Commonwealth v. B.D.

• Decision Date: 14 February 2012
• Docket Number: 10-P-485
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. B. D.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

COMMONWEALTH v. B. D.

10-P-485

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT

Entered: February 14, 2012

NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The defendant was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender after a bench trial before a judge of the Superior Court. He appeals, arguing that, because he moved just prior to his birthday, the statute requiring him to register annually merged with the statute requiring him to register ten days prior to any move. In his view, he was required to register only in his birth month: he maintains that any further requirement would be 'beyond the legislative intent' and 'an undue burden.' We affirm.

It is well settled that '[l]egislative intent is gleaned from the language of the statute' and a statute should be 'construed as written, in keeping with its plain meaning.' Canton v. Commissioner of the Mass. Hy. Dept., 455 Mass. 783, 788 (2010), quoting from eVineyard Retail Sales -- Mass., Inc. v. Alcoholic Bevs. Control Commn., 450 Mass. 825, 831 (2008). (Internal citation omitted.) In reviewing a statute, 'it is our duty to ascertain and implement the intent of the Legislature . . . . We cannot interpret a statute so as to avoid injustice or hardship if its language is clear and unambiguous . . . .' Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 423 Mass. 534, 539 (1996), quoting from Rosenbloom v. Kokofsky, 373 Mass. 778, 780-781 (1997).

The purpose of the sexual offender registration is to 'protect the public from 'the danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders' and to aid law enforcement officials in protecting their communities by providing them with information.' Commonwealth v. Rosado, 450 Mass. 657, 659-60 (2008), quoting from Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3844 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 768, 769 (2006). See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 780, 789 (2008), quoting from St. 1999, c. 74, § 1 (''[L]aw enforcement agencies' efforts to protect their communities' from sex offenders are 'impaired by the existing lack of information known about sex offenders who live within their jurisdictions'').

The first statute, G. L. c. 6, § 178F 1/2, requires a level 2 sex offender personally to appear annually during his or her month of birth at the 'local police department in the city or town in which such sex offender lives . . . to verify that the registration data on file remains true and accurate.' G. L. c. 6, 178F 1/2, as amended by St. 2003, c. 17, § 15. The Sex Offender Registry Board (board) sent the defendant a letter on November 1, 2007, reminding him of his registration obligations and informing him of the consequences of knowingly violating the law. The defendant registered with the Quincy police department on November 2, 2007, the month of his birth, fulfilling his annual registration obligation.

The second statute, G. L. c. 6, § 178E, requires a sex offender to notify the board by mail no later than ten days prior to moving, informing the board, among other things, of the new home address or intended home address. G. L. c. 6, § 178E(h). The defendant moved from his registered residence in Malden sometime...