Combs v. State
| Decision Date | 04 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 67A05-0511-CR-652.,67A05-0511-CR-652. |
| Citation | 851 N.E.2d 1053 |
| Parties | Keith COMBS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Edward A. McGlone, Terre Haute, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ryan D. Johanningsmeier, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Keith Combs ("Combs") was convicted in Putnam Circuit Court of Class C felony possession of methamphetamine, Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license, and Class A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. He was sentenced to serve an aggregate term of six years with two years suspended. Combs appeals raising two issues, which we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence obtained during the warrantless search of Combs's vehicle; and,
II. Whether Combs's six-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the evidence obtained during the search of Combs's vehicle, but that Combs's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On January 24, 2005, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Putnam County Sheriff's Department Deputy Craig Sibbitt ("Deputy Sibbitt") received a dispatch concerning a report of a suspicious vehicle near the fire department at Van Bibber Lake. The vehicle was described as a white Cadillac with a license plate number of 60A8719. The caller, a captain of the fire department, alleged that the driver of the vehicle was possibly stealing gas from the department's fuel vehicle.
As he proceeded toward Van Bibber Lake, Deputy Sibbitt observed a white vehicle traveling from the direction of the lake, and turned around to follow it. When Deputy Sibbitt caught up to the vehicle, the driver, later identified as Combs, pulled the vehicle over to the side of the road. Deputy Sibbitt pulled in behind the vehicle and activated his emergency lights. Before he approached the vehicle, the deputy confirmed that the license plate number matched the number given in the dispatch.
As Deputy Sibbitt was speaking with Combs, his behavior made the deputy nervous. Combs was leaning sideways in the vehicle and had his arm between his legs underneath the seat. Because Combs was also acting paranoid, speaking rapidly, and appeared to have dry mouth, Deputy Sibbitt believed that Combs was possibly under the influence of methamphetamine.
Deputy Sibbitt returned to his vehicle to relay Combs's information to dispatch and learned that Combs's driver's license was suspended. Also, at that time the deputy requested backup because of concern for his safety and due to the fact that he was acquainted with Combs socially.
Deputy Mike Johnson, who is also a canine officer, arrived shortly thereafter. Deputy Johnson told Combs to sit in Deputy Sibbitt's vehicle, and Deputy Sibbitt began to write a citation to Combs for driving while suspended. At that time, Deputy Johnson observed behavior that also led him to believe that Combs was under the influence of methamphetamine. Therefore, Deputy Johnson walked his canine around the perimeter of Combs's vehicle. The canine alerted by the driver's side front door.
Combs was then read his Miranda rights and Deputy Johnson requested consent to search the vehicle. Combs refused and told the officers that he did not own the vehicle. Combs was then asked to call the owner of the vehicle and request consent to search. After contacting the vehicle's owner, Combs told the deputies that the owner would not give his consent to search the vehicle.
Because the vehicle was parked in an unsafe location, Deputy Johnson called for a tow truck and started to conduct an inventory search of the vehicle. During the inventory search, Deputy Johnson found two loaded handguns under the driver's seat. After Combs stated that he did not have a handgun permit, he was arrested for carrying a handgun without a license. Deputy Johnson also found a knife, a smoking pipe, and a baggie containing a powdery substance that was later determined to be methamphetamine with a weight of 0.10 grams.
On January 26, 2005, Combs was charged with Class C felony possession of methamphetamine, Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license, and Class A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.1 On July 13, 2005, Combs filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the alleged illegal search of the vehicle. The motion was denied and a jury trial commenced on that same day. The jury found Combs guilty as charged. Combs was then sentenced to serve a six-year sentence with two years suspended for his Class C felony possession of methamphetamine conviction. Combs now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Combs argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the evidence obtained during the warrantless vehicle search. Because Combs challenges the admission of the evidence following a completed trial, "the issue is . . . appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial." Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). Our standard of review of rulings on the admissibility of evidence is essentially the same whether the challenge is made by a pre-trial motion to suppress or by trial objection. Ackerman v. State, 774 N.E.2d 970, 974-75 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Collins v. State, 822 N.E.2d 214, 218 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), trans. denied. However, we must also consider the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Id.
Initially, we must determine whether Deputy Sibbitt had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop.2
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures" by the Government, and its safeguards extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest. However, a police officer may briefly detain a person for investigatory purposes without a warrant or probable cause if, based upon specific and articulable facts together with rational inferences from those facts, the official intrusion is reasonably warranted and the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity "may be afoot."
Reasonable suspicion is a "somewhat abstract" concept, not readily reduced to "a neat set of legal rules." When making a reasonable suspicion determination, reviewing courts examine the "totality of the circumstances" of the case to see whether the detaining officer had a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting legal wrongdoing. The reasonable suspicion requirement is met where the facts known to the officer at the moment of the stop, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur. We review the trial court's ultimate determination regarding reasonable suspicion de novo.
State v. Atkins, 834 N.E.2d 1028, 1032 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied (internal citations omitted). In support of his argument that Deputy Sibbitt lacked reasonable suspicion to subject him to an investigatory stop, Combs relies on State v. Glass, 769 N.E.2d 639 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) trans. denied, and Washington v. State, 740 N.E.2d 1241 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied.
In Glass, a patrolling police officer received a dispatch of a "suspicious vehicle for reckless driving" and was provided with a description of the vehicle. 769 N.E.2d at 640. The officer found the vehicle, and initiated a traffic stop after following it for one block, even though the officer did not witness any traffic violations or inappropriate driving. Id. As a result of the stop and subsequent search, Glass was charged with possession of marijuana, reckless possession of paraphernalia as a Class A misdemeanor, and operating a vehicle with a controlled substance or metabolite in his body as a Class C misdemeanor. Prior to trial, Glass successfully moved to suppress all evidence, arguing that the detention and search occurred without reasonable suspicion. Our court affirmed, stating:
The State merely showed that the caller described a car sufficiently to permit Officer Fluery to identify a similar vehicle. The officer followed the vehicle for about one block without observing any driving irregularities. Officer Fluery did not personally observe facts to verify the reliability of the caller or the reliability of any significant information provided by the caller. To the extent that the caller predicted future conduct, it did not occur. Reasonable suspicion requires more than conjecture. On the record created, the State has not demonstrated that Officer Fluery had an objective and articulable suspicion that Glass had committed, was committing, or was about to commit legal wrongdoing. The investigative stop violated Glass's Fourth Amendment rights.
In Washington, an anonymous informant contacted a state police post to report a possible drunk driver and described the vehicle as a black Cadillac with a white top proceeding southbound on Interstate 65. 740 N.E.2d at 1243. The informant also provided the license plate number of the Cadillac. Id. An officer found and began to follow the vehicle, and although he did not observe any evidence of drunken or erratic driving, the officer initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle. Id. Washington was placed under arrest because his license was suspended, and...
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