Commonwealth v. Chase

• Decision Date: 13 May 1879
• Citation: 127 Mass. 7
• Parties: Commonwealth v. John Chase
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

127 Mass. 7

Commonwealth v. John Chase

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

May 13, 1879

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Suffolk. Indictment in two counts, on the St. of 1874, c. 372, § 115. The first count was as follows: "The jurors for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on their oath present, that John Chase, of said Boston, on the twenty-fifth day of October in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight, at said Boston, was the commander of a certain vessel, to wit, a tug-boat, then and there being in the waters of the Charles River, in said Boston; that Stephen H. Welch was then and there the superintendent, duly and legally appointed and qualified, of a certain drawbridge, to wit, the drawbridge of the Boston and Lowell Railroad Corporation, a corporation duly and legally established bye law in said Commonwealth, situate and being in the railroad of said corporation, and over the draw and the waters of said Charles River, there in said Boston, as aforesaid, and being there duly erected and legally maintained as such drawbridge by said corporation; that said Chase then and there made application to said Welch, as such superintendent, to pass the said draw with said tug-boat; that then and there, and at the same time, a second vessel, to wit, the schooner Fawn, also made application to said Welch, as such superintendent, to pass said draw; that then and there said Welch, having full power and authority so to do, then decided that said schooner had the priority of right then to pass said draw first and before said tug-boat, and then communicated said decision there to said Chase; that said Welch, as such superintendent, then began to open the drawbridge of said draw, and to prepare to pass said schooner Fawn through such draw, and before said tug-boat; that said Chase then and there, well knowing the decision as aforesaid of said Welch, and that said Welch then had there full power and authority to make said decision there as aforesaid, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully, fail to be governed, and refused to be governed by said decision, and attempted to pass his said tug-boat through said drawbridge first, and did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully, refuse, being by said Welch lawfully requested and directed so to do, to withdraw his said tug-boat to the rear and astern of said schooner, and then and there did wilfully and unlawfully threaten said Welch, as such superintendent, to interfere with said schooner, and to jam said schooner, and block up and impede said draw: against the peace of said Commonwealth and the form of the statute in such case made and provided."

The second count set forth substantially the same facts, and charged the defendant with obstructing the superintendent in the lawful performance of his duties.

In the Superior Court, before the jury was empanelled, the defendant moved to quash the indictment, for the following reasons: "1. It is not alleged in the indictment by whom the said Stephen H. Welch was appointed superintendent of the drawbridge. 2. It is not alleged in the indictment, with sufficient certainty, that the Boston and Lowell Railroad Corporation had then and there any legal right to build a railroad across Charles River, or to maintain a drawbridge over said river. 3. It is not alleged, with sufficient precision, in said indictment, that the defendant disobeyed any order then and there given by the said Stephen H. Welch, as to the priority of the right of the tug-boat to pass said draw. 4. The indictment does not set forth, with sufficient clearness and proper allegations, any offence under the statutes of this Commonwealth. 5. There is no averment in said indictment that the two counts in said indictment are different descriptions of the same offence." Colburn, J., overruled the motion; and the defendant excepted.

At the trial, the government, for the purpose of showing the authority of the Boston and Lowell Railroad Corporation to maintain a drawbridge over the waters of Charles River, referred to the St. of 1832, c. 87, authorizing the corporation to build such a bridge. There was evidence that the drawbridge had been built about fifteen or twenty years, and that it was built and had been kept in repair by the Boston and Lowell Railroad Corporation; that the draw and bridge consisted of a passage for vessels, through the railroad, about thirty-six feet wide, spanned by a movable bridge, which, when opened, swung up-stream of the river; that, from the draw, piers extended up-stream of the river, one on each side of the draw, the inner faces of the piers at their lower ends corresponding with the sides of the passage through the railroad, but diverged from each other somewhat as they advanced up-stream.

The superintendent of the drawbridge testified, that on October 25, 1878, the schooner Fawn, a sailing vessel, made application to pass the draw, and afterwards, but at about the same time, the defendant made application to pass the draw with a tug-boat propelled by steam; that the witness decided that the schooner had priority of right to pass the draw first and before the tug-boat, and that he made this decision without regard to the fact that the tug-boat was propelled by steam, and without regard to the provisions of the St. of 1872, c. 221, in relation to vessels propelled by steam on Charles River; and that, had not the schooner made application first, he should have allowed the tug-boat to pass the draw in about twenty minutes after her arrival.

It also appeared in evidence that the two vessels were about sixty or sixty-five feet from the drawbridge, and up Charles River but in the space between the piers, and remained at that distance for about three hours, during which a contest between the defendant and the superintendent was kept up, and the tug-boat was then allowed to pass the draw first, with the consent of the draw-tender, acting under the advice of the harbor-master. At the time these vessels were at said distance from the drawbridge, but in such position that the Fawn could not pass unless the tug either passed first or was run back, the draw-tender ordered the defendant to withdraw his tug-boat to the rear and astern...