Commonwealth v. Atkinson
| Decision Date | 19 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 1562 EDA 2016,1562 EDA 2016 |
| Citation | 265 A.3d 715 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Daiychelle ATKINSON, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Aaron J. Marcus, Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Victor E. Rauch, Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Owen W. Larrabee, Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Karl Baker, Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Lawrence J. Goode, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Jeffery M. Krulik, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Hugh Burns, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Daiychelle Atkinson appeals from the trial court's order denying her motion to dismiss1 based on the compulsory joinder principles of section 110 of the Crimes Code. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. This matter has been remanded for a second time2 from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania—which granted Atkinson's petition for allowance of appeal and vacated our prior decision3 —instructing us to reconsider the case "in light of Commonwealth v. Johnson , [––– Pa. ––––], (2021)."4 Because at the time Atkinson was found guilty of her summary traffic violation in the now-eliminated sui generis Traffic Court of Philadelphia, it was statutorily impossible for the Commonwealth to consolidate both of Atkinson's offenses for prosecution, we find that compulsory joinder principles do not apply to the instant matter, and, therefore, affirm.5
Before recounting the specific factual and procedural history of Atkinson's case, a brief primer on the establishment and purpose of the Traffic Court of Philadelphia, where Atkinson's summary offense was prosecuted, is necessary to set the stage for this appeal. In 1968, the Philadelphia Traffic Court was authorized and established under Article V, §§ 1 and 6(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution and 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 301, 1321 of the Judicial Code.6 The Philadelphia Traffic Court was granted exclusive jurisdiction over all prosecutions for summary offenses arising under the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code (VC)7 and any related City Ordinance committed within the limits of the City. Neither the Criminal Trial Division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court nor the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction to try summary VC offenses. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 1123(a)(1) () (emphasis added); see also id. at § 1302(b) () (emphasis added).
The Traffic Court was comprised of six publicly-elected judges who served six-year terms.8 The president judge of the Traffic Court was appointed by the governor and was responsible for the administration of the court's activities. The court's primary function was to adjudicate all traffic violations, with an ancillary function of collecting and remitting to the City and State all fines and costs resulting from adjudicating those violations.
On June 19, 2013, the Traffic Court of Philadelphia was effectively abolished when the General Assembly restructured the Philadelphia Municipal Court, creating two administrative sections, the General Division and the Traffic Division. See Act 17 of 2013, P.L. 55, No. 17 (June 19, 2013). Thereafter, all Traffic Court responsibilities were transferred to the Municipal Court. See Pa. Const. Art. V, § 6 (c) ( ). The restructuring transferred jurisdiction of all Vehicle Code moving violations to the Municipal Court's new Traffic Division, which was overseen by the trial court's administrative judge for reforming the operations of the former traffic court. On April 26, 2016, the Pennsylvania Constitution was amended to fully eliminate the Philadelphia Traffic Court.9
Like the Traffic Court, the newly-established Traffic Division of the Municipal Court also has jurisdiction over prosecutions for VC summary offenses and ordinances. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 1123(a)(9). However, unlike the Municipal Court that existed before the 2013 restructuring, the General Division of the Municipal Court exercises "full jurisdiction over of the [M]unicipal [C]ourt under section 1123(a) [,]" which includes those summary offenses under the jurisdiction of the Traffic Division.10 Therefore, while the Traffic Division's jurisdiction is limited to those offenses outlined in section 1123(a)(9), the prosecution of those offenses is not exclusive to that division, as they are able to be prosecuted in the General Division of the Municipal Court. Additionally, the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court is "concurrent with the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, except with respect to matters specified in subsection (a)(2)."11 See id . at § 1132(a)(2). Therefore, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County also has jurisdiction to hear those summary offenses that are within the limited jurisdiction of the Traffic Division.
Having set the stage with a general understanding of the court system in Philadelphia before and after its June 2013 restructuring, we may now turn to the relevant facts underlying Atkinson's appeal.
On January 8, 2013, Atkinson was arrested and charged with driving under the influence (DUI), 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), as well as a violation of the VC for disregarding a traffic device, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3111(a). On March 13, 2013, Atkinson was found guilty in the now-eliminated Traffic Court of Philadelphia of the offense of disregarding a traffic device. No appeal was filed. The Commonwealth continued its prosecution of the DUI offense in the Criminal Trial Division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court. On August 3, 2015, Atkinson filed a motion to dismiss the DUI offense, in the Municipal Court, pursuant to section 110, the compulsory joinder statute. The Municipal Court denied Atkinson's motion to dismiss.
Atkinson filed an interlocutory appeal from that order to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas by means of a petition for writ of certiorari . On October 23, 2015, the trial court denied the petition, affirming the Municipal Court's denial of Atkinson's motion to dismiss after concluding that section 110 was inapplicable to the case because, at the time Atkinson's traffic citation was issued, no single court had jurisdiction over both the citation and the DUI charge. On November 23, 2015, Atkinson filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. On September 29, 2017, our Court affirmed the trial court's order denying Atkinson's motion to dismiss. On June 27, 2019, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Atkinson's petition for allowance of appeal, vacated our September 29, 2017 unpublished memorandum and order, and remanded the matter to be considered in light of Perfetto , supra .12 See supra , at n.2.
On remand, a three-judge panel of this Court again affirmed the trial court's order denying Atkinson's section 110 motion. See Commonwealth v. Atkinson , 178 A.3d 206 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 4, 2019) (unpublished memorandum decision). However, that panel decision was later withdrawn after our Court granted en banc reargument on November 15, 2019. The parties filed new briefs. On reargument, our full Court unanimously affirmed the trial court's order denying Atkinson's motion to dismiss the DUI prosecution, noting that "unlike Perfetto , at the time Atkinson was prosecuted and found guilty of her summary offense, neither the Traffic Division nor the General Division of the Municipal Court existed," as the former Philadelphia Traffic Court was a separate entity to Municipal Court. Commonwealth v. Atkinson , 245 A.3d 1140 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 8, 2021) (en banc).
On March 10, 2021, Atkinson filed a petition for allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court asserting that this Court's en banc decision misapplied section 112 of the compulsory joinder rule, such that it conflicts with one of its own prior published decisions, as well as a holding from the Supreme Court. On April 23, 2021, the Supreme Court granted Atkinson's petition, vacated our Court's en banc decision, and remanded the case to this Court "for reconsideration in light of Commonwealth v. Johnson , [––– Pa. ––––], (2021)." Order, 4/23/21. We ordered the parties to re-brief the issue on remand.13 On July 30, 2021, the parties agreed to have the matter submitted on briefs. See Per Curiam Order, 7/30/21.
On appeal, Atkinson claims that section 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder rule "mandates dismissal [of her DUI charge] where all four criteria are met[,] even in cases where no single court has jurisdiction over both offenses." Appellant's Brief After Remand, at 8. Atkinson also asserts that "[t]he statutorily enumerated exceptions to [s]ection 110 (codified at [ section] 112 ) do not apply to this case," id. , where the former prosecution (summary traffic offense) was before a court (the then-extant Traffic Court of Philadelphia) which properly had jurisdiction over summary traffic offenses. Id. at 17.
Our standard of review of issues concerning the compulsory joinder statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 110, is plenary. Commonwealth v. Reid , 35 A.3d 773, 776 (Pa. Super. 2012). In Perfetto , supra , our Supreme Court recounted the history of section 110, noting:
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