Comm'r of Ins. v. Broad St. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.
| Citation | 306 Mass. 362,28 N.E.2d 222 |
| Parties | COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE v. BROAD STREET MUT. CASUALTY INS. CO. |
| Decision Date | 27 June 1940 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County.
Suit by the Director of Unemployment Compensation, brought in the receivership proceedings of the Commissioner of Insurance against the Broad Street Mutual Casualty Insurance Company, to compel the receiver of defendant company to pay an employer's contribution under provisions of G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 151A, as amended. On report from a single justice to the full Supreme Judicial Court.
Report dismissed.J. J. Leonard, of Boston, and R. Clapp, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
J. T. Noonan and H. L. Mason, Jr., both of Boston, for respondent.
This is a suit in equity, brought in the above-entitled case by the director of the division of unemployment compensation, in which he seeks to compel the receiver of the defendant company to pay an employer's contribution of $126.55 under the provisions of G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 151A, as it appears in St. 1937, c. 421, St. 1938, c. 163; c. 469; c. 470, and St. 1939, c. 20, § 3. See also St. 1939, c. 319; c. 374; c. 490.
The case was heard by a single justice of this court, the material facts having been agreed to. On October 6, 1939, the single justice filed ‘Findings and Order,’ wherein he ordered that the petition be dismissed. On October 10 he entered a decree, entitled ‘Interlocutory Decree on Petition of Unemployment Compensation Commission for Order Directing Contributions' in the following form: ‘This case came on for hearing on petition of the Unemployment Compensation Commission for an order directing the Receiver of Broad Street Mutual Casualty Insurance Company to pay the Commission a contribution of $126.55 as provided by General Laws (Ter.Ed.) Chapter 151A and was argued by counsel, and thereupon, upon consideration thereof, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed That the petition be, and the same hereby is, dismissed.’
On October 23, 1939, the single justice at the request of the petitioner, who does not appear to have appealed, reported his findings and order and the ‘interlocutory’ decree entered by him to the full court, and stayed ‘all further proceedings except such as are necessary to preserve the rights of the parties.’ The stay of further proceedings is phrased in the language of G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 214, § 30, which provides that ‘If, upon making an interlocutory decree or order, the justice is of opinion that it so affects the merits of the controversy that the matter ought, before further proceedings, to be determined by the full court, he may report the question for that purpose, and stay all further proceedings except those necessary to preserve the rights of the parties.’ Such an order is appropriate to cases where the justice, acting under that section, reports an interlocutory order or decree for the determination of the full court. The section, however, has no application where final decree on the subject matter before the justice has been entered. Section 31 provides that ‘A justice of either court by whom a case is heard for final decree may reserve and report the evidence and all questions of law therein for the consideration of the full court; and thereupon like proceedings shall be had as upon appeals from final decrees.’ This section ‘permits a judge, instead of finishing a case by the formal entry of a final decree from which an appeal may be taken, to reserve and report it for a final decision by the full court.’ Hildreth v. Thibodeau, 186 Mass. 83, 85, 71 N.E. 111, 112,104 Am.St.Rep. 560.
In the present case the single justice, having made an interlocutory order that the petition be dismissed, did not, without more, report that action for the determination of the full court, but actually entered the decree dismissing the petition. In the report this decree is described as an interlocutory decree, and the decree itself is so entitled. That the decree was thus...
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