Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation v. Dalton

• Decision Date: 25 October 1939
• Citation: 23 N.E.2d 147,304 Mass. 147
• Parties: COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS AND TAXATION v. ELIZABETH L. DALTON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

304 Mass. 147

23 N.E.2d 147

COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS AND TAXATION v. ELIZABETH L. DALTON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

October 25, 1939

December 6, 1938.

Present: FIELD, C.

J., LUMMUS, QUA DOLAN, & RONAN, JJ.

Tax, On income. Husband and Wife.

Payments to a wife resident in this Commonwealth, by a trustee, a nonresident under a separation agreement made between the wife, the trustee, and the husband to provide for her support through income from securities placed by the husband with the trustee, were not taxable to the wife as income under G.L (Ter. Ed.) c. 62, Sections 1, 11.

APPEAL by the commissioner of corporations and taxation, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, on September 24, 1938.

J. B. Sullivan, Assistant Attorney General, for the commissioner of corporations and taxation.

H. G. Crockett, Jr., for the taxpayer.

RONAN, J. This is an appeal under G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 58A, Section 13, by the commissioner of corporations and taxation from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board granting an abatement upon payments received by the appellee in 1934 and 1935, in accordance with a separation agreement made in 1928, in North Carolina between herself, her husband and a trustee, all of whom were then domiciled in that State. The husband transferred real estate and shares of stock to the trustee for the purpose of paying $150 a month to his wife for her support and maintenance during her life or until she should again marry, and an additional sum for the support of their children while they were living with their mother. The payments made to her by the trustee during the two years in question exceeded the rate fixed by the agreement as some of the payments included arrears for previous years when the income was insufficient to pay the prescribed amounts. The parties make no contention that this agreement was not valid under the law of North Carolina. The appellant taxed all payments received by the wife from the trustee, except those that consisted of rentals from the trust realty. The wife was a resident of this Commonwealth at the time of the receipts of these payments and has been ever since. The question to be decided is whether these payments constituted income taxable under G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 62.

Our statutes taxing income were enacted in pursuance of the power granted to the General Court by the Forty-fourth Amendment to our Constitution to impose and levy a tax on income, which may be at different rates upon income derived from different classes of property but which shall be levied at a uniform rate throughout the Commonwealth upon incomes derived from the same class of property. The legislation has been as broad as the Amendment, and it has been frequently observed by the court that the various taxing statutes manifest an intent to reach whatever income it is within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth to tax. Follett v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 267 Mass. 115 . Harrison v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 272 Mass. 422 . Brink v. Commissioner of Corporations

& Taxation, 299 Mass. 280 . While these statutes do not specifically define income for purposes of the tax, yet, in view of the language employed and the aim sought to be accomplished, this court has, whenever urged, refused to limit the ordinary and natural significance of the term. Tax Commissioner v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522 . Bingham v Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 249 Mass. 79 . United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 299 Mass. 296 .

The appellant contends that the taxpayer has an equitable interest in a trust; that the income which she has received from the trustee was interest and dividends within the description of taxable property under G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 62, Section 1, and that, as the trustee was a nonresident, the tax was properly assessed in accordance with G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 62, Section 11. The appellee contends that such payments were not received by her as the beneficiary of a trust but were made for her separate support and maintenance in the nature of alimony, and as such were not taxable income.

G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 62, Section 11, so far as material, provides: "Any inhabitant of the commonwealth who receives income from one or more trustees or other fiduciaries who are not subject to taxation under this chapter, shall be subject to the taxes imposed by this chapter upon such income according to the nature of the income received by such trustees or other fiduciaries . . . ." The incidence of the tax is upon the receipt of income by the resident beneficiary. There is no present tendency to exempt income received by a resident beneficiary from a foreign fiduciary if the property received is itself of a taxable nature. Longyear v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 265 Mass. 585 . Tirrell v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 287 Mass. 464 . Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19.

It is urged that the payments were in the nature of alimony and are not subject to an assessment. Our statutes, however, do not in terms exempt such payments from the imposition of the tax. The general principle that taxing enactments must be strictly construed against the taxing power and that the right to tax, if not expressly conferred, cannot be implied, is not applicable. Bingham v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 249 Mass. 79. Cabot v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 267 Mass. 338 . DeBlois v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 276 Mass. 437 . Statutes are to be reasonably construed and their scope, even when couched in broad language, is not to be extended "by enlargement of signification to comprehend matters not within the principle and purview on which they were founded when originally framed and their words chosen. General expressions may be restrained by relevant circumstances showing a legislative intent that they be narrowed and used in a particular sense." Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398 , 401, 402. Commonwealth v. Slack, 19 Pick. 304. Commonwealth v. Gardner, 300 Mass. 372 . Frye v. School Committee of Leicester, 300 Mass. 537 . Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation v. Bristol County Kennel Club, Inc. 301 Mass. 27 . A matter may be within the letter of a statute and not come within its spirit, if the matter is beyond the mischief intended to be reached or if to include it would require a radical change in established public policy or in the existing law and the act does not manifest any intent that such a change should be effected. Somerset v. Dighton, 12 Mass. 383 . Bradford v. French, 110 Mass. 365 . Conklin v. John Howard industrial Home, 224 Mass. 222 . Zoulalian v. New England Sanatorium & Benevolent Association, 230 Mass. 102 . Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398.

In determining whether property received by a citizen constitutes taxable income, judicial inquiry is not limited by the forms or methods employed but looks beyond to ascertain the real substantial nature of the transaction that resulted in the transfer of the property. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation v. Hornblower, 278 Mass. 557 , 560. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation v. Simmon, 292 Mass. 507 . United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 299 Mass. 296 . Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670.

The parties entered into a voluntary agreement which was registered in the office of the clerk of the county court.

The payments were not alimony because they were not made in accordance with any judgment or decree of any court. Holbrook v. Comstock, 16 Gray, 109. Brown v. Brown, 222 Mass. 415 . Topor v. Topor, 287 Mass. 473 . The board found that such payments were in the nature of alimony and were in substance and effect an allowance to the wife for her support and maintenance. That would imply a further finding that the amounts given were reasonably necessary for the purposes for which they were paid. We do not know the value of...