Commissioner of Social Services, on Behalf of Wandel v. Segarra

• Citation: 577 N.E.2d 47,78 N.Y.2d 220,573 N.Y.S.2d 56
• Parties: , 577 N.E.2d 47 In the Matter of the COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES, on Behalf of Christine WANDEL, Appellant, v. Arnaldo SEGARRA, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 02 July 1991
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 56

573 N.Y.S.2d 56

78 N.Y.2d 220, 577 N.E.2d 47

In the Matter of the COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES, on Behalf of Christine WANDEL, Appellant, v. Arnaldo SEGARRA, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 2, 1991.

[78 N.Y.2d 221] [577 N.E.2d 48] Victor A. Kovner, Corp. Counsel (Patrick L. Taylor and Pamela Seider Dolgow, of counsel), New York City, for appellant.

Respondent, precluded.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ALEXANDER, Judge.

We consider on this appeal the question of whether in a child support proceeding commenced by the Commissioner of Social Services pursuant to Family Court Act § 415, the obligation of a father for the support of his child receiving public assistance is limited to the amount of the child's share of the monthly public assistance rather than being based on the child's actual needs and the father's means. The Appellate Division affirmed Family Court's determination that the father's obligation is so limited, concluding that as assignee of the support rights of the custodial mother who receives public assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, the Commissioner may only seek reimbursement for the amount of the AFDC grant, and that "applicable Federal and State statutes are likely to preclude the family's receipt of any such additional funds exceeding $50 per month." (165 A.D.2d 655, 560 N.Y.S.2d 33.)

In a paternity proceeding commenced against respondent, Arnaldo Segarra, by the Commissioner of Social Services, a determination of paternity was made against respondent following his numerous defaults in appearance and a Family Court order of filiation was entered on January 7, 1981. In July 1988, the instant proceeding was commenced by the Commissioner on behalf of Christine Wandel and her child, who were recipients of public assistance pursuant to the AFDC program, seeking a support order retroactive to the child's birth. ¹

Neither respondent nor his attorney appeared at the scheduled hearing before the Hearing Examiner, but respondent's financial statement and recent pay stubs which had been previously submitted were available and indicated an annual income of approximately $46,000. The Hearing Examiner found that respondent's income was more than sufficient to meet the public assistance grant and awarded child support in the sum of $269.50 per month, representing the child's share of the monthly AFDC payment plus $50.

Family Court rejected the Commissioner's objection to the Hearing Examiner's findings, stating that the purpose of Family Court Act § 415 was to reimburse the government for moneys expended--not to enrich it. As indicated the Appellate Division affirmed. This Court granted leave to appeal to the Commissioner and we now reverse for the reasons that follow.

Family Court Act § 415 renders a spouse or parent of a recipient of public assistance, of sufficient ability, responsible for the support of such person under 21 years of age. ² We find nothing in that statute limiting a parent's obligation to support his or her child to that child's portion of the public assistance grant. Indeed, the statute explicitly permits consideration of a noncustodial parent's means in determining the level of child support payments, and the Family Court is authorized in its discretion to require a spouse, parent or stepparent of a recipient of public assistance to contribute "a fair and reasonable sum for the support of such relative". ³

The obligation of a parent to support its child arises under both common law and statute (see, Landes v. Landes, 1 N.Y.2d 358, 365, 153 N.Y.S.2d 14, 135 N.E.2d 562; Family Ct.Act § 413). The financial resources of parents have always been a factor to be taken in account in determining the amount of a child support award under Family Court Act § 413. That statute obligates parents of a child under 21 years of age, to support such child and if they are possessed of or able to earn sufficient means, to pay a fair and reasonable sum for the child as the court may determine. (See, Family Ct.Act § 413.)

In 1989, section 413 was amended to adopt guidelines setting minimum and meaningful standards of obligation. (See, L.1989, ch. 567, § 8.) The amendment, referred to as the Child Support Standards Act, requires the court to determine the amount of the basic child support obligation by combining the income of both parents and multiplying that income, up to $80,000, by a child support percentage. The resulting figure is then ratably apportioned between the two parents.

The statute (Family Ct.Act § 413) was amended further in 1990 (L.1990, ch. 818) to provide: "notwithstanding any other provision of law, including but not limited to section four hundred fifteen of this act, the court shall not find that the non-custodial parent's pro rata share of such obligation is unjust or inappropriate on the basis that such share exceeds the portion of a public assistance grant which is attributable to a child" (Family Ct.Act § 413[1][g]. The legislative memorandum indicates that this amendment was intended as a clarification, not a change of the law, and was aimed particularly at courts that have refused to order parents to pay support that exceeds the child's share of the public assistance grant (Sponsor's Mem., Assembly 115505-C). Thus, with respect to a parent's child support obligation, Family Court Act § 415 merely supplements existing law by making it clear that a parent's duty to support is not abrogated by a child's receipt of public assistance; it does not limit that obligation to the amount of the public assistance grant.

The Commissioner contends that as the assignee of the custodial parent's right to compel support from the noncustodial parent he should be entitled to seek a child support award based on the child's reasonable needs and the parents' financial means. The Appellate Division concluded that Federal and State statutes and regulations limit the scope of the Commissioner's child support assignment to reimbursement for the amount of the AFDC grant. We disagree.

The Commissioner's right to seek support payments on behalf of an AFDC recipient is derived from Social Services Law §§ 111-b and 348 and Family Court Act § 571. ⁴ The Commissioner is authorized to act as assignee of a child's right to support with regard to all types of child support payments (Family Ct.Act § 571) and an application for aid to dependent children automatically operates as an assignment to the State and the applicable social services district of any rights the applicant has to support from other persons (Social Services Law § 348[2]. Social services officials are authorized generally, to bring proceedings to enforce assigned support rights pursuant to article 4 of the Family Court Act (Family Ct.Act § 571) and Social Services Law § 111-b(2) gives the official bringing the proceeding to enforce such an assignment the same rights as if the proceeding were being brought to enforce section 415 of the Family Court Act. Although Social Services Law § 349-b provides that the amount of the payments due from the absent parent shall be the amount of a current court support order, we find nothing in the relevant statutes or regulations that limit the amount of support which a court may order to the amount of the public assistance grant.

New York has elected to participate in the AFDC program, thus Federal statutes and regulations with respect to that program are controlling to the extent they are applicable. (Matter of Lumpkin v. Department of Social Servs., 45 N.Y.2d 351, 355, 408 N.Y.S.2d 421, 380 N.E.2d 249.) The 1975 amendments to the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children Act included a scheme for the distribution of court-ordered support collected on behalf of AFDC recipients. The scheme provides for reimbursement to the States for past, as well as present, AFDC payments. This distribution scheme is adopted in the New York State regulations (see, 18 NYCRR 347.13)--and contemplates that all assigned support payments be paid directly to the Commissioner (see, 45 CFR 302.32; 18 NYCRR 347.12[a]. The Commissioner must then determine if the current support payment makes the family...