State of Ohio v. Barron, F023873

• Decision Date: 15 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. F023873,F023873
• Citation: 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 342,52 Cal.App.4th 62
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 495, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 759 The STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Joseph BARRON, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

Page 342

60 Cal.Rptr.2d 342

52 Cal.App.4th 62, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 495,

97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 759

The STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Joseph BARRON, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

No. F023873.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Jan. 15, 1997.

Certified for Partial Publication. ^*

[52 Cal.App.4th 64] Katherine E. Donovan, Fresno, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Roderick E. Walston, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Ann White, Statewide Support Coordinator and M.J. Hamilton, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

WISEMAN, Associate Justice.

Joseph Barron, Jr. (defendant), a noncustodial parent of a minor child, complains regarding the trial court's order requiring he pay support arrearages pursuant to WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE SECTION 11350¹, subdivision (a)(2). The root of defendant's equal protection and due process violation claims is that he is required to pay support to the custodial parent for his minor child in excess of the amount actually paid out by the state. Defendant correctly observes that noncustodial parents whose children receive AFDC benefits are treated differently from noncustodial parents whose children do not receive AFDC benefits. However, this disparity in treatment is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose: conforming California's child support recovery scheme with federal law, thereby insuring the state's continued access to matched funds from the Federal Government. We conclude section 11350 is not an arbitrary imposition of pecuniary liability on defendant. Instead, it is a valid exercise of legislative power, mandated by federal law and tailored to impact on the precise individuals (defendant) who are responsible for the expenditure of state funds.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL ISSUES

On November 17, 1987, while residing in Ohio, Pamela C. (Pamela) gave birth to a son, Joseph Michael C. (minor). The child was conceived while Pamela was stationed in Germany along with defendant to whom she was engaged to be married. When Pamela became pregnant, defendant broke off their engagement. On February 28, 1992, Pamela filed a paternity affidavit claiming defendant was the father of her son. Pamela received monthly Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payments from the State of Ohio, although the total amount of aid she received is unclear.

On November 4, 1992, the Common Pleas Court of Allen County, Ohio, entered a judgment certifying to the California Central Registry the issue of the existence of a parent and child relationship between defendant and the minor. The court requested California courts to order defendant to pay current and past due support; provide medical and health insurance for the minor child; and reimburse the Ohio Department of Human Services for birth expenses. This judgment along with all supporting documents was forwarded to the California Central Registry in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), Family Code, section 4800 et. seq.

The judgment was received by the California Central Registry on November 23, 1992. It is not clear when the action was filed in the Fresno County Superior Court. There is a date stamp on the petition indicating it was filed on May 26, 1993, but this date is crossed out. The Fresno County District Attorney filed a "Citation and Order to Show Cause" on September 23, 1993. Another "Order to Show Cause" was filed on June 7, 1994. A third was filed on September 20, 1994. There is nothing in the record to indicate why three orders to show cause issued. However, it appears the first two went off calendar because of lack of service. Defendant was served the third order on November 14, 1994.

Defendant appeared in family support court on December 20, 1994, at which time DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) blood testing was ordered and a continuance granted until March 27, 1995. On March 24, 1995, defendant filed a response to the order to show cause, admitting parentage and agreeing to pay child support prospectively. On March 27, 1995, defendant appeared, again admitted parentage, and agreed to pay prospective support, as well as arrearages equal to the amount actually paid in AFDC to Pamela since November 1991. Defendant claimed at the hearing, without objection from the deputy district attorney, that Pamela had only received AFDC until October 1992. Defendant claimed, therefore, he was only liable for arrearages for the actual amount of AFDC paid to Pamela during the three years preceding entry of the judgment. The court entered a judgment that defendant was the minor's father and ordered defendant to provide ongoing support in the amount of $235 per month, effective November 14, 1994. In addition, the court ordered defendant to pay an additional sum of $35 per month for accrued arrearages.

On April 4, 1995, the court entered a judgment confirming its finding and establishing the amount of the arrearages at $9,870 for the period from September 20, 1991, to November 13, 1994. On May 14, 1996, a "Stipulation for Relief from Judgment and for Entry of Stipulated Judgment and Order" was filed in the Fresno County Superior Court. This order reduced the amount of arrearages to $8,930 for the period from September 20, 1991, to November 13, 1994.

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Welfare and Institutions Code section 11350, subdivision (a)(2) does not violate the California Constitution's guarantees of equal protection and due process.

Defendant claims his rights to equal protection and due process of law under article I, section 7, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution were violated when he was ordered to pay support arrearages pursuant to the provisions of section 11350, subdivision (a)(2). Defendant argues section 11350 singles him out as a noncustodial parent whose child received AFDC for different treatment than a noncustodial parent whose child has not received AFDC without any rational basis for doing so. He bases this claim on the fact an original order for child support cannot be made retroactive beyond the date of filing of a notice of motion or order to show cause. In contrast, section 11350, subdivision (a)(2) authorizes retroactive application of a support order for the entire period the noncustodial parent is separated from the child, limited only by the three-year statute of limitations.

Additionally, defendant points out section 11350, subdivision (a)(2) does not limit the state's authority of recovery to just the money it has paid out during that period as AFDC to the custodial parent. It allows the state to recoup the amount of support which would have been ordered by the court, based on the child support guidelines in effect at the time of institution of the action. The state then disburses to the family any amount collected in excess of the amount which it has paid out. It is the assessment of this amount as arrearages to which defendant objects.

A. Standard of Review

As correctly noted by defendant, constitutional issues are reviewed de novo. When reviewing a statute to determine whether it violates an individual's right to equal protection, it must be remembered that "[l]egislative classifications are not per se violative of federal or California equal protection guarantees. [Citations.]" (State of Washington v. Cobb (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 773, 776, 239 Cal.Rptr. 726.) Unless the differentiation made by the statute involves suspect classifications or an alleged infringement of a fundamental interest, the classification is upheld if it is "rationally related to a legitimate state purpose and tailored to accomplish that purpose." (City and County of San Francisco v. Thompson (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 652, 655, 218 Cal.Rptr. 445; State of Washington v. Cobb, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 776, 239 Cal.Rptr. 726.) Section 11350 involves social and economic legislation and, therefore, is subject to the rational basis test. (State of Washington v. Cobb, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 776, 239 Cal.Rptr. 726.)

B. Analysis

Although the action to recover child support was initiated in Ohio, California law is controlling. "Duties of support applicable under this chapter are those imposed under the laws of any state where the obligor was present for the period during which support is sought. The obligor is presumed to have been present in the responding state during the period for which support is sought until otherwise shown." (Fam.Code, § 4820.) Therefore, this URESA action is treated as if it were initiated in California. (In re Marriage of Ryan (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 841, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 580.)

"The equality guaranteed by the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions is equality under the same conditions, and among persons similarly situated. The Legislature may make reasonable classifications of persons and other activities, provided the classifications are based upon some legitimate object to be accomplished. [Citation.]" (Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1994) 8 Cal.4th 630, 659, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 641, 882 P.2d 358.)

Resolution of defendant's claim comes down to the answer to two questions. First, does the California statutory scheme for collection of child support treat similarly situated individuals differently? Second, if it does treat similarly situated individuals differently, is the disparity in treatment rationally related to a legitimate state purpose and tailored to accomplish that purpose? We conclude the answer to both questions is yes.

1. Treatment of similarly situated individuals

In defendant's case, the class of similarly situated individuals is the noncustodial parents who do not provide support for their children. Within this general class, there are two subcategories: noncustodial parents whose children do not receive state aid; and noncustodial parents whose children do receive aid (AFDC). It...