Commonwealth v. Breakwater Co.
| Citation | 214 Mass. 10,100 N.E. 1034 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. BREAKWATER CO. |
| Decision Date | 26 February 1913 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
Jos T. Kenney, Dist. Atty., of New Bedford, for the Commonwealth.
Elder Whitman & Barnum, of Boston, for defendant.
This is a complaint for violation of the boiler inspection laws of this commonwealth. The material portions of St. 1907, c. 465 St. 1909, c. 393, § 1, are:
The facts are that the defendant in 1911 was constructing a breakwater at Provincetown, whither it transported stone on a barge or lighter known as 'No. 43' from Rockport, both places being within the territorial limits of Massachusetts. The barge or lighter was loaded with stone at dock in Rockport, and then was towed in as straight a course as navigation would permit across the high seas to the harbor of Provincetown, where it was unloaded. 'No. 43' was built at Baltimore, in the state of Maryland, in 1910. Her tonnage was 330 net tons. Her dimensions were, length 115 feet over all, 91 feet over bottom and width 35 feet with two bulkheads extending its entire length, both ends being square and shaped alike, but not vertical, and the bottom being flat. She has no sails nor means of self-propulsion, nor rudder, and can progress only by being towed. The load is carried entirely on deck, and the hatches are never opened. She has a deck house, in which are a boiler, pump, two engines, and sleeping quarters. The boiler, which was used only for loading and unloading its cargo and weighing anchor, was found by the state inspector not to be in safe working condition in November, 1911, and no certificate of inspection had been granted for it as required by the statute. It was installed after January 1, 1908, and was not inspected by the state officers when installed. Immediately after being built 'No. 43' was used on the tow from quarries at Bellevue in the state of Delaware to the jetties then being built at Cape May, in the state of New Jersey, the route lying partly over the open sea. In the spring of 1911 she was towed from Cape May over the high seas around Cape Cod to Rockport, and used in carrying stone for the Provincetown breakwater.
Numerous requests for instructions were presented by the defendant. As we understand the exceptions, the judge ruled that 'if the jury find that the vessel known as No. 43 is a seagoing barge, the boiler upon it was under the jurisdiction of the United States,' and then directed a verdict of guilty. This was equivalent to a ruling that No. 43 was not a seagoing barge, and was not 'under the jurisdiction of the United States.'
The first question relates to the correctness of this ruling. 'Jurisdiction,' like many other words in general use, has different meanings, dependent upon the connection in which it is found and the subject-matter to which it is directed. But it is always a word of comprehensive import. It cannot be assumed that the Legislature employed it in the sense of territorial limits. It must refer to a situation over which concurrent legislative power of both a state and the United States might be supposed to exist under our system of government. As applied to a sovereign, either state or nation, jurisdiction signifies the authority to make and declare the law, the right to apply the law to the acts of persons, and the power to enforce the law under all circumstances. Com. v. Manchester, 152 Mass. 230, 246, 25 N.E. 113, 9 L. R. A. 236, 23 Am. St. Rep. 820; Wedding v. Meyler, 192 U.S. 573, 584, 24 S.Ct. 322, 48 L.Ed. 570; Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315, 320, 29 S.Ct. 383, 53 L.Ed. 528. This broad definition, however, requires further limitation and specification with respect to the possible conflict between state and nation growing out of the dual government prevailing in this country. In using 'jurisdiction' the Legislature hardly could have intended to exclude from the operation of the statute everything over which the United States, by the fullest exercise of its powers under the Constitution, might assume authority. There is an extensive field of human activity over which the states may exercise jurisdiction, until the United States through congress asserts its power. Illustrations of this are found in pilotage regulations ( Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 341, 25 S.Ct. 52, 49 L.Ed. 224), quarantine laws (Morgan Steamship Co. v. Louisiana, 118 U.S. 455, 6 S.Ct. 1114, 30 L.Ed. 237), and many aspects of interstate commerce (Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Washington, 222 U.S. 370, 32 S.Ct. 160, 56 L.Ed. 237). There is a different field illustrated by another class of cases, in which it has been held that the states may pass laws in the exercise of the police power general in their nature and operating widely, and not relating primarily to subjects under federal control, which nevertheless may incidentally affect such subjects in common with all other property and rights within their territory. Questions of this sort have arisen most frequently in connection with interstate commerce. See cases collected in Com. v. People's Express Co., 201 Mass. 564, at 578, 88 N.E. 420, 131 Am. St. Rep. 416.
The character of this legislation, its humane objects and its comprehensive phase, in the light of these well-recognized and ample boundaries within which the state may exercise its power, forbid a narrow construction of the operative language of the statute. The matter of boiler inspection is one affecting the safety of large numbers of people and considerable amounts of property. It is of vital concern, directly or indirectly, to very many persons. The legislation is general in character, and is designed to operate widely. These considerations, in view of the principles of constitutional law which have been adverted to, lead to the conclusion that 'jurisdiction of the United States' in the connection now being considered means the exclusive authority of the United States or its authority actually asserted to apply its controlling law to the subject. More specifically stated 'boilers under the jurisdiction of the United States,' as these words are used in the exceptions of the statute, does not mean those over which the United States by putting forth all the powers granted to it might exercise jurisdiction if it choose to do so, but does mean those over which in fact that power already has been exercised, and those over which in no event could a state law be effectual because solely under the power of the United States.
The next step is to inquire whether the boiler in question was under the jurisdiction of the United States as thus defined. The inspection of boilers upon craft like 'No. 43,' used not for navigation or propulsion but for hoisting alone, is not exclusively national in character, relating wholly to the external concerns of the country, so that jurisdiction is vested solely in the federal government. Undoubtedly, 'No. 43' is a 'vessel' as defined in U.S. Rev. Stats. § 3: 'The word 'vessel' includes every description of water craft or other artificial contrivance used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water.' It thus may be within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, if that aspect of its character be involved. The Robt. W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 30, 24 S.Ct. 8, 48 L.Ed. 73. But this is not decisive against a state statute general in its scope, and otherwise valid, even though it occasionally and temporarily interrupt the use of the vessel in domestic or foreign commerce. Martin v. West, 222 U.S. 191, 198, 32 S.Ct. 42, 56 L.Ed. 159, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 592. That the vessel was enrolled and licensed under the laws of the United States did not remove it necessarily from the police power of the state. Anderson v. Pacific Coast Steamship Co., 225 U.S. 187, 32 S.Ct. 626, 56 L.Ed. 1047.
It remains to ascertain whether the United States has assumed jurisdiction over the inspection of such boilers as that now under consideration. Being used exclusively upon tide water and having thus a possible direct relation to coastwise and foreign commerce upon the high seas, plainly the entire subject might be regulated by the United States. See Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U.S. 379, 387, 24 L.Ed. 668. By 35 U.S. St. at Large, p. 428, c. 212, approved May 28, 1908 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1243), it was enacted by section 10 'that on and after January 1st, 1909, the local inspectors of the steamboats shall, at least once in every year, inspect the hull and equipment of every sea-going barge of one hundred gross tons or over, and shall satisfy themselves that such barge is of a structure suitable for the service in which she is to be employed, has suitable accommodations for the crew, and is in a condition to warrant the belief that she may be used in navigation with safety to life.'
It is argued that the 'equipment' which is to be inspected under this section refers only to those 'appliances' with which under section 11 of the same act 'every such barge shall be equipped,' viz., 'at least one life boat, at least one anchor with suitable chain and cable, and at least one life-preserver for each person on board,' and hence does not include boilers for moving the cargo. But this seems to us too cramped a construction. The duty imposed by section 10 upon the steamboat inspectors is not only to examine the hull and equipment, but also to certify that the barge...
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