Commonwealth v. Burnham
| Decision Date | 13 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15–P–826.,15–P–826. |
| Citation | 90 Mass.App.Ct. 483,60 N.E.3d 396 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Christopher J. BURNHAM. |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Cynthia M. Von Flatern, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
James Petersen for the defendant.
Present: WOLOHOJIAN, AGNES, & NEYMAN, JJ.
NEYMAN
, J.
The defendant, Christopher J. Burnham, was involved in a single-car accident, and indicted for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), subsequent offense. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge, claiming that the citation for OUI was not issued in compliance with G.L. c. 90C, § 2
. Following an evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge allowed the motion.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the issuance of a citation to the defendant, more than four and one-half months after the police officers had concluded their investigation, violated the provisions of G.L. c. 90C, § 2
, and mandated dismissal of the indictment. Where the defendant did not have prompt and definite notice of the offense for which he was charged, and the delay in issuing the citation was not justified under any of the exceptions to the statutory requirement to provide the citation at the time and place of the violation, dismissal was warranted.
Background. We summarize the judge's findings.1 In the early morning of November 24, 2013, Officers Kyle Gribi and Eric Alexander of the Easthampton police department arrived at the scene of a single-car accident. Officer Gribi, trained as an emergency medical technician, observed and attended to the driver (the defendant), who “was unresponsive, but later regained consciousness.” Officer Gribi stabilized the defendant's cervical spine and maintained his airway. Approximately ten minutes after the officers' arrival, an ambulance arrived and took the defendant to Baystate Medical Center (Baystate). The officers did not accompany the defendant to the hospital. The judge credited testimony that “neither officer detected any indicia of the defendant being intoxicated during their investigation of the scene.”
While at the scene, Officer Alexander learned that the defendant's license had been suspended, and Officer Gribi subsequently issued a citation against the defendant for “operating after suspension” and a “marked lanes” violation (the Easthampton charges).2 The officers' investigation “ended in good faith when Officer Gribi issued and caused to be mailed to the defendant a citation for marked lanes violation.”3
Three months later, on February 23, 2014, the defendant was arrested in Northampton for an unrelated incident and charged with OUI. Upon reviewing the Northampton OUI charge and inspecting the defendant's probation record, the prosecutor learned of the Easthampton charges still pending in Northampton District Court. The prosecutor initiated an independent investigation into the Easthampton charges and obtained the defendant's medical records from Baystate, relating to the treatment he received as a result of the earlier Easthampton incident.4 The medical records included a toxicology report that revealed that the defendant had an “ethanol level on the night of the Easthampton incident [that] translated to a blood alcohol concentration of 0.18 [per cent].” On April 16, 2014, the prosecutor relayed this information to Officer Gribi and instructed him to issue a citation for OUI to the defendant. That same day, Officer Gribi issued and delivered a citation for OUI to the defendant at his home.
Discussion. 1. Statutory framework. General Laws c. 90C, § 2
, as appearing in St. 1985, c. 794, § 3, commonly known as the “no-fix” law, provides in relevant part:
(emphasis added).
Thus, the statute mandates that citations be delivered to an alleged offender at the time and place of the violation, subject to three exceptions. Where, as here, the citation was not delivered at the accident scene, the Commonwealth bears the burden to establish the applicability of an exception. See Commonwealth v. Correia, 83 Mass.App.Ct. 780, 783, 989 N.E.2d 921 (2013)
. The Commonwealth asserts that the second and third exceptions applied to the present case and justified the delayed delivery. We analyze both, in turn, keeping in mind the two fundamental purposes of the statute: (1) prevention of “manipulation and misuse” of citations; and (2) “prompt and definite notice” to the alleged violator of the nature of the offense. Commonwealth v. Pappas, 384 Mass. 428, 431, 425 N.E.2d 323 (1981). In addition, there is no bright-line rule to ascertain whether a particular delay in issuing a citation is justified. Rather, “[e]ach case must be decided on its own peculiar facts.” Commonwealth v. Provost, 12 Mass.App.Ct. 479, 484, 426 N.E.2d 453 (1981).
2. The second exception. The second exception to the requirements of G.L. c. 90C, § 2
, excuses delayed delivery of a citation where “ additional time was reasonably necessary to determine the nature of the violation.” Pappas, supra. The Commonwealth contends that neither officer detected any indicia of intoxication from the defendant; thus, the nature of the violation was unclear, and additional time was reasonably necessary to investigate. Based on the prosecutor's investigation, facts justifying the OUI charge became apparent, which prompted the Commonwealth to immediately issue a citation to the defendant. Accordingly, the Commonwealth posits, the letter of the statute was satisfied.
The defendant counters that the Commonwealth's argument fails, because Massachusetts courts have applied the second exception in cases involving “continuing” or “ongoing” police investigations. He argues that, here, the investigation was not ongoing, as evidenced by the officers' admission that it had concluded at the accident scene, four and one-half months prior to the citation issuing. The Commonwealth does not challenge, in its brief or at oral argument, the notion that the second exception must involve an ongoing investigation. Instead, it claims that the prosecutor's review of the case and request for the defendant's medical records constituted an ongoing investigation.
We take this opportunity to clarify that the second exception speaks to “additional time ... reasonably necessary to determine the nature of the violation,” and does not contain the nomenclature “ongoing” or “continuing” investigation. See G.L. c. 90C, § 2
. Although our common law has interpreted the second exception, in some instances, to involve further investigative work in analyzing what is “reasonably necessary” within the statutory framework,5 our courts have not adopted a bright-line rule that an investigation must be continuous or ongoing to justify the application of the second exception, and we decline to do so here. The ongoing nature of an investigation may be a significant factor in discerning the reasonableness of any delay in issuing a citation,6 but neither its presence nor absence is dispositive of the issue. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barbuto, 22 Mass.App.Ct. 941, 942–943, 494 N.E.2d 33 (1986)
(). We continue to adhere to our precedent of deciding each case on its unique facts. See Provost, supra at 484, 426 N.E.2d 453.
The facts in the present case do not support the application of the second exception. The officers did not seek information from Baystate, nor did the circumstances at the scene present any indicia that the defendant was intoxicated. The officers admitted that they had concluded their investigation the day of the incident and, as the judge found, did not believe that “additional time was reasonably necessary to determine the nature of the violation.” The Commonwealth responds that although the officers had concluded their investigation, the prosecutor had not, as evidenced by the open case alleging operating after suspension and a marked lanes violation, and by the ensuing grand jury investigation. This argument is unpersuasive. Months had passed until the prosecutor, on a hunch spurred by the defendant's subsequent arrest in an unrelated matter, commenced an investigation regarding the defendant's potential intoxication on November 24, 2013. The information ultimately sought and obtained by the Commonwealth had been available all along. We agree with the judge's conclusion that “the defendant's subsequent arrest in Northampton did not provide previously unavailable information regarding the Easthampton incident; rather it was a coincidence that instigated the renewed, independent investigation by [the prosecutor].” Accordingly, the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that more time was reasonably necessary to determine the nature of the offense within the meaning of the second exception to G.L. c. 90C, § 2
.7
The shortcoming of the Commonwealth's argument is further apparent when we...
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...we do not disturb absent clear error, and supplement them with uncontroverted details from the record. Commonwealth v. Burnham, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 483, 484 n.1, 60 N.E.3d 396 (2016), citing Commonwealth v. Eckert, 431 Mass. 591, 592, 728 N.E.2d 312 (2000). Around 10:30 P.M. on April 19, 2014......
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...details from the record." Commonwealth v. O'Leary, 480 Mass. 67, 67-68, 101 N.E.3d 271 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. Burnham, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 483, 484 n.1, 60 N.E.3d 396 (2016). At approximately 10 P.M. on January 23, 2015, an accident involving two cars occurred in the area of Bedford S......
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...to base a reasoned decision whether citations should be issued and criminal complaints sought"). Contrast Commonwealth v. Burnham, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 483, 487–488 (2016) (affirming dismissal of a citation for operating under the influence where investigation was concluded at the scene withou......