Comba v. Town of Ridgefield
| Decision Date | 10 April 1979 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Diane COMBA et al. v. TOWN OF RIDGEFIELD et al. |
Robert R. Sheldon, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was T. Paul Tremont, Bridgeport, for appellants (plaintiffs).
Bruce L. Levin, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was Arnold J. Bai, Bridgeport, for appellee (named defendant).
George L. Holmes, Jr., Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was Richard F. Oburchay, and F. D. Neusner, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., for appellee (defendant James F. Shugrue, Commissioner of Transp.).
Before LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO, PETERS and PARSKEY, JJ.
This action was brought against the defendant town of Ridgefield and the commissioner of transportation for the state of Connecticut to recover for personal injuries caused by an overhanging tree limb that fell on the named plaintiff while she was a passenger in a vehicle using a public highway. Demurrers to the complaint were sustained in part and judgment was rendered as to those counts where demurrers were sustained. The plaintiffs have appealed.
The complaint alleged in part as follows: The plaintiff Diane Comba was a passenger in a motor vehicle owned and operated by her father, the plaintiff Joseph J. Comba. The vehicle was proceeding southerly on a public highway in the town of Ridgefield. Located within the limits of the highway was a sugar maple tree. The crotch area of the tree was rotten and too weak to support a large limb which extended from it out over the traveled portion of the highway. As the Comba vehicle approached the area where the tree was located, the tree limb broke off and fell onto the vehicle, striking the plaintiff Diane Comba and injuring her severely.
Four counts of the complaint are addressed to the alleged liability of the defendants under General Statutes §§ 13a-149 and 13a-144. Those statutes impose liability upon municipalities and the state respectively for injuries or damages caused "by means of a defective road." There is no substantial difference in the duties imposed by those statutes, and, for purposes of discussion in this appeal, the duties are deemed to be identical. Hay v. Hill, 137 Conn. 285, 289, 76 A.2d 924 (1950). It is the claim of the plaintiffs that the limb of the tree which was rotted at the crotch and which hung over the traveled portion of the highway was a "defect" in the highway within the meaning of the above statutes.
A defect in a highway that would give rise to liability under either General Statutes §§ 13a-144 or 13a-149 has been generally defined as "(a)ny object in, upon, or near the traveled path, which would necessarily obstruct or hinder one in the use of the road for the purpose of traveling thereon, or which, from its nature and position, would be likely to produce that result." Hewison v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 136, 142 (1867). This court in Hewison recognized that the defect need not be a part of the roadbed itself. It gave, among other examples, tree limbs overhanging the roadway near the ground which necessarily obstructed the use of the road. On the other hand, the case pointed out that those objects which have no necessary connection with the roadbed or public travel, which expose a person to danger, not as a traveler, but independent of the highway, do not ordinarily render the road defective. This court listed trees, walls of buildings standing beside the road, and objects suspended over the highway which are so high as to be entirely out of the way of travelers, as examples of the latter. It further pointed out that a person could be injured by them, but the use of the highway, as such, does not necessarily bring about the injury. Such objects may be a nuisance that the government unit may have an obligation to abate, but they are not defects in the highway.
In Dyer v. Danbury, 85 Conn. 128, 81 A.2d 958 (1911), an action was brought against the city and town to recover damages for personal injuries caused by a falling limb of a tree which overhung the sidewalk. The defendants' demurrers, claiming that overhanging limbs of trees were not a "defect" under the statute, were sustained. It was held that the overhanging limb did not obstruct travel on the highway and that the municipality was not bound to remove it as a part of its duty to maintain the highway within its limits. See also Riccio v. Plainville, 106 Conn. 61, 63, 136 A. 872 (1927).
The complaint in Dyer did not allege an obstruction or a hindrance to travel on the highway, but claimed that the overhanging limb in its rotted condition was the defect or hindrance. The fact that the limb was not a part of the roadbed, or not within the traveled portion of the highway, was not controlling. See Hay v. Hill, supra, 289, 76 A.2d 924; Parker v. Hartford, 122 Conn. 500, 502, 190 A. 866 (1937). In Dyer, however, this court reasoned that if there is a defective...
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Ryszkiewicz v. City of New Britain
...immunity that the common law gives to municipalities. Cf. Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982); Comba v. Ridgefield, 177 Conn. 268, 413 A.2d 859 (1979); Martyn v. Donlin, 151 Conn. 402, 198 A.2d 700 (1964); see McQuillin, supra. As regards defective roadways, the legisla......
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White v. Burns
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Sanzone v. Board of Police Com'rs of City of Bridgeport
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Giannoni v. Comm'r of Transp.
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