Commonwealth v. Devereaux

• Decision Date: 10 November 1926
• Citation: 257 Mass. 391
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. JOHN J. DEVEREAUX. SAME v. EDWARD J. HEINLEIN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

257 Mass. 391

COMMONWEALTH v. JOHN J. DEVEREAUX. SAME v. EDWARD J. HEINLEIN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

November 10, 1926

October 18, 1926.

Present: RUGG, C.

J., CROSBY CARROLL, WAIT, & SANDERSON, JJ.

Practice, Criminal New trial.

The granting of a new trial in capital cases on the ground of newly discovered evidence rests on sound judicial discretion.

A judge who presided at the trial of an indictment for murder, at which the defendant testified in his own behalf and there was not presented any evidence as to his mental condition, may well have been able to form a judgment as to legal responsibility of the defendant for crime, based upon common sense inferences and intelligent observation, more reliable as a practical guide to accomplishment of justice than the refined distinctions and technical niceties of alienists and experts in psychopathic inferiority; and, upon a motion by the defendant for a new trial, based upon alleged newly discovered evidence as to the defendant's mental condition and supported solely by affidavits of alienists and psychiatrists, the judge properly may find the affidavits not to be reliable and, in the exercise of his judicial discretion, properly may deny the motion.

It is proper for a judge, who presided at the trial of an indictment for murder upon the hearing of a motion for a new trial based on allegations of newly discovered evidence of the mental condition of the defendant, to examine and give weight to a report made and filed previous to the trial by the department of mental diseases under Section

100A, added to G.L.c. 123, by St. 1921, c. 415, and amended by St. 1923, c 331.

The fact that the question of insanity was not raised at the trial of an indictment for murder is no reason in and of itself for granting a motion for a new trial, although affidavits are presented in support of the motion having a tendency to show insanity; when such a motion is presented, it becomes the duty of the trial judge to determine whether there is sound ground for such a defence and whether "it would or ought to produce a different result in the minds of another intelligent jury"; and this is a matter for the trial judge to determine for himself in the exercise of sound discretion.

Three defendants separately indicted for murder were tried together and each was found guilty under G.L.c. 265, Sections 1, 17, upon evidence which showed that only one of them committed the homicide. Each filed a motion for a new trial based on allegations of newly discovered evidence that the perpetrator of the homicide was not mentally responsible at the time of the crime. The judge who heard the motion found that such defendant was responsible and denied all the motions. Held, that all three motions properly were denied.

THREE INDICTMENTS, found and returned on October 7, 1925, charging the defendants with the murder of one James H. Ferneau.

The indictments were tried before Fosdick, J., and the defendants were found guilty on November 29, 1925. Exceptions saved by the defendants at the trial were overruled in a decision reported 256 Mass. 387 . The defendants on June 16, 1926, were sentenced to die by electrocution in the week beginning August 8, 1926.

On August 10, 1926, the defendants filed the motions for a new trial described in the opinion. The motions were heard by the trial judge on August 12, 1926. The defendants presented affidavits; the Commonwealth presented none. Both the defendants' counsel and the district attorney, however, argued with respect to the report of the department of mental diseases, filed under Section 100A, added to G.L.c. 123, by St. 1921, c. 415, and amended by St. 1923, c. 331. The defendant asked for the following rulings in the case of Devereaux:

"1. Upon all the evidence the defendant is entitled to a new trial. "2. As a matter of law the evidence is sufficient as presented on the motion for a new trial to warrant a finding that Devereaux was insane at the time of the commission of the offence charged.

"3. The evidence presented on the motion for a new trial if believed and uncontradicted requires a finding that Devereaux was insane at the time of the commission of the offence charged.

"4. A new trial is necessary in this case in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

"5. Where a decisive or pertinent point affecting the substantial rights of a defendant in a criminal case has not been raised at the trial a new trial should be granted.

"6. If a defendant is insane at the time of the commission of a certain act with which act he is later criminally charged and convicted he is entitled to a new trial as a matter of law if the defence of insanity is not raised at the trial.

"7. The trial justice should as a matter of law grant a new trial to a defendant convicted of a crime if at the time of the commission of the crime the defendant was insane and if the defence of insanity was not interposed at his trial.

"8. The defence of insanity is a decisive and pertinent point affecting the substantial rights of a defendant charged with crime.

"9. A conviction of a person who was insane at the time of the commission of an offence is a miscarriage of justice."

The judge gave the second, third, eighth and ninth rulings, adding after the word "finding" in the second and third rulings, the words "by this court at this time," and refused to give the other rulings.

In the cases of Heinlein and McLaughlin, the defendants asked for the same rulings as those numbered 1-5, above set out, and also for the following rulings:

"6. Where several defendants are jointly tried for murder and are convicted upon evidence which disclosed that the fatal blows were struck by one under circumstances which would render the others equally responsible with him even though they had taken no part in the actual killing if the one who struck the fatal blows was insane at the time of the commission of the offence, the others are not chargeable with the murder.

"7. In the case at bar if at the time of the offence charged Devereaux was insane defendant is not guilty of murder in the first degree.

"8. If three defendants are jointly tried for murder in the first degree and are convicted, the defendant who struck the fatal blows and caused the death was insane at the time of the commission of the offence, his codefendants are entitled to a new trial if the defence of insanity is not raised at the trial.

"9. The defence of insanity is a decisive and pertinent point affecting the substantial rights of a defendant charged with crime and this applies to a case in which three defendants are jointly tried for the acts of a defendant who was insane.

"10. A conviction of two of three joint defendants tried together for the acts of a third codefendant who at the time of the commission of the offence charged is insane is a miscarriage of justice."

The judge made the same rulings as to the first five requests as he did in the Devereaux case, gave the sixth, ninth, and tenth rulings, and refused the seventh and eighth rulings.

The motions were denied. The defendants appealed and, on September 20, 1926, presented their assignment of errors.

F. Juggins, (M.

Morrill with him,) for the defendants.

A.K. Reading, District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

RUGG, C.J. These defendants were indicted and convicted of murder in the first degree after a trial free from error in law. 256 Mass. 387 . The defendants thereafter were sentenced to pay the penalty required by the statute. Then they severally filed motions for a new trial.

The motion filed by Devereaux, hereafter called the defendant, will be considered first. It is stated in that motion that evidence has been newly discovered to the effect in substance that he was insane and "absolutely irresponsible and not appreciative of the significance between right and wrong." The motion was accompanied by supporting affidavits. The motion was denied after hearing. The defendant appealed. The assignment of errors is founded on refusals to give several requests for rulings and on the denial of the motion. St. 1925, c. 279. No evidence as to the mental condition of this defendant was offered at the trial before the jury. From the report of the case when here at its earlier stage, it appears that the defendant testified as a witness in his own behalf at that trial.

The granting of a new trial in capital cases on the ground of newly discovered evidence rests on sound judicial discretion. "It is a power to be used sparingly for the protection of innocence not to screen the guilty." Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 515 , 536, 550. Commonwealth v. Borasky, 214 Mass. 313 , 322. Commonwealth v. Russ, 232 Mass. 58 , 83.

Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12 , 25, 32, 33. The governing rules of law as to motions for a new trial in capital cases are the same as in civil and in other criminal cases. Commonwealth v. Madeiros, 257 Mass. 1 . Matter of Sleeper, 251 Mass. 6 , 22. In view of the controlling principles of law, which are amplified in these decisions and which need not be repeated, it is plain that there was no error of law in the refusal to give requests for rulings, and no abuse of judicial discretion in denying the motion. Commonwealth v. Morrison, 134 Mass. 189 . Davis v. Boston Elevated Railway, 235 Mass. 482 , 496, 497.

The judge who denied the motion presided over the jury trial, saw the defendant, heard him testify in his own behalf, and of course watched his apparent mental...