Commonwealth v. Coggins
| Decision Date | 21 July 1949 |
| Citation | 87 N.E.2d 200,324 Mass. 552 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. MICHAEL F. COGGINS, JUNIOR. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
May 2, 1949.
Present: QUA, C.
J., DOLAN, RONAN SPALDING, & WILLIAMS, JJ.
Practice, Criminal New trial, Capital case, Appeal with assignment of errors. Constitutional Law, Due process of law. A murder case did not remain a "capital case" within G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c.
278, Section 33E St. 1939, c. 341, after a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree.
A refusal by a trial judge to receive oral testimony, instead of affidavits in support of a motion for a new trial in a criminal case was permissible Massachusetts practice and did not deprive the defendant of due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the
An assignment of error in a criminal case tried subject to G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 278, Sections 33A-33G, as amended, is ineffective if not based on a properly saved exception.
INDICTMENT, found and returned on April 8, 1947. The case was tried before, and motions for a new trial were heard by, Pinanski, J.
J. P. Donahue, for the defendant. L. C. Sprague, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
On November 14, 1947, the defendant and one Ralph P. Dupont were found guilty of murder in the second degree on an indictment which charged "that Ralph P. Dupont and Michael F Coggins, the younger of that name, on the first day of March in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and forty-seven at Lowell, in the County of Middlesex aforesaid, did assault and beat Mario Grimolizzi with intent to kill and murder him, and by such assault and beating did kill and murder said Mario Grimolizzi." The trial was subject to the provisions of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 278, Sections 33A-33G, as amended in Section 33E by St. 1939, c. 341. There was no claim of appeal filed by the defendant (Section 33B), and the assignments of error now before us relate to the hearing and disposal of two later motions for a new trial which were heard by the judge who presided at the trial.
The murder of which the defendant and his codefendant were convicted was committed in connection with an attempted armed robbery. The principal issue at the trial was the identification of the defendant as one of the two assailants of the victim Grimolizzi. On June 9, 1948, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial supported by affidavits filed on June 22, 1948, which were considered by the judge as though filed with the motion. See Rule 46 of the Superior Court (1932). Affidavits by Theresa Rutina, Doris Faulkner, Jane Sarmento, Gertrude Williams, Donald J. Coggins, and the defendant related to alleged false testimony given by Theresa Rutina at the trial in reference to admissions made to her by the defendant. Her affidavit contained a retraction of her former testimony. Affidavits by Edward Keating and John L. Fralick were to the effect that at the time of the murder the defendant was in their company at a place other than where the crime was committed. Affidavits of John E. Boyle, Stephen J. Doyle and Alfred J. Dupont, Junior, related to the failure of a witness for the Commonwealth, Maureen Gilday, at a time previous to the trial, to identify the defendant as one of the two assailants of Grimolizzi. At the trial she so identified him. An affidavit of the codefendant Ralph P.
Dupont contained a denial of the truth of the testimony of a police officer, Kulickowski, who testified at the trial as to statements made by the defendant in the police station. The motion for a new trial was denied after hearing and a "claim of exceptions" "to all the findings and rulings of this court wherein and whereupon the said defendant's `motion for new trial' was adversely affected and thereupon denied" was filed by the defendant. In this claim of exceptions he incorporated a motion that the case "with all matters appertaining thereto . . . be removed and transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court . . . forthwith," which motion we consider as intended to be a claim of appeal under Section 33B.
Thereafter on September 24, 1948, the defendant filed a second motion for a new trial supported by an affidavit of Theresa Rutina, similar in substance to the one she had filed in support of the first motion for a new trial, and one by George L. Merchant, one of the jurors at the trial, stating that as a juror he was influenced by the testimony of Theresa Rutina at the trial. This second motion was also denied after hearing, and the defendant filed claims of exceptions and appeal similar to those filed after the former hearing.
The appeals of the defendant from the denial of these two motions for new trial are before us accompanied by eleven assignments of error.
Assignments of error 1 to 4, inclusive, relate to the refusal by the judge, on request made by the defendant, to issue compulsory process to bring Ralph P. Dupont and Alfred J. Dupont, Junior, into court to testify at the hearing on the second motion. At that hearing the judge ruled that the evidence be submitted on affidavit. The fifth assignment of error relates to a refusal to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to bring Ralph P. Dupont and Alfred J. Dupont, Junior, before the court to testify at the hearing. Assignment of error 6 alleges error by the judge in refusing to hear oral testimony of Ralph P. Dupont and Alfred J. Dupont, Junior, and in ruling that their evidence must be presented by affidavit. Assignment of error 7 relates to the refusal to find and rule "as a matter of fact" that the statements of Theresa Rutina in her affidavit were true and that her testimony at the trial was perjured. Assignment of error 8 is similar to assignment 7. Assignment of error 9 is to the failure of the judge to find and rule that the statement of George L. Merchant in his affidavit was a true statement. Assignment of error 10 is to the failure of the judge to find and rule "that, as a matter of fact, the defendant was deprived of a fair trial as a result of the perjured testimony of Theresa Rutina." Assignment of error 11 is to the failure of the judge to find and rule that as a matter of fact the trial and conviction of the defendant was in violation of the defendant's constitutional right to due process of law.
The principles governing the hearing and disposition by a judge of the Superior Court of a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence have frequently been stated and need not be repeated. See Davis v. Boston Elevated Railway, 235 Mass. 482 . These principles apply to criminal as well as to civil cases. Commonwealth v Devereaux, 257 Mass. 391 , 395. Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403 , 407. A judge is not required to make findings of fact, and his disposal of the motion is to be guided only by the exercise of sound discretion, meaning "sound judicial discretion, enlightened by intelligence and learning, [and] controlled by sound principles of law." Davis v. Boston Elevated Railway, 235 Mass. 482 , 496-497. In hearing the motions in the present case the judge said that he would "assume that this murder case remains a `capital case,'" doubtless being influenced by the like assumption made by this court for the benefit of the defendant, but without decision, where a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree was returned on an indictment charging murder in the first degree, in several recent cases. [1] Accordingly he considered all of the affidavits presented by the defendant, without first determining whether they...
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