Commonwealth v. Deitrick

• Decision Date: 29 April 1907
• Docket Number: 341
• Parties: Commonwealth v. Deitrick, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

66 A. 1007

218 Pa. 36

Commonwealth v. Deitrick, Appellant

No. 341

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

April 29, 1907

Argued March 4, 1907

Appeal, No. 341, Jan. T., 1906, by defendant, from judgment of O. & T. Montour Co., Feb. T., 1906, No. 1, on verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree in case of Commonwealth v. Peter Deitrick. Reversed.

Indictment for murder. Before EVANS, P.J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the case.

Error assigned was portion of the charge quoted in the opinion of the Supreme Court.

Judgment reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded.

Fred Ikeler, with him Wm. Kase West, for appellant. -- The burden of proof did not shift from the commonwealth to the prisoner Com. v. McKie, 67 Mass. 61; Meyers v. Com., 83 Pa. 131; Com. v. Kilpatrick, 204 Pa. 218.

H. M. Hinckley, with him Chas. P. Gearhart, district attorney, for appellee, cited: Meyers v. Com., 83 Pa. 131; Williams v. Com., 29 Pa. 102; Kilpatrick v. Com., 31 Pa. 198; Reeves v. D., L. & W.R.R. Co., 30 Pa. 454; Alexander v. Com., 105 Pa. 1; Shovlin v. Com., 106 Pa. 369; Rudy v. Com., 128 Pa. 500; McCloskey v. Bells Gap R.R. Co., 156 Pa. 254; Com. v. Mika, 171 Pa. 273; Com. v. Bowman, 171 Pa. 448; Com. v. Washington, 202 Pa. 148.

Before MITCHELL, C.J., BROWN, MESTREZAT, ELKIN and STEWART, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE ELKIN:

At the trial in the court below on an indictment charging murder, under the plea of not guilty, the defendant relied upon the defense of accidental killing. The learned trial judge charged the jury as follows: "We further say to you that the burden is upon the defendant Deitrick to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing of Jones was purely accidental before he should be acquitted upon that ground," and this instruction has been assigned for error.

Under the plea of not guilty the defendant may show that the killing was accidental, and if the testimony satisfies the jury that the killing was the result of an accident, they should return a verdict of not guilty. We are not familiar with any authority which holds that when such a defense is set up the burden rests upon the defendant to show that the killing was accidental beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a rule would shift the burden of proof from the commonwealth, whose duty it is to establish the guilt of the defendant in all cases beyond a reasonable doubt. The defense of accidental killing is clearly distinguishable from that of an alibi or insanity, in which cases it has been held that the burden of proving such defenses is on the defendant. No Pennsylvania cases have been called to our attention in which the exact question raised by this appeal has been decided, but the rule recognized by many text-writers and established in some jurisdictions is that the burden in homicide cases where the defense of accidental killing is set up does not shift, but rests on the commonwealth to show that the killing was willful and intentional.

In State v. McDaniel, 68 So. Car. 304, the court said "But we do not think that a defense that the homicide was accidental was in any sense an affirmative defense. It is distinguishable from self-defense as a plea which admits an intentional killing and sets up as a justification a necessity to kill in order to save the accused from death or serious bodily harm, whereas a defense of homicide by accident denies that the killing was intentional." In State v. Cross, 42 West Va. 253, the rule was laid down in the following language: "Accidental killing is not such matter of defense as throws on the accused the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence. It is the duty of the state to allege and prove that the killing, though done with a deadly weapon, was intentional or willful. But when the evidence taken as a whole raises a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to whether the...