Commonwealth of Pa. v. Baez

• Decision Date: 01 August 2011
• Citation: 21 A.3d 1280,2011 PA Super 109
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellantv.Lazaro Rodriguez BAEZ, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

21 A.3d 1280

2011 PA Super 109

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant

v.Lazaro Rodriguez BAEZ, Appellee.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 22, 2011.Filed May 23, 2011.Reargument Denied Aug. 1, 2011.

Nichole L. Eisenhart, Assistant District Attorney, Lebanon, for Commonwealth, appellant.Joseph M. Sembrot, Harrisburg, for appellee.BEFORE: BENDER, DONOHUE and OTT, JJ.OPINION BY BENDER, J.:

This is a Commonwealth appeal from the trial court's order granting part of Lazaro Rodriguez–Baez's (Defendant) motion to suppress. The Commonwealth claims that the trial court erred in suppressing Appellant's statements because at the time that Appellant made the statements, the police had given him Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). We agree, and for the reasons that follow, we reverse.

This appeal arises from the prosecution of Defendant for his drug dealing activity. After the police executed three controlled buys of cocaine over several weeks, they procured a search warrant for Defendant's home and executed the warrant. Defendant was present at the time the police executed the warrant and the police arrested him. The police gave Defendant his Miranda warnings and asked him if he understood those rights, to which Defendant answered in the affirmative. Defendant then proceeded to answer the officer's questions, and more particularly, he indicated the location of a gun. Importantly, the police did not ask him if he was willing to give up his rights or whether he was willing to waive those rights prior to questioning him. Subsequently, while the police were transporting Defendant, he made a statement regarding his owning the gun for protection.

Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress these statements based on the failure of the police to obtain a valid waiver of his rights. He also sought suppression of physical evidence seized during the execution of the warrant. The trial court denied the motion in part and granted it in part. It suppressed Defendant's statements but allowed the introduction of the physical evidence seized during the search. The Commonwealth then filed this appeal presenting three questions for our review:

A. Whether the trial court erred in denying the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss defendant's pretrial motion to suppress?

B. Whether the trial court erred in suppressing all of defendant's statements when the pretrial motion to suppress alleged only statements made during transportation for processing were made without a valid waiver of his Miranda rights?

C. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Defendant did not execute a valid waiver of his Miranda right?

Brief for Appellant at 4.

Our standard of review in this appeal is as follows.

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the evidence from the defendant's witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court's findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those findings. The suppression court's conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

Commonwealth v. Byrd, 987 A.2d 786, 790 (Pa.Super.2009).

In the first question presented for our review, the Commonwealth challenges the trial court's decision to permit Defendant to file a pretrial motion to suppress beyond the thirty-day period established by Pa.R.Crim.P. 579. In pertinent part, Rule 579 states:

(A) Except as otherwise provided in these rules, the omnibus pretrial motion for relief shall be filed and served within 30 days after arraignment, unless opportunity therefor did not exist, or the defendant or defense attorney, or the attorney for the Commonwealth, was not aware of the grounds for the motion, or unless the time for filing has been extended by the court for cause shown.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 579(A) (emphasis added).

In the instant case, Defendant sought leave to file a motion to suppress beyond the thirty-day period set forth in Rule 579. His basis for doing so was that the Commonwealth had provided him with information in a supplemental discovery report, which warranted the filing of a motion to suppress. Pursuant to Rule 579, the court then granted Defendant leave to file a motion to suppress.

On appeal, the Commonwealth claims this ruling was in error, as the motion to suppress that Defendant subsequently filed did not relate to the information contained in the supplemental discovery report. Regardless of the veracity of this allegation, the Commonwealth's argument fails, as it does not claim nor argue that the delay of a few months in Defendant's filing of his motion to suppress prejudiced it in anyway. Cf. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 585 Pa. 547, 889 A.2d 501, 528 (2005) (stating, “Mere error in the abstract is not sufficient to warrant a retrial.”).

In the second question presented for our review, in reliance upon Pa.R.Crim.P. 581, the Commonwealth claims that because Defendant's pretrial motion only challenged statements made while the police were transporting Defendant, the court erred in also suppressing the statements that Defendant made during the execution of the warrant at his home. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(D) (stating, “The motion shall state specifically and with particularity the evidence sought to be suppressed, the grounds for suppression, and the facts and events in support thereof.”).

Defendant's motion stated the following:

23. The statements of Mr. Baez, while being transported for processing, were obtained from the Defendant without a sufficient advisement of Miranda warnings and/or following a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of such warnings.

24. Accordingly, any statements obtained from Mr. Baez were obtained in violation of Mr. Baez's Fifth Amendment right to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Reproduced Record (R.) at 13. The Commonwealth argues that these allegations are “devoid of any mention of statements given at his home, grounds for suppression or facts and circumstances in support thereof.” Brief for Appellant at 14. We disagree.

The trial court ruled that all of Defendant's statements were inadmissible because he did not explicitly waive his rights under Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Paragraph 24 of Defendant's motion to suppress expressly alleges such a violation as a basis for suppressing any of Defendant's statements to the police. While Paragraph 23 qualifies the statements as those given during transportation, Paragraph 24 contains no such qualification, but rather references “any statements” made by Defendant. R. at 13. We conclude that these allegations were sufficient to put the Commonwealth on notice that Defendant was seeking suppression of any statements he made after the alleged violation of his rights.

In the third question presented for our review, the Commonwealth claims that the trial court erred in finding that Defendant did not “execute a valid waiver of his Miranda rights.” Brief for Appellant at 14. “It is the Commonwealth's burden to establish whether [a defendant] knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. In order to do so, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that the proper warnings were given, and that the accused manifested an understanding of these warnings.” Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 591 Pa. 1, 915 A.2d 1122, 1135–36 (2007) (citation omitted).

While under Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, an explicit waiver is not required, Pennsylvania has developed a more nuanced approach, which requires that a defendant express a manifestation of the desire to waive his or her Miranda rights. An explanation of this approach necessarily requires that we examine three cases that address the protection offered under Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution in regard to a defendant's waiver of his or her Miranda rights during a custodial interrogation. See Commonwealth v. Bussey, 486 Pa. 221, 404 A.2d 1309, 1314 (1979) (plurality opinion) (stating, “pursuant to our supervisory powers and interpretation of the Pennsylvania Constitution, we hold an explicit waiver is a mandatory requirement”); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 536 Pa. 355, 639 A.2d 763, 769 (1994) (applying Bussey and contrasting Pennsylvania law with Federal constitutional jurisprudence that employs the “implicit waiver” rule of North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)); Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831, 843 n. 13 (2003) (following the holding in Hughes, but expressly stating that Bussey is non-precedential because it is a plurality opinion).

We begin with Bussey where the defendant was arrested after which the police gave him Miranda warnings. The defendant did not indicate that he understood his rights nor did he expressly waive his rights. Fifteen minutes later, the defendant made an incriminating statement implicating himself in a murder. Bussey, 404 A.2d at 1312. Nonetheless, the trial court found that the defendant had implicitly waived his rights. In its plurality opinion, the Court sought to put in place greater safeguards against a violation of a defendant's Miranda rights than those afforded under Federal constitutional law.

In

North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held an implicit waiver of rights could be found where an accused expresses understanding of his rights and gives a statement without expressly waiving his rights. We could distinguish the instant case on the basis that Bussey never expressed an understanding of his rights prior to incriminating himself at 1:45 a.m., but we decline to do so and we decline to follow North Carolina v. Butler, su...