carr, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for Com., appellee.

Before: JOHNSON, FORD ELLIOTT, JOYCE, STEVENS, ORIE MELVIN, LALLY-GREEN, BENDER, BOWES, and GRACI, JJ.

JOHNSON, J.

¶ 1 Colleen Wood appeals the judgment of sentence imposed following her conviction of underage drinking. Ms. Wood contends that police stopped her illegally, without reasonable suspicion that she was engaged in criminal activity. The District Attorney for Philadelphia County asks this Court to conclude that it was reasonable for a Pennsylvania State Trooper, assigned as a liquor enforcement officer, to suspect that a seventeen-year old sitting in a bar was engaged in criminal activity where the only observation put forth by the Commonwealth to support such suspicion was that, from the arresting officer's experience, the minor "looked to be under the age of 21." For an investigative detention to comport with constitutional minimums, the law requires that the suspected criminal activity must be linked with the officer's observation of suspicious or irregular behavior of the particular individual involved. Here, the enforcement officers possessed absolutely no evidence, nor had they observed any culpable conduct involving Colleen Wood, prior to her alleged inculpatory declaration overheard by one of the officers. We believe that the detention of Ms. Wood was not justified by reasonable suspicion and that, accordingly, her alleged confession of underage drinking is not admissible at trial. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of sentence, reverse the conviction and remand.

¶ 2 Ms. Wood presents this matter framing the statement of the question as follows:

Where it is not a crime for minors to be present in a bar and where no law requires persons inside a bar to have or show identification, do the federal and state constitutions require that the police have probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime before arresting her for underage drinking, or can they conduct mass arrests first and then release those who can prove they are not violating the law?

Brief for Appellant at 2. While the statement as phrased might reasonably be seen by some as hyperbolic, it captures the issue this Court must resolve on this appeal: when viewing all of the surrounding circumstances, did the liquor enforcement officers have reasonable suspicion that Ms. Wood was engaged in criminal activity prior to subjecting her to the investigative detention that gave rise to her confession? We conclude that the officers did not possess reasonable suspicion that criminal activity by Ms. Wood was afoot.

¶ 3 Our Supreme Court has recently re-stated the standard by which we review a trial court order denying a motion to suppress:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Since the prosecution prevailed in the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831, 842 (2003) (citations omitted). "When ruling on suppression motions, the suppression court is required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether evidence was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights." Commonwealth v. Haynes, 395 Pa.Super. 322, 577 A.2d 564, 570 (1990); see Pa. R.Crim.P. 581(I). Here, the suppression court did not make findings of fact on the record at the time of the hearing, although it did discuss the suppression issue in its opinion filed 11/5/01 pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Because the only witness at the suppression hearing was Liquor Enforcement Officer Cynthia A. Taylor, we will consult the record directly to ascertain the facts surrounding Ms. Wood's detention and subsequent arrest. See Haynes, 577 A.2d at 570.

¶ 4 The Suppression Hearing Transcript (S.H.T.), 6/20/01, establishes the following facts. Pennsylvania State Trooper Taylor was assigned as a liquor enforcement officer and had been in that assignment for approximately a year and a half at the time of the incident here under review. S.H.T. at 4-5, R.R. 7a-8a. She had been with the Philadelphia enforcement unit for six months. Id. at 5, R.R. 8a. On February 27, 2001, Trooper Taylor, along with other officers, was working an assigned detail for the Mardi Gras celebration on South Street in Philadelphia. Id. at 6, R.R. 9a. The officers were on South Street as a result of their sergeant having received reports from the Philadelphia Police Department Vice Unit that "there was a good chance [the officers] would be finding a lot of underage drinking because it's a well-known party on South Street during Mardi Gras." Id.

¶ 5 At the suppression hearing, when the assistant district attorney questioned Trooper Taylor as to what the officers would look for while on patrol, the transcript includes this exchange:

Q. [ADA Joseph Doyle]: And tell us what you looked for?

A. [Trooper Taylor]: Usually [,] what we do is just go in in undercover status in street clothes, walk around and we're assigned to go into bars, take a look around, see if we see anyone youthful appearing drinking beer or alcoholic beverages. If we do, then we radio to the entire detail to come down and do a routine inspection of the premises.

Q. What happens if you think you go into a bar and you see someone youthful in appearance, do you mean under the age of 21?

A. Yes.

Q. And why is that?

A. Because it is illegal in the city of Pennsylvania [sic] to be drinking alcoholic beverages under the age of 21.

S.H.T., 6/20/01, at 6-7, R.R. 9a-10a (emphasis added).

¶ 6 Along with several other officers from the State Liquor Control Department, Trooper Taylor entered the "Name That Bar" on South Street. Id. at 8, R.R. 11a. Trooper Taylor testified that, from the officers' "experience," and based solely on whether a bar patron "looked to be under the age of 21," the officers would ask the bar patron for identification, a process known as carding. Id. at 9, R.R. 12a. When the officers have found "four, five, six" underage patrons, they separate all the patrons under 21 in a separate area of the bar. Id. at 10, R.R. 13a. Any patron over the age of 21 is ordered to leave the bar. Trooper Taylor acknowledged that, on this occasion, patrons over 21 were "free to leave" the bar. Id. The conclusion is inescapable that persons in the bar who were carded and could not prove they were over 21 were not "free to leave." As to the sequence by which the officers proceeded with their investigation, Trooper Taylor testified that first, the officers would determine age, and then, and only then, were the officers "going to determine whether or not they had been drinking alcohol." Id.

¶ 7 On cross-examination, Trooper Taylor again confirmed that it was only after the "over 21's" had been separated from the "under 21's" that the officers proceeded to determine whether or not the "under 21's" had been drinking. Id. at 15, R.R. 18a. During the raid, either state or city police officers blocked the doorway and all exits until identification could be established. Id. at 13-14, R.R. 16a-17a. The identity of the officers blocking egress was clear to all in the bar. Id. at 14, R.R. 17a. Taylor testified that any patron "youthful in appearance" would have been prevented from leaving, even if the patron expressed a desire to leave the bar. Id.

¶ 8 After the officers identified Ms. Wood as being seventeen years of age, and only after she was segregated along with the other patrons who were "youthful in appearance," Trooper Taylor overheard Ms. Wood declare that "she was drinking not in that bar but ... she had been drinking that evening." Id. at 11, R.R. 14a. It was based upon this declaration alone that Ms. Wood was "set aside" to "get in line and be cited for [18 Pa.C.S. § ] 6308 [underage drinking]." Id. at 12, R.R. 15a. Officer Manning, a Philadelphia police officer who did not testify at the suppression hearing, wrote the Section 6308 citation underlying Ms. Wood's prosecution and conviction. Id.

¶ 9 Trooper Taylor, the only Commonwealth witness, offered no testimony that she or anybody else observed Ms. Wood purchasing, attempting to purchase, consuming or possessing any alcoholic beverages in the "Name That Bar" or anywhere else in Philadelphia. In fact, the suppression hearing transcript is devoid of any testimony that any officer had observed anybody who may have "looked to be under the age of 21" purchasing, consuming or possessing any alcoholic beverages prior to the segregation of those patrons thought to be minors. The officers segregated Ms. Wood and others such that she reasonably could understand she was not free to leave. Ms. Wood's confession of prior consumption of alcohol arose only after she had been detained for investigation, without any observed suspicious or criminal conduct on her part. Ms. Wood's detention was based solely on her appearance. The summary citation issued to Ms. Wood was based solely on Ms. Wood's admission, after being detained, that she had consumed alcohol earlier in the evening at a location away from "Name That Bar." We conclude that Ms. Wood's statement was acquired while she was unlawfully detained. Her admission, therefore, is inadmissible.

¶ 10 On this appeal, this Court need not decide whether the police practice of...